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PREFACE 
The essays in this volume deal with material and conceptual aspects 
of the radical transfonnations that have occurred in South Pacific 
socities in the colonial and post-colonial eras. Topics that are 
discussed include the sometimes disastrous impact of development 
proj ects , the effects of increasing political and economic 
incorporation, the adaptability and viability of indigenous cultures, 
and the biases in Western representations of Pacific history and 
change. The five contributions depict historical trajectories in 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and 
the Polynesian islands. In an introductory chapter I highlight and 
elaborate on the central themes of the following essays. 
The authors share a critical perspective on Western material and 
intellectual involvement in the Pacific and they emphasize the need 
for reflection, dialogue and political engagement. Four of the 
authors are leading Western anthropologists with long-term 
involvement in the region; the fifth author is a distinguished 
Pacific Islander who assesses the colonial impact from a Pacific 
point of view. 
The five contributors were invited to deliver keynote addresses 
during the First  European Colloquium on Pacific  Studies 
organized by the Centre for Pacific Studies in Nijmegen on 17-19 
December 1 992. The general theme of the conference was 
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'Transformation and tradition in the South Pacific' and more than 
1 20 scholars had gathered to listen to and discuss fifty papers. 
The Centre for Pacific Studies maintains close institutional ties 
with the Department of Anthropology in the Research School of 
Pacific Studies of The Australian National University. As a 
graduate of the latter institution I am pleased that this volume is 
published as a joint venture, thus facilitating distribution in the 
Pacific. 
I am grateful to Michael Young for advice and assistance in the 
editing process, Paula Harris for her careful copy-editing, Margaret 
Tyrie for her skilful word processing, Natalie Spratt for artfully 
designing the cover and Judith Wilson for overseeing the last stages 
of publication. In Nijmegen I wish to thank Ricky Breedveld and 
Marlies B erbers for typing two of the contributions and B art 
Hoogveld for taking the photographs during the conference. 
The work on this volume was done while I was a post-doctoral 
fellow of the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of 
Tropical Research (WOTRO). I thank this institution for its financial 
support and the Department of Archaeology and Anthropology at 
The Australian National University for granting me a Visiting 
Fellowship. 
On 7 May 1 993, less than five months after presenting his 
keynote address in Nijrnegen, Roger Keesing died tragically and 
prematurely from a heart attack. To commemorate his great 
achievements as an anthropologist and his deep concern about 
developments in the Pacific this volume is dedicated to him. 
Ton Otto 
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EMPTY TINS FOR LOST TRADITIONS? 
THE WEST'S MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE PACIFIC 
Ton Otto 
INTRODUCTION 
Political decolonization began late in the South Pacific.  Most 
island countries attained political independence only in the 1 960s 
and 1970s. A few nations are still in bonds of colonial dependency 
whereas some other popul ations have  become indigenous 
minorities encapsulated in state structures dominated by immigrant 
majorities . In spite of their late political evolution as modem states 
most Pacific peoples have had a long history of contact with the 
West. The impact of this contact has been pervasive and has 
irreversibly changed the face of the Pacific. Histories of  migration, 
technological innovation, and conquest predate Western presence 
in the South Seas and we should be careful to avoid a Eurocentric 
perspective on the Pacific's past which, in its most crude form ,  
identifies the beginning o f  history proper with the start of 
European exploration and documentation .  However, the 
transformations during the past few centuries, the extent of which 
cannot be easily exaggerated, have incorporated the populations of 
the Pacific into one evolving world system of political and 
economic interdependence: local history has become part of world 
history.  
2 EMPfY TINS RJR LOST TRADIDONS? 
In their contact with the West, Pacific Islanders have mostly been 
'at the receiving end' , as Pokawin phrases it in the final essay of this 
volume. They saw explorers land on their beaches and march into 
their valleys ; they met with traders who wanted beche-de-mer or 
coconuts in exchange for beads and nails ; they watched planters 
occupy their lands; they were defenceless against the soldiers who 
came to protect the planters and traders; they li stened to the stories 
of missionaries; and, finally, they encountered anthropologists who 
came to record their stories. It would be mistaken, however, to 
depict the Islanders only as passive victims of developments 
beyond their control. They confronted the new events according to 
their own cultural convictions and they manipulated the new 
circumstances to suit their own interests, sometimes by successfully 
playing colonial agents off against each other. The issue of 
indigenous agency is an important one and I will return to it 
below. It is evident, nevertheless, that the initiative and the impetus 
to the colonial transformati ons derived from Western 
expansionism. 
It is beyond the scope of this introduction to analyse the 
dynamics of the Western expansion and it suffices to note that the 
process was propelled by multifarious and varying interests and 
motives . Knowledge about the existence of South Sea islands and 
the great South Land (Terra Australis) was provided by explorers 
from the sixteenth century onwards. However, serious colonial 
settlement commenced late , for most regions only in the nineteenth 
century. Apparently the islands had been considered too far away 
and econom ic profits too marginal. Only when the established 
empi res were scrambling to occupy the left-over regions , 
presumably more for strategic than for economic reasons , was the 
Pacific finally divided up into colonial territories (see Russier 
1 905). Strategic occupation and economic exploitation were 
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accompanied by another kind of expansion: that of Christianity, 
the predominant Western religion. This expansion was often 
accomplished at the cost of great personal endurance and even 
sacrifice by both Western and indigenous missionaries. However 
respectable their motives and however great their  concern for local 
populations, this should not blind us to the fact that the missions 
provided an especially powerful ideological justification of  
colonialism. 
With the way prepared by pacification and regular transport 
facilities, the Pacific also saw other kinds of visitors, who were not 
primarily interested in economic gain or ideological conversion. 
Rather, these travellers were drawn by the exotic l ifestyles of 
Pacific Islanders and by the intricate artefacts they produced .  
Whether they came as  collectors, artists, tourists or  anthropologists, 
these travellers had one thing in common. Their interest concerned 
the indigenous cultures in their 'pristine' state , untouched by 
colonial influences. The irony of the situation was that while other 
agents of colonialism were engaged in irreversibly changing the 
Pacific societies, these latecomers on the scene wanted to preserve 
an ahistorical , tradition-bound, 'primitive' society that had in fact 
never existed. Following the requirements of their own intellectual 
projects , they converted living realities into ossified images which 
were then reproduced in books or exhibitions.  They thus added 
the insult of intellectual appropriation to the injury of colonial 
exploitation. 
Of course, this image is black and white and leaves out m any 
shades of grey. The development of anthropology in the Pacific, 
for example, has not been as independent of material colonial 
interests as the above sketch suggests. Not only was the colonial 
situation a precondition for the conduct of field· research, but an 
important part of anthropological research has actually been 
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carried out in the service of colonial administrative interests. 
Applied anthropologists, as they are often called, were interested in 
the practical issues of cultural change and their expertise was called 
upon to facilitate the process of modernization under colonial 
control. The majority of anthropologists , however, enjoyed a 
greater intellectual independence since they  were based in 
universities and museums. They freely engaged in the intellectual 
debates of their time,  such as those concerning the evolution of 
hum an society and the development of culture . These 
anthropologists provided the images of exotic 'others' which the 
dialectics of Western intellectual development required. As a result, 
contemporary Pacific peoples were sometimes depicted as (clues 
to) stages on an evolutionary ladder leading to Western 
civilization. I The same images, however, were also used to analyse 
the negative effects of modernization and to criticize Western 
impact on Pacific Island peoples . Intellectual development is never 
linear and it is important to realize that the same images which in 
certain contexts serve oppressive goals may also give openings to 
critical self-awareness. 
In the post-colonial era, which in some parts of the Pacific has 
not yet begun, the interests of the West have remained basically the 
same. Large Western states are concerned about their strategic 
positions and use economic pressure to achieve continuing access 
to tiny Pacific countries. They also misuse the Pacific area to test 
their deadly weapons. Western and Asian companies have an avid 
interest in the natural resources of the Pacific region. They are 
mining the minerals , harvesting the tropical rainforests, and 
overfishing the seas at an unprecedented and possibly catastrophic 
scale. Are they leaving the next generation only 'empty tins' ,  as 
Keesing suggests in his essay? Anthropologists and other romantic 
travellers are still interested in resources of another kind : the 
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traditions of  Pacific  Islanders . These traditions seem to be 
disappearing as fast as the natural resources . At the same time an 
indigenous interest in, and even celebration of, the 'age-old' 
traditions has emerged. Subsumed under the heading of 'the 
pol itics  of trad ition' thi s indigenous pro cess o f  cultural 
objectificati on and appropriation of Western images has 
constituted a new field of interest for anthropological research. 
The Pacific is changing and is doing so fast. Pacifi c  Islanders 
have achieved knowledge of Western ways and are applying this 
knowledge skilfully . They point to continuing econom ic 
exploitation and intellectual appropriation and they demand 
respect and recompense . The following essays provide the personal 
views of five  people who have been closely involved in 
developments in the South Pacific.  Four of them are Western 
anthropologists, each with decades of research commitment to one 
or more Pacific countries. The fifth author is a Pacific Islander 
who has been intellectually and practically immersed in the 
transformations , both as a scholar and a politician .  In diverging 
ways the authors take stock of various aspects of the m aterial and 
intellectual interaction between the West and the Pacific. 
CENTRAL THEMES 
By way of introduction to the concerns of the following essays I 
have selected several themes which in my reading constitute the 
central issues from which the arguments of the various authors 
evolve .  I have organized these issues under three headings: 
'Dependency, exploitation and agency', 'Tradition and innovation' 
and '(Self-)criticism and dialogue' .  
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Dependency, Exploitation and Agency 
Although political independence is now a fact for most South 
Pacific countries, economic and cultural dependency i s  greater 
than ever before .  As a result of the increasing reliance on Western 
industrial and even agricultural products, the Pacific Islands have 
become part of the world economic system, forced to sell whatever 
resources they have in order to obtain the goods they need. In 
most cases their economic base is small and this makes them 
dependent on the continuation of foreign aid and on remittances 
from migrant citizens . This  economic dependency clearly 
undermines their political autonomy, which runs the risk of being 
corrupted. Modern means of communication have established an 
appetite for Western cultural products . Video tapes, frequently of 
dubious quality, are being viewed in many Pacific villages with the 
help of generator-powered video sets. Missionization and modem 
education continue to propagate Western models of thought in 
more formal ways . The processes of economic and cultural 
encapsulation irreversibly determine the options available to 
Pacific Islanders to shape their futures. 
Increasing dependency is linked to exploitation by Western 
business. As some of the authors justifiably remark, 'development' 
is often little more than the adaptation of local institutions and 
economies to better suit Western interests; it is a post-colonial 
euphemism for economic exploitation. However, exploitation does 
not only occur between the Pacific and the West, it has increasingly 
become a phenomenon internal to Pacific economies. Local elites 
with access to state and business power are consolidating and 
e�panding their positions thereby enlarging social inequality and 
contributing to the formation of national and even supra-national 
economic classes. 
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Increasing dependency is also accompanied by the loss of 
control that Pacific Islanders have to shape their own lives. 
International market forces cannot be influenced by tiny nation 
states with limited resources , nor have local communities much 
impact on international flows of information and cultural styles .  
The process of colonization, initiated by Western agents, has seen 
the gradual transformation of autonomous and autarkical tribal 
groups into dependent citizens and consumers. The loss of control 
has undoubtedly engendered psychological problems such as 
alienation and concomitant social problems of anomie and 
rascalism. However, it is a mistake to deny Pacific Islanders agency 
in the changes their societies have undergone. As Keesing and 
Godelier show in their essays , there have been choices in the past, 
however limited, and Pacific leaders have therefore been partly 
complicit in the developments described. 
Lest this story of dependency, exploitation and alienation 
becomes one-sided in i ts gloomy perspective, it is  important to 
note some signs of opposite trends. In spite of increasing 
dependency some Pacific economies are doing well according to 
Western standards. With a real growth rate of around 9 per cent in 
1 992,2 Papua New Guinea's formal economy is experiencing rapid 
expansi on. Economic exploitation, although widespread and 
possibly even increasing, is also successfully controlled by 
government measures and conscientious officers. Manus Provincial 
Government, for example, has recently reduced the logging harvest 
volume to about one-third of previous allocations in order to 
maintain sustainable yields. The premier reported that a Malaysian 
logging company had m ade an attempt to bribe him and his 
forestry minister. 3 Western cultural models and knowledge not 
only contribute to the alienation of local groups from their own 
traditions, they are also appropriated and used in combination with 
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local wisdom to contain alienation and to create alternative cultural 
and social fonns. Manus Province may again serve as an example 
since its government has embarked on an ambitious plan of 
'integral human development' denying the primacy of economic 
objectives. 
Tradition and Innovation 
The concept of tradition has recently attracted a great deal of  
scholarly attenti on. 4 I t  is  not the place here to  attempt to 
summarize the current debate. I will selectively di scuss those 
aspects that are relevant to the following essays. The word tradition 
is basically used in two different ways .. First, closely following the 
meaning of the Latin root, it refers to the customs of a society 
which have been handed down from one generation to the next. 
Tradition in this sense does not necessarily presuppose a conscious 
awareness on the part of those adhering to the tradition. It is a 
'lived in' reality which assumes an aspect of naturalness to the 
participants. Therefore ,  in  this usage , tradition i s  almost 
synonymous with the concept of culture. Second, tradition has also 
come to denote a conscious objectification of culture. Selected 
parts of a culture are constructed as 'traditional' in order to imbue 
them with greater authoritative force or to use them as marks of 
distinction. I will discuss some implications of both meanings, 
beginning with the first. 
When contrasted with the concept of modernity , the noun 
tradition invokes the adjectives 'static' and 'conseivative'. Traditions 
are often seen as hampering rational development. The opposition 
thus constructed has been used to distinguish between two different 
kinds of societies: Western, modem, developing or 'hot' societies as 
opposed to primitive, 'traditional' , static or 'cold' societies. In this 
view, the latter have to be awakened from their traditional 'Sleeping 
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Beauty' slumber by the touch of Western civilization, which will 
push them into an irreversible process of 'acculturation' . Although 
this  conceptual image is persistent, it has been sufficiently 
disproved by modem scholarship. The image of a primitive society 
dominated by its static traditions is utterly misleading. Whereas the 
actual speed of cultural change may vary, it has become evident 
that cultures or traditions are always in flux. They adapt to new 
circumstances , import new elements from outside, or change by the 
internal process of cultural invention, fuelled by competition and 
contradictions of meaning and interest. Tradition in the first sense, 
then, as 'lived in' culture , refers to a 'living' reality which may 
perhaps serve to stabilize soci al relations by renderi ng them 
conventional but does not ossify them. 
An important part of the 'tradition' of Pacific societies, referred 
to in the following essays, consi sts of their various forms of 
subsistence agriculture . These are 'traditional ' because they are 
based on the accumulated experience and wisdom of generations 
of practitioners. However, these traditions have always been open 
to incorporate new crops , tools and techniques. As Keesing and 
Pokawin argue, it is important that Pacific Islanders build on this 
base of 'subsistence affluence', not abandon it. Undoubtedly, the 
majority of the population will have to rely on subsistence forms 
of agriculture for some time to come. Where people have given up 
this base - for example , by using all their land for cash crops -
they have voluntarily enslaved themselves to the uncontrollable 
forces of the world market and industrial politics. 
Another cruci al aspect of tradition, which may be classified as 
economic in Western terms, is the way in which products are 
redistributed. Numerous obligations to support kin and affines and 
to partake in reciprocal exchange relationships not only cement a 
network of social relations but also ensure that everyone has access 
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to goods. In the context of modernization these 'traditional' 
exchange mechanisms may lead to a massive redistribution of 
urban wealth, collected by migrants, into rural areas (Carrier and 
Carrier 1989). Migrant workers feel strong pressure of obligation 
to support their village kin in exchange activities lest they 
themselves lose status and access to village resources. As Keesing 
notes in his paper, this complex of reciprocal dependency 
organized through kin and village ties constitutes the richness of 
Melanesian sociality. 
Traditions, as is implied in the name, depend on transmission in 
order to survive. In so-called oral cultures there is, therefore, a 
greater risk that whole sections of traditional knowledge vanish; for 
example, when a generation loses interest or consciously rejects 
some part of their culture. Ethnographic description is a way to 
preseive as much as possible of the variety of cultural traditions, 
and thus of human experimentation, in a way that allows for future 
consultation. As some of the essays suggest, cultural traditions, 
whether living or recorded, can be seen as repositories of values 
and models of sociality. Pacific Islanders may rely on the rich 
resources of their still-living traditions to find alternative and 
innovative solutions to today's problems. As Keesing speculates, 
these solutions may prove essential not only for their own survival 
but also for that of the West. 
In its second meaning tradition refers to an objectified image of 
practices which are constructed as typical of the culture of a 
particular society. The scholarly discussion about tradition 
received new impetus by the obscivation that these objectified 
'traditions' do not need to be continuous with the past (Hobsbawn 
and Ranger 1 983). They may in fact be relative1y new practices so 
that their traditionalness is 'invented'. The use of the term 
'invention' in this context has caused a great deal of confusion as 
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well as  political debate. For instance, the word may carry the 
connotation of inauthenticity: invented or spurious traditions are 
juxtaposed to 'genuine' ones. The political loading of this  
connotation is  obvious. It  is based 0n the contradiction inherent in 
the concept of invented traditions: if traditions are not really of the 
past then they lose their purported authority. However, in much 
scholarly debate, invention is used in a different sense, that is, as 
cognate to construction . This usage may be traced back to 
Wagner's powerful book, The invention of culture ( 198 1 ), in which 
he argues that 'culture' and also 'a particular cultural description' 
are inventions of the ethnographer. This kind of invention is in 
fact a universal process of cultural construction which does not 
create cultural meanings de novo but is grounded in conventional 
and negotiated values. In this sense traditions are always invented, 
whether they are 'lived in' or objectified, and, consequently, the 
discussion about authenticity assumes the character of a red 
herring (cf. Jolly 1 992; Linnekin 1992). 
It remains important, though, to investigate the circumstances 
under which processes of objectification occur as it is mistaken to 
relate these exclusively to the context of colonization. The 
objectification of certain cultural traits to mark a separate identity 
from neighbouring groups is a well-documented practice among 
Melanesi an peoples (Schwartz 1 975).  However, under the 
conditions of colonization, with extreme inequalities of power and 
wealth, the objectification of culture assumed new forms. The 
opposition between colonizer and tho se colonized led to an 
awareness of commonalities between indigenous traditions and 
thus to a generalization of 'our ways' as opposed to 'their ways'. It 
also resulted in the valuation of tradition, seen as whole, either as 
positive, in opposition to Western influence (Keesing 1 992), or as 
negative, in contrast to the coveted goal of modernization (Otto 
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1992; Thomas 1992). In the latter case indigenous reform 
movements sometimes emerged aiming at the abolition or 
'inversion' of tradition. 
A common aspect of the different varieties of cultural 
objectification under colonialism was that they were a means for 
those who were colonized to come to tenns with and contest their 
subordinate position. Tradition was either used as an emblem of  
positive identification and political motivation or it was radically 
rejected in an attempt to become equal to the colonizers on their 
own terms. In the period of political decolonization tradition 
became a symbol of urbanized elites to assert the common identity 
of the nations they were trying build. Tradition then functioned 
both as a reason for demanding political liberation from outside 
domination and as a means of creating political unity within. In the 
same way, Fourth World nations, like the Australian Aborigines 
and the New Zealand Maori , have been trying to assert their 
political and economic rights within the context of a larger state. 
They invoke tradition to reclaim land and to demand a certain 
autonomy. Although tradition is thus used to forge a unity where 
there was none, it may be equally mobilized to emphasize local 
differences when political secession is on the agenda. The events in 
Bougainville , Papua New Guinea, are a recent example of this. At 
the village level traditions continue to be deployed to demarcate 
the identities of local groups or competing political parties . In the 
study of objectification, therefore, it is of primary importance to 
distinguish between these various levels and contexts (see 
Tonkinson 1993). 
Objectified tradition may not only be a vehicle of psychological 
and political liberation for oppressed groups; it can also be 
appropriated by local elites to assert and 'naturalize' their priviliged 
positions . If the objectification of tradition is used to maintain 
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inequality and to suppress moves for political reform , it may be 
characterized as an ideology of traditionalism comparable to 
similar conservative ideologies which have prevailed in European 
history (see Lawson n.d.). In relation to outsiders the concept of 
tradition m ay also be used in an oppressive and morally 
objectionable way. I refer in particular to the denial of some 
political rights to certain categories of citizens on the basis of race 
or ethnicity. In some contexts traditionalism can shift rapidly from 
being anti -coloni al to being anti -migrant. With respect to 
expatriate research the concept of traditional culture is sometimes 
invoked by local eli tes to claim an exclusive right to the 
representation (and even an exclusive capacity for the 
understanding) of their own culture . By grounding rights and 
knowledge in ethnicity and even 'blood-ties' , the ideology of 
traditionalism assumes dangerous aspects of cultural mystification 
and racism. 
In addition to the various political uses of objectified tradition, 
the concept also functions in an economic context. In particular, it 
is used where it can provide an added value to commodities,  
notably artefacts and tourist travel. Products of indigenous 
handicraft are more attractive to buyers if they are assumed to be 
traditional . And tourists are foremost interested to see and 
experience 'stone-age culture', 'age-old customs' ,  and 'authentic 
lifestyles' . In the touri sm and artefact business expatriate 
entrepreneurs and local agents share a complicit interest in 
sustaining dreams of primitivism and exoticism. These spurious 
images are economic commodities which can be sold at high 
prices. Unfortunately, most of the profits still end up in Western 
pockets . 
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(Self-)criticism and Dialogue 
All the authors in this volume share a critical attitude in their 
work as scholars. Their criticisms concern various aspects of the 
relationship between the Pacific and the West. Evidently the 
enormous and often exploitative impact of the West on Pacific 
Island societies is a primary focus of such scrutiny, exemplified by 
all of the essays that follow. This criticism is often extended, 
however, to include not only the West's impact on other cultures 
but also the nature of Western society itself. Again, all of the 
authors have assumed a critical distance towards Western culture, 
which allows them to see both positive and negative aspects . A 
special case of the West's influence is the work of researchers 
themselves. Guiart critically reflects on the concepts that have been 
used , showing how Western models and research traditions have 
biased anthropological research. Keesing is  concerned that 
anthropologists should use their knowledge of local situations to 
speak up against destructive developments and exploitation, while 
Howard ponders about ways to decolonize Pacific historiograpy. 
Finally, academic criticism may be directed against developments 
in the Pacific which cannot be reduced to Western agency, in 
particular the exploitation of Pacific Islanders by Pacific Islanders. 
Howard takes a stand against moral relativism and Keesing has on 
several occasions addressed the ways in which tradition may be 
used as an ideology of repression (Keesing 1 982 , 1989) . 
As part of a self-critical anthropology it is important to reflect 
on the grounds for continuing to do research in the Pacific. From 
the point of view of a developing discipline interested in the scope 
of human cultural variation, the Pacific wil1 remain an important 
area for research in spite of the current process of globalization of 
Western culture. As is evidenced by contemporary research , 
participation in the universal flows of cultural information does not 
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mean that Pacific Islanders will forfeit their specific identities. As 
always they will ' invent culture' by adopting, incorporating, 
adapting and recreating foreign elements, thereby producing 
unique constellations of meaning and practice . This process of 
cultural change is at the very heart of present academic interests . 
The anthropological study of cultural models, cultural change 
and culture production is, like any other form of knowledge, not 
'value free' as the old positivist ideal would have it. In his essay 
Pokawin emphasizes that this knowledge can be used both to 
oppress and to assist Pacific Islanders in developments they opt for 
themselves. Although he is critical of much of the research that has 
been done, he has no doubt that anthropological knowledge is a 
valuable resource which can be used by Pacific Islanders to their 
own advantage, provided that the information is presented in an 
ethically and politically acceptable way. 5 With this advice in mind, 
anthropologists should see it as their task to do their research work 
as well as they can, while avoiding bias stemming from foreign or 
local interests . This is not the same as 'value-free' research: research 
workers always operate in a political field and it is their prime 
responsibility to be aware of this. In the questions they ask, in the 
methods they apply and in the ways they present their results, 
researchers have to consider the implications of their investigations 
and to be prepared to confront ethical choices. The results of 
anthropological research may not always please local leaders, but, 
as Howard affirms, it is better to risk the denial of research entry 
than to compromise academic and ethical standards. 
An important raison d'etre for anthropological research has 
always been that it allows us to take a more distanced perspective 
on our own culture . Knowledge of other cultures implies this 
reflexivity since it is impossible to describe a foreign culture 
without (implicit or explicit) comparison with our own categories. 
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The confrontation between Western and indigenous concepts and 
practices lies at the heart of the anthropological project. This 
means that if anthropology is done well, it will provide a strong 
base for cultural critique. If it is not, it will only reaffirm existing 
models and images . In practice it may be difficult to distinguish 
between good and bad anthropology as we depend on the forms of 
ethnographic rhetoric in which it is  expressed. However, a 
sustained dialogue with the bearers of a culture may provide an 
additional mechanism of control. Self-criticism and dialogue are 
the two keywords for a relevant anthropology which is acceptable 
to and useful for the populations studied. Only in this way can the 
process of intellectual assimilation and appropriation be arrested 
and reversed. 
Reciprocity is often described as one of the principal organizing 
mechanisms in Pacific societies . It should also apply to the 
intellectual engagement of scholars with their field of study. 
However, I do not support the presentation of material tokens as a 
return for co-operation in a research project. I am not referring 
here to the accepted practice of anthropologists to share their 
material belongings in locally accepted patterns of exchange with 
the people among whom they live .  I mean the exaggerated 
demands for compensation that are sometimes reported, be it in the 
form of high research fees or in the form of development projects. 
It is laudable if anthropologists are concerned to find and supply 
money for local projects (as Roger Keesing has done). However, 
the value of their research (not least for the local population) 
should not be measured against the success they have in building 
community centres and the like. Their projects should be 
conducted in such a way that the people studied perceive it as 
beneficial to their own lives and that of their children. 
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CON1RIBUTORS AND CON1RIBUTIONS 
The contributors to this volume all have hi stories of genuine 
concern for local populations and of a critical attitude towards the 
di scipline of anthropology . Thei r articles represent research 
undertaken in the Papua New Guinea Highlands and Lowlands, in 
the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and the Polynesian 
i slands .  B efore characteri zing and summari zing the five 
contributions I will briefly introduce the authors , thereby 
privileging Stephen Pokawin as the only Pacific Islander and non­
anthropologist. 
Mr. Pokawin i s  a Papua New Guinean, born in Manus,  who 
received part of hi s university training abroad (he holds a Master 
of Arts degree in Political Science from McGill University , 
Montreal) . Having worked as a university lecturer and a politician, 
he has developed a criti cal but balanced view of Western 
involvement in the Pacific. As a young radical scholar he wrote 
that the best thing Australia could do for Papua New Guinea was to 
reduce its financial aid to the country .6 And one of the first policy 
acts he undertook when elected as Premier of Manus Province in 
1985 was to institute a Provincial Research Committee whose task it 
was to formulate research priorities and critically assess the value 
of research projects for the province. The committee rejected some 
foreign research applications . However, the Manus Government led 
by Pokawin does not object to expatriate research involvement per 
se. As Pokawin has stressed on several occasions, there are clear 
benefits for Manus and Papua New Guinea from anthropological 
and other social research, be it in the field of education or in the 
field of social and economic development. A first requirement, 
however, is that researchers are sensitive to ethical and political 
issues . 
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Moving from the university to politics, Pokawin exposed 
himself to the radical test of trying to put into practice the ideas he 
developed as a scholar in political science. He has gained national 
recognition as a political innovator for his initiatives in the fields of 
education and government organization, focusing on integral 
hum an development and a fair representation of village 
communities. Nor does he eschew political opposition and conflict. 
In the field of forestry he successfully resi sted national 
government policy measures which his provincial government 
considered detrimental to the sustenance of the province's natural 
resources . More recently, he has opposed strong moves to abolish 
the provincial government system , fearing that this would give 
disproportionate power to national politicians . His landslide victory 
in the recent provincial elections not only testified to his 
unequalled populari ty as Premier but may perhaps also be 
interpreted as a vote of popular support for his position in the 
provincial government debate. 
The other four authors do not need much introduction to an 
anthropological readership. Each one of them is an accomplished 
anthropologist who has made a major contribution to Pacific 
studies. The late Roger Keesing was professor and head of the 
Department of Anthropology in the Research School of Pacific 
Studies at The Australian National University for more than fifteen 
years until he accepted a chair of anthropology at McGill 
University in Montreal in 1 990. which he held until his recent 
death. He began his fieldwork among the Kwaio of Malaita in the 
Solomon Island s in 1962 and returned many times in the 
following three decades. Maurice Godelier is professor at the Ecole 
des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris. He has gained 
international reputation through his work in the fields of neo­
Marxist and political anthropology. His fieldwork among the 
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Baruya of Papua New Guinea started in 1967. Jean Guiart is 
another well-known French anthropologist from Paris , testifying to 
the importance of Paris as a centre for Oceanic studies. He was 
director of the Musee de l'Hommt for many years and president 
and vice-president of the Societe des Oceanistes. His research 
involvement in New Caledonia covers more than four decades. 
Married to a New Caledonian woman from the Island of Lifu, he 
also has a strong personal involvement. Alan Howard is professor 
of anthropology at another important centre for Pacific research, 
the University of Hawaii in Honolulu . He has gained repute 
especially through his work on Polynesia. Like the other authors 
he has a long-term perspective on this region having started his 
fieldwork on Ro tum a in 1959. 
In concluding this introductory chapter I shall outline the five 
essays in the order of their appearance in this volume. Firstly, 
Roger Keesing's paper forcefully criticizes conventional Westem­
style 'development' as an instrument of economic exploitation. 
Once fashionable, such critique has largely faded away, although, 
as Keesing argues, pauperization and dependency caused by 
'rational' development are more in evidence than ever before in the 
Pacific. In some places the situation is truly desperate because 
natural resources are being stripped away at a catastrophic speed , 
undermining the viability of the economy to sustain future 
generations . Anthropologists are in a unique position to witness the 
local consequences of global processes, standing as they do with 
one foot in the village and the other in the outside world. 
Unfortunately their voices are rarely heard and their advice rarely 
heeded by those in positions of authority. Keesing illustrates his 
argument by painting a dismal picture of the Solomon Islands. 
Development experts have foolishly attacked subsistence 
agriculture and customary land tenure, which constituted a secure 
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base for Solomon Islanders' survival. Large-scale logging is fast 
removing the option for people to leave the overcrowded coastal 
villages and resettle the interior. 
The present situation is caused both by global forces beyond 
local control and by wrong-headed policies and misguided 
planning. In Keesing's opinion local leaders, therefore, share part 
of the responsibility : 'desperately striving to keep [their] books 
balanced and achieve a measure of Western-style prosperity, and 
taking counsel from the prophets of development, [they] will leave 
to [their] children a tin with the meat taken out'. Keesing believes 
that in many respects it is too late to follow the alternative routes 
that were available in the past, but he still places hope in the 
resilience of traditional values 'that may prove to be more adaptive 
in the twenty-first century - to all humans - than those of the 
post-industrial West'. 
In view of the apparent success of Western expansion, Maurice 
Godelier poses the general question whether the West is the model 
for humankind. To answer this one has first to reflect on what the 
West is. In Godelier's view it may be characterized by an amalgam 
of three central components or sets of institutions , each with its 
own logic ,  symbols and values : capitalism ,  parl iamentary 
democracy and Christianity. These components have different 
origins and different histories and their part in the process of 
Westernization also differs. Japan and the 'four li ttle dragons', for 
example, though profoundly Westernized , have retained their 
adherence to Buddhism. 
To illustrate how Westernization of pre-industrial societies takes 
place, Godelier describes in some detail the recent history of a 
tribal group in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, the Baruya. 
Discovered by an Australian patrol officer as late as 1951, their 
colonial and post-colonial history spans little more than four 
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decades . However, in this short period they have experienced all 
the instruments of colonial domination and Western intrusion. 
Pacification meant the end of political sovereignty; missionization 
contributed to the loss of cultural autonomy; and contract labour 
and coffee production radically altered the economic system which 
was partly self-sufficient but also an integral part of a regional 
network of exchanges. The Baruya were not just passive victims of 
these changes;  they made choices to co-operate, for example, by 
sending some of their children to school. Godelier documents that 
later they objectified and revalued their tradition in a process of 
psychological emancipation :  'We must find strength in our 
customs; we must base ourselves on what the whites call culture'. 
Godelier discusses the re-emergence of tribal warfare and the 
weakness of the post-independence state. He concludes that, in 
spite of obvious continuities, the culture of the B aruya has been 
irreversibly changed . These changes affect the core of their  
society, such as  relations of authority between young and old, male 
and female. The society of the Baruya has not collapsed and it has 
even grown in numbers . But its development is largely controlled 
by external forces to which the Baruya are compelled to adapt. 
Alan Howard reflects on history in Polynesia, but his thoughts 
are pertinent also to other parts of the South Pacific. He begins by 
reconstructing the hi story of historical interes t  among 
anthropologists. Initially this interest was inspired and coloured by 
theories of diffusionism, evolutionism and acculturation. When the 
dominant paradigm shifted to functional, cognitive and symbolic 
approaches, it resulted in a relative disregard of historical process. 
Only in the 1 980s did a historical perspective come back in vogue, 
initiated by the work of Marshall Sahlins and Greg Dening. 
Howard points to the Western colonial bias of most written sources 
and suggests that biography is a useful means for Western 
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anthropologists to compensate for the absence of Polynesian 
voices in colonial history. 
Interestingly, Howard finds that biography as a historical form 
is absent in Polynesian representations of the past. Polynesian 
histories are embedded in family lines and not linked to the larger 
polity. When investigating indigenous historical forms Howard 
discovers - in addition to the well-known but often misinterpreted 
ones, such as legends and genealogies - a whole range of tropes: 
family jokes,  sayings, place names and chiefly titles. These tropes 
differ sharply from more familiar forms of history because the 
historical knowledge represented by them is largely implicit: in 
order to understand the tropes the listener needs prior knowledge. 
Howard has some pertinent things to say about the necessary 
dialogue between Western and indigenous representations. While 
rejecting claims by some educated Polynesians to an exclusive 
right of representation based on racial arguments ('Polynesian 
blood'), he finds that the scope of academic discourse should be 
broadened to include the tropes used by Polynesian authors. As a 
result of changing practices of fieldwork, emphasizing the 
importance of return visits, anthropologists have become witnesses 
and participants in a Pacific 'history in the making'. This gives 
them a responsibility to speak up not only against colonial 
injustice and Western intrusion, but also against contemporary 
forms of exploitation by Pacific Islanders themselves. In an era of 
rampant post-modern relativities it takes courage to take such a 
clear stance against moral relativism. 
Capitalizing on his long research involvement in the South 
Pacific, especially in New Caledonia and Vanuatu, Jean Guiart 
takes it upon himself to critically review some of the concepts and 
approaches that have assumed the force of anthropological 
tradi tions. He shows how cert ain Western concepts and 
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expectations have resulted in misrepresentations of Pacific realities. 
The lack of communication between different academic traditions 
based on language or region has also led to unnecessary 
distortions and has hampered useful comparison. 
The biological cause of the low fertility of indigenous 
populations after the dramatic decline in population numbers 
following colonization has often been misconceived. Guiart refers 
to the spread of gonorrhoea linked with the presence of Western 
sailors and soldiers. Indigenous populations had to radically adapt 
their 'traditions' to the new demographic realities which made 
many positions in the social structure vacant. Anthropologists 
lacking sufficient historical awareness often failed to see the effects 
of reduced populations, identifying cultural 'rules' which were in 
fact only applied in a minority of cases. In the study of land tenure 
the Western concept of 'ownership' put researchers on the wrong 
foot, whereas implicit gender conceptions coloured the perception 
of Melanesian women, who were more independent - politically, 
economically and sexually - than commonly described. 
Discussing the problems resulting from a regional division of 
types of hierarchy (chief versus big-man) Guiart makes a plea for 
a radical comparative anthropology: 'The South Pacific thus 
should be treated as a working whole for comparison purposes as 
well as theoretical analysis .  There are no hard set frontiers 
anywhere in the island space, except geographical (distance being 
th e principal operating factor)' . The Polynesi a-Melanesia  
opposition i s  meaningless in  this context and has to be understood 
as a colonial artefact (the Western invasion proceeded from east to 
west and made use of the 'more civilized' Polynesians to control the 
'dangerous' Melanesians). As a complement to the discussion about 
hierarchy which has dominated Pacific political anthropology, 
Guiart points to the pervasive importance of 'horizontal structures' 
2A EMJYIY TINS FOR LOST TRADffiONS? 
or 'networks' based on trade, marriage and migration. Finally, he 
gives compelling evidence that Aboriginal Australia, which has its 
own regional tradition of anthropological scholarship, should be 
included into the larger framework of comparative study of the 
Pacific. 
Stephen Pokawin concludes the volume with a critical appraisal 
of Western impact on the Pacific. From the point of view of a 
Pacific Islander, he discusses the negative and positive aspects of 
Western penetration, using the situation of Papua New Guinea, his 
home country, as his primary example. In a gentle but determined 
way he points to past and present exploitation and to continuing 
intellectual colonialism. 
As it i s  today, the Pacific is to a· large extent a creation of 
European political and conceptual divisions. In the process of 
colonization the hundreds of autonomous tribal societies became 
classified as Melanesians , Polynesians and Micronesians and 
organized into colonial states. Missions prepared the people for the 
acceptance of a foreign authority . After political independence 
foreign influence and control continued to prosper. In fact, 
Pokawin notes that 'European influence on Papua New Guinea is 
much greater today than it has ever been in the past' . The means of 
this influence are foreign aid,  with considerable benefits for the 
donor; expanding commercial activ ities ;  and 'scholastic 
endeavour'. Research in the Pacific provides knowledge which may 
be used for development or control, while training opportunities 
for Pacific Islanders in Western universities lead to the expansion 
of Western models of thought. 
Pacific Islanders are eager to share in the benefits of modern 
knowledge and technology without, however, sacrificing their own 
identity. 'Traditional' models of sociality maintain their hold over 
people but do so at the cost of being transformed. Pokawin 
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summarizes the ambivalent relationship of Pacific countries to the 
West under the heading of four 'syndromes' which stress feelings 
of dependency and exploitation. In his conclusion he converges 
with Keesing's view on sustainable development, although he 
appears to be more optimi stic about the possibil iti es of its 
realisation: 
The hope of the Pacific Islanders is to become more innovative and 
industrious in fully appreciating the positive value of what the Pacific 
offers them and to follow the path of development that fits their 
situation ... 
Thus, in a remote resource-scarce atoll ,  development is not 
Amsterdam, London and New York, but it is improvement and 
sustenance of a dynamic island life. 
NOTES 
I wish to thank Klaus Neumann, Nicholas Thomas and especially Michael 
Young for helpful comments on this introductory chapter. It was written 
when I was a visiting fellow in the Department of Archaeology and 
Anthropology, The Australian National University. I am grateful to this 
insti tution as well  as to WO TRO (Nederlands Foundation for the 
Advancement of Tropical Research), the University of Nijmegen and the 
Australian Research Council for making my stay ir. Canberra possible. 
1 See Fabian 1 98 3 ,  who calls this displacement in time the denial of 
coevalness; see also Thomas 1989. 
2 International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistic , vol. 46 
no. 9 (September 1993), p.420. 
3 From Northeast Wantok System Newsletter, no. 20. See also the Islands 
Business Pacific, July 1 993, pp.35-38 concerning the enormous pressure that 
was exerted on the Papua New Guinea forestry minister, Tim Neville, by the 
logging industry as well as by landowners affected by 'a gold rush mentality'. 
4 See Kcesing and Tonkinson 1982; Linnekin and Poyer 1 990; Jolly and 
Thomas 1992; Friedman 1992; and White and Lindstrom 1 993. 
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5 He reiterated this point in the discussion following his keynote address, 
stressing that a certain sensitivity is required from the researcher concerning 
ethical issues and local political circumstances. 
6 Pokawin ( 1982:59-60) : 'The best gesture Australia can give to PNG to 
facilitate effective independence is to mind her own business, reduce all aid 
and permit the country to face the hard truth of nation building'. 
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A TIN WITH THE MEAT TAKEN O UT :  A BLEAK 
ANTHROPOLO GICAL VIEW OF UNSUSTAINAB LE 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC 
Ro ger M. Keesi n g  
We can well wonder - as m y  longtime Solomons research 
colleague, now a parliamentarian [the late Jonathan Fifi'i] , does 
- whether what is passed on to the next generation will be 
'like a tin with the meat taken out' (Keesing 198 1 :40). 
INTRODUCTION 
In the heady days when New Left critiques were a strong voice in 
academia, conventional 'development' was challenged as an 
instrument of the imperialist world system. Development Western 
style, it was argued , maintained pauperization and dependency on 
the capitalist periphery and sustained and perpetuated a radically 
unequal international division of labour in which formerly 
colonized tropical countries provided cheap labour and cheap raw 
materials and markets for the industrialized world. Although the 
pauperization and dependency are more acute than ever, with debt 
bondage and political and economic chaos trapping much of the 
'Third World' in ever-narrowing vicious circles from which escape 
seems impossible, the critiques have largely faded away. 1 Global 
capitalist rationality has seemingly triumphed with the collapse of 
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state socialism almost everywhere; the alternative futures the New 
Left envisioned have vaporized into myth. 
The Pacific countries where we work are increasingly trapped in 
the cycle of pauperization and dependency. They are being 
stripped of remaining resources - timber, minerals, marine life -
at a frightening rate , and with no possibility of renewal or 
sustainability. Furthermore ,  the old economic mainstays of the 
tropics - copra and palm oil and other plantation crops - are 
vani shing from the industrialized world's shopping list. The 
anthropologist, with one foot in the village and the other in the 
world outside, is in a unique position to see local costs and 
consequences of global processes , to see the trees as well as the 
forest. Yet most of us write and speak about other things, whether it 
be exchange or concepts of personhood or such modem 
phenomenon as the rhetoric of kastom. 
Here , I will reflect anthropologically on the course of 
'development' in the Pacific, with special attention to the part of it I 
know best, the Solomon Islands. In doing so, I come back to issues 
I addressed around the time of Solomons independence, fifteen 
years ago (Keesing 1 973 , 1978a, 1978b, 198 1 ) .  I return to them in 
the disenchanted mood of our times, less caught up in romantic 
populism and a socialist master narrative (in Lyotard's  [ 1 979] 
sense) than I was then. (In any case, the socialist success story we 
kept looking for in those days - which kept being relocated , from 
Cuba to Vietnam to Mozambique to Nicaragua, always somewhere 
just beyond the horizon - was always mythic) . I have no magical 
solutions or alternatives to offer. But the situation in many parts of 
the Pacific is desperate , and worsening. If anthropology has 
something to say about the Human Condition, it should have 
something interesting - perhaps even something hopeful - to 
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say about what is happening to the futures of the Pacific Islanders 
whose lives we have been privileged to share. 
THE SOLOMONS IN 1 992: A DISMAL SKETCH 
I will begin with a quite general sketch of the present economic 
position of the Solomon Islands to illustrate the declining situation 
widespread in the Pacific and the strategies being used in seeking 
to make ends meet. I will then come back to examine the historic 
processes that have led to this state of affairs , looking particularly 
at the advice and pressures of development planners during and 
since the colonial period. My purpose is partly to ask whether the 
present deteriorating situation is at least partly a predictable 
outcome of wrong-headed policies and misguided planning, as 
well as of global forces beyond local control. 
We can take as a symbolic encapsulation of the present situation 
two recent vignettes. The first is the recent sale to an Asian 
consortium of a prime piece of Honiara real estate, a coastal strip 
which included not only the Coronation Gardens but Government 
House - the Governor-General's official residence, inherited from 
the B ritish. The consortium paid several million (Solomons) 
dollars, committing itself to building a five-star hotel on the site 
(which then entailed construction of a new official residence for 
the Governor-General) - an arrangement a dollar-hungry 
Solomons Government accepted even though there was no 
evidence that the consortium, seemingly m ainly representing 
timber interests, had any record of hotel investment. Once the 
transaction was finalized, the Asian consortium turned around and 
sold their interests to another Asian development group for well 
over twice the original price. It is an open question whether any 
hotel will be constructed on the site, but meanwhile the Solomons 
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Government has had to build another residence for the Governor­
General with borrowed funds. 
A second vignette , just reported to me from my informant on 
the spot, Christine Jourdan, is that it is now impossible to 
communicate by telephone between the capital , Honiara, and the 
island capital of Western Solomons Province, Gizo. The provincial 
government is unable to pay its telephone bill. 
With world prices for copra and palm oil low and deteriorating, 
through both a glut in supply and a dwindling of demand for 
dietary-disastrous tropical oils , the plantation agricultural economy 
that was once the mainstay of the Solomons is in a poor and 
declining state. A deteriorating balance of trade continues to erode 
a battered Solomons dollar, which is worth roughly a third of what 
it was at the time of independence fifteen years ago .  A proudly 
launched expansion of Solomon Airlines into international travel 
has foundered, with losses last year of $S I 8.5 million; and the 
government is tendering a 70 per cent share in the airline to 
overseas investors. While this has been a bad time for airlines 
everywhere , losses of this kind are harder to sustain in such a 
fragile economy. Tourism,  much heralded as a revenue source, 
remains at a modest level , reduced because of world-wide 
recession. Honiara's two substantial hotels often house more 
members of the international development industry and overseas 
investors than tourists. Mining exploration (mainly gold) has been 
pursued in a number of areas,  but has yet to yield any significant 
return. The economy now rests heavily on the export of fish, 
mainly through a Japanese-Solomons joint venture, and on timber 
exports . 
An enormous public service, relative to the country's population 
and means, is the major employer. The rising cost of living, as 
rel i ance on imported foods continues to increase,  generates 
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continuing pressure for wage increases that the national budget 
cannot afford.  Recently, government doctors went on strike and, 
before that, it was the teachers. With a very young population and 
an alarming rate of population growth (around 3 .5 per cent, one of 
the highest in the world) , the education system continues to pour 
young people into an employment market that offers few places 
for them and little prospect of expansion. 
Overseas aid ,  much of it geared to specific educational or 
medical purposes, continues to pour into the country, but at 
reducing levels. Although this aid bolsters otherwise crumbling 
infrastructures of social service, it cannot be relied upon to balance 
a deteriorating overall fiscal situation. A politically astute prime 
minister has so far fended off the World Bank-IMF potentates who 
impose radical models of fiscal governmental reorganization - at 
a virtual cost of sovereignty - on Third World countries whose 
economic disintegration pushes them into the basket-case 
category. B ut total economic collapse is never far from view; 
Solomons politici ans are now easy prey for the international 
loansharks who hunt on the margins of the Third World offering 
get-rich-quick schemes , mainly fraudulent, at low interest rates. 
In terms of health, borderline malnutrition among urban 
children and diet-induced diseases , such as diabetes, pose serious 
threats . Further, devastating new strains of malaria are lethally 
dangerous and are overturning both ancient balances between 
plasmodia and genetically adapted human hosts and the gains in 
malari a  control achieved in the last twenty years through 
(dangerous) DDT-based spraying. 
Finally, the level of political morality is deteriorating rapidly, 
with public servants and politicians at the highest levels - hard­
pressed to meet rising living costs and facing uncertain futures -
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succumbing to the lure of overseas money proffered 'under the 
table' and to the diversion of aid funds. 2 
Leaving aside for the moment the situation with regard to 
logging - which, as I will show, is devastating the country's 
rainforest interiors in a one-time-only sell off - the Solomon 
Islands is in a dismal economic situation. I leave it in these general 
terms because the statistics , in so far as they are available, would 
require extensive explication; but more particularly, because I want 
to paint the picture with such broad brushstrokes that the 
Solomons can serve to represent 'the post-independence South 
Pacific political economy'. I will fill in some of the statistics in what 
follows. 
Some aspects of this deterioration - a decline in world 
commodity prices , world-wide recession - obviously come from 
forces beyond the control of the Solomon Islands or any 
individual country , even one much larger than the tiny island states 
of the Pacific . But some, I will suggest, represent the 'coming home 
to roost' of misguided development strategies perpetrated by 
Western 'experts' who misunderstood and undervalued Island ways 
of living and failed to anticipate - or worse yet, concealed -
predictable global economic consequences of plans and strategies 
being promulgated all over the 'developing' tropical world. I tum, 
then, to the historical roots of the present crisis. 
SOLOMONS DEVELOPMENT: A HISTORICAL SKETCH 
It is just thirty years since I first arrived in what was then the 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate. In those days, the economic 
mainstay of the Solomons was the export of copra, produced on 
plantations most of which were owned by overseas interests, 
notably Lever's Pacific Plantations Limited. In a sleepy and remote 
tropical colony where a racist caste system and rituals of empire 
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still went unchallenged, the only substantial commitments to 
development were in agriculture. Although this mainly entailed 
coconut agronomy, the agricultural officers were trying to 
persuade local landowners to invest resources in planting cocoa, 
which had brought miraculous prosperity to Ghana. And at an 
agricultural experiment station on Malaita they were also 
attempting to dazzle local farmers with fertilizer-enriched 
production of food crops (and thus persuade them of the folly of 
shifting cultivation). 
These can be taken as tropes of 1960s development 'wisdom' 
applied to tropical colonies now independent or moving in that 
direction. The case of cocoa shows how a commercial agricultural 
success story anywhere in this emerging 'Third World' was taken to 
be the secret of a similar miracle in a score of other places:  with 
scant thought given to the consequences for world market prices of 
a flooding of the market from all directions once production 
began in earnest. In the second case, the antagonism and scorn 
towards traditional indigenous food crops and production regimes, 
and the effort to di splace them with fixed-field monocrop 
agriculture, was not only culturally arrogant, but ecologically narve 
and often environmentally disastrous. 
The effort to intensify agricultural production and cash crops 
along the coastal strips of the larger islands in the Solomons group 
was on1 y the latest in a series of pressures and inducements towards 
resettlement on the coasts and the abandonment of old settlement 
sites and agricultural zones in the rainforested interiors. Missions 
had long encouraged the establishment of large coastal villages, 
free from pagan religious associations and more accessible to 
Europeans. The machinery of colonial government - tax 
collection, court houses, local schools - imposed further pressures 
and inducements towards concentration on coastal strips ; so did 
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prospects of access to coastal copra land, and markets and trade 
goods. By the early 1960s, only four or five significant pockets of 
interior settlement remained in the entire archipelago. 3 
Although token effort was expended in advising co-operatives , 
the prevailing assumption of the Solomons administration was that 
traditional structures of kinship and institutions of collective land 
title and communal obligation were obstacles to development and 
modernization; the hope lay, always , in the ambitious individual 
willing to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities against the grain of 
tradition. 4 
In the fifteen years of my fieldwork, government investment in 
rural education and medical services - which, where they existed 
at all , had lain in the hands of the missions - expanded 
considerably . 5 World Health Organization malaria eradication 
programmes and treatment of infectious diseases cut death rates , 
especially childhood mortality ,  in rural areas , setting off a 
demographic time bomb that has been ticking down ever since. 
Although the much-heralded cocoa project had predictably 
collapsed, efforts to foster cash crops in rural areas continued; in 
the mid-1970s heavy funding from Australia and New Zealand was 
poured into the establishment of rural cattle proj ects , further 
diverting already overcultivated garden land from subsistence 
productivity. In this period ,  agribusiness expanded considerably 
with the establishment of a large oil-palm industry on the 
Guadalcanal plains and heavily subsidized efforts to establish 
commercial rice production. 
The 1970s also saw the first phases of a very rapid growth of 
Honiara as a major urban centre, with the substantial indigenous 
population being swollen annually by temporary and permanent 
migrants from rural villages. In these respects, the Solomons were 
following a trajectory of development paralleled in what became 
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Vanuatu and , on a very different scale, Papua New Guinea. The 
scenario was not so different from those being played out in the 
same period in the Gilberts and the Polynesian colonies and 
countries to the east. 
The general political-economic pattern of Pacific colonies on 
the verge of nationhood followed those already laid down in 
Africa. In a 1 973 paper I pointed out that radical critiques of what 
had happened in post-colonial Africa - allowing for differences 
and island geography - aptly characterized what was then 
happening in the Solomons and other parts of the Pacific (Keesing 
1973 :23) :  the emergence of indigenous bourgeois classes serving 
nee-colonial interests ; the development of prim ary-export 
economies largely in European hands; growing urban centres tied 
to overseas metropoles; and rural stagnation. As Hopkins points 
out: 
The reason an economy of this sort came into existence is [that it] 
was never supposed to constitute the economy of a separate society at 
all. Its modem sector was to form an integral part of the metropolitan 
country's economy . . .  Labour or its produce was . . .  to flow from the 
subsistence to the modem sector, and some imports, social services, 
and administration were permitted to flow in the opposite direction 
(1964: 1 57) . 
If the processes of indigenous class formation and economic 
domination and dependency in the Pacific followed depressing 
scenarios already familiar from Africa, then developments since 
the independence of Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and the 
Solomon Islands (in particular) continue to follow the same 
channels. These are manifested by the marked class stratification in  
post-colonial urban centres; continuing drift of population into 
mini-cities that now have periurban squatter settlements and all that 
goes with them; the rise of violence and predation; and , in the 
hinterlands ,  further stagnation and pauperization of village 
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economies and the breakdown of medical and educational 
infrastructures built up and initially funded by the colonial rulers 
and other foreign aid . The tragedies of regional secessionist 
movements and tribal-ethnic conflict inscribed in modem African 
history - Biafra, Uganda, Katanga - now have their counterpart 
in Bougainville. 
THE A TT ACK ON SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE 
AND CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE 
What i s  most striking about the development strategies 
promulgated by the British in the last phase of the development 
period , and the pressures exerted by development experts in the 
post-coloni al period, has been a consi stent denigration of 
subsistence agricultural production, and a concomitant stress on 
the commitment of labour and land to cash-crop production and 
the di smantling of customary land tenure . The capacity of 
Solomon Islanders (or other Pacific Islanders) to feed themselves 
- the backbone of village life but also a focus of cultural value 
and of sharing, reciprocity, feasting and exchange - has been 
consistently denigrated, misunderstood , and systematically eroded 
and subverted by Western development planners . 
The orientation on the part of British development planners in 
the pre-independence Solomons is strikingly expressed in a 
passage from the 1 975 Annu al Report on the National 
Development Plan: 
The overall concept . . .  is to continue the move away from dispersive 
and often destructive subsistence farming towards a more disciplined 
commercial approach, this being the only form of agriculture which 
can be acceptable to, viable for, and provide job opportunities for, 
future generations. 
The weight of pressure from Western 'experts ' became evident to 
me when I took part in a 1977 conference in Honiara, organized 
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by Fred Fisk, exploring ways in which traditional agricultural 
production could be adapted to feed growing urban populations in 
the Third World (Fi sk 1 978) .  The Solomons Mini ster of 
Agriculture and senior public servants li stened politely to early 
conference presentations . However, when we asked whether this 
might have some influence on governmental policy decisions6 the 
Minister told us that for every Western 'expert' giving advice in the 
direction we were advocating, there were twenty urging precisely 
the opposite course. 
When Western experts do involve themselves in subsistence 
agriculture, they still characteristically show an arrogance that is  
amazing in the light of contemporary knowledge of the intricacy 
of swidden agricultural systems. In 1988  I met one of the many 
British tropical agronomists circulating around the former colonial 
world. He had come equipped with aerial photographs and surveys 
of several riverine drainage systems in the Solomons marked on 
development plans for intensification of production; and he was 
off to New Georgia to teach local villagers how to cultivate their 
ancestral land efficiently. He was completely incredulous when I 
suggested that more than the allotted week might be needed, and 
that the villagers might possibly know more about cultivating this 
terrain than he, their ancestors having lived there for some three 
thousand years. 7 
A recent World Bank report notes that 'the strong subsistence 
base and extended family system have helped to provide the basic 
needs of food and shelter for most of the population' ( 1 99 1  :203). 
However, it goes on to observe that 
[The customary] system of land tenure has tended to reduce incentives 
for smallholder development and limit the supply of land for 
plantation, timber and tourism development ( 199 1 :205). 
Land disputes can be expected to intensify as population pressures 
increase and the cash economy grows in importance. The only lasting 
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solution is to demarcate, survey and record customary land . . .  It will 
take some time to gain the trust of customary landowners, as past 
efforts at recording have been associated with the alienation of land by 
the Government, often for lease to foreign companies . . .  First priority 
should be given to areas where smallholder resettlement or plantation 
development are planned (199 1 :21 3). 
In addition to agricultural development , both by overseas 
investment in large-scale plantations and smallholder cash-crop 
production, a number of cash-generating spheres of development 
have been promoted by the colonial government and post-colonial 
development industry. I will focus on logging, because of its scale 
and environmental and social consequences .  Before I tum to 
logging, I will briefly sketch other areas : livestock production, 
mining, fishing and tourism. 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
In the years immediately preceding independence ,  a strong 
push was made for development of a cattle industry in the 
Solomons. Much of the pushing came from the Australi an and 
New Zealand government development aid organizations , with 
cattle experts flocking to give technical advice (that would establish 
markets for their countries' products and expertise) and aid . I and 
some others with experience at village level in the Solomons 
protested in vain about the obvious problems in developing a cattle 
industry. Cattle simply come in the wrong sizes. First, for village 
people they represent a very large capital investment per animal ; 
and, second, the investment i s  thre atened by the animals '  
vulnerability to disease in a tropical climate. Further, getting them 
to urban markets poses serious problems; and killing them for 
village subsistence is feasible only for very large feasts . Every prior 
attempt to maintain processing and transportation and di sease 
treatment-prevention infrastructures  (mainly in agriculture ,  
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notably cocoa) in the Solomons had fallen apart, because of 
factors of small scale, dispersion, difficulties of marine transport 
and village-level scepticism. Success seemed no more likely in 
cattle production, which offered no possibility of integration in 
village economies comparable to the old local traditions of pig and 
poultry raising. Most serious of all ,  the very land needed for cattle 
raising - highly destructive environmentally in a fragile tropical 
ecosystem - was the land most needed for subsistence food (and 
cash-crop) production along the already overcrowded coastal 
strips. In terms of productivity per hectare of desperately needed 
agricultural land, cattle seemed an absurd choice in contrast to pigs 
and chickens , which require little diversion of arable land and 
modest intensification of existing subsistence production. 
Yet when I had my interview with the new prime minister to 
present my university's independence gift of books, I met him in 
the plush new Cattle Development House . Predictably,  within a 
decade the cattle horns on the logo had been replaced and the 
rapidly deteriorating building had become the centre of the 
Livestock Development Authority that had been reduced to 
encouraging the rai sing of pigs and chickens . The Solomon 
Islands is  producing so little beef that it must be imported from 
Vanuatu . 8 This thoroughly predictable fiasco has not been without 
long-term cost. The 1990 Central Bank of Solomon Islands (CBSI) 
Annual Report observes that: 
The story of Solomon I slands' long, costly and unsuccessful attempt 
to establish a cattle industry should be written now, in time for 
participants to contribute their experiences; and in time for lessons to 
be learned by project planners, government finance officials and 
extension workers engaged on any other schemes designed to change 
the face of Solomon Islands agriculture. The Asian Development 
Bank and the Australian government would presumably also like to 
see a competent and impartial account of the project, to which they 
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contributed many millions of dollars of concessionary loans (which 
have eventually to be repaid) and grants (1990: 1 1).  
MINING 
Despite promises of wealth, a mining industry has never 
succeeded in getting off - or under - the ground in the 
Solomons . 9 Although there clearly is some gold, both at Gold 
Ridge and at other sites , notably in New Georgia, the richness of 
the deposits is not such as to encourage investments in the 
Solomons , unlike Papua New Guinea. Substantial deposits of 
bauxite are too costly and low-grade to encourage development in 
the present world market climate. 
A major factor in the reluctance of mining companies to pursue 
large investments in the Solomons is the ambivalent political 
climate, both centrally and locally . Local landowners,  alerted by 
Bougainville secessionists to the environmental destruction and 
community disruption mining can generate, have been reluctant to 
negotiate mining agreements . There are other ideological forces :  
gold has become a kind of symbol of Europeans' exploitative 
extraction of wealth. 
Given the urgent need for export earnings, in a country whose 
long-time plantation crops have an unpromising future, a modest 
mining industry may become urgent economically. Yet Howard's 
conclusions seem apt: 
Known ore deposits are small and the problems of getting a mining 
operation underway . . . are considerable. It looks now that if the Isles 
of S olomon are to produce any fabulous wealth it will have to be 
from some other source than mining - and for this,  perhaps, the 
country should consider i tself blessed ( 1 99 1 : 128) . 
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FISHING 
Commercial fishing in the Solomons , particularly through a 
Japanese-Solomons joint venture, is a major source of employment 
( 1 700 workers in 1 986) and a substantial source of revenue. I O 
Although catches have fluctuated in response to water temperatures 
and other systematic factors , construction of  an 1 8 ,000 ton 
cannery at Noro in the Western Solomons opens the way to further 
expansion. Again, although there are considerable costs to the 
Solomons in terms of the inroads that commercial baitfishing 
makes in coastal fishing zones and the threat to local fish 
populations, it is hard to see how the country could survive without 
considerable dependence on fish exports ; som e  cheap and 
commercially undesirable low-grade canned tuna contributes a 
good deal to the local diet as well. The largely Okinawan crews and 
Japanese m anagement further contribute needed cash, although 
again with social costs , including prostitution. 
TOURISM 
Like other 'tropical paradises ' ,  the Solomon Islands covets 
tourist dollars . Optimistic planners and entrepreneurs portray 
tourism as preserving and valorizing 'traditional culture' ;  and in the 
Solomons as elsewhere, this commoditization of culture exacts 
deep and often hidden costs . In this realm, the Solomon Islands is 
relatively off the beaten track for tourists , and hence spared the 
impact tourists have in Vanuatu or Fij i .  However, most of the 
tourist dollars are spent in up-market hotels, resorts , and dive 
services, and go to overseas investors; what local people get are the 
crumbs - and it is they who bear the costs , in terms of alienation, 
economic servitude , prostitution (and its risk of AID S ) , and 
disruption. Moreover, such income as tourism brings is always 
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contingent on economic prosperi ty or recession in the 
industrialized countries . 
LOGGING 
Logging, which has generated between SI$20 to SI$50 million in 
export income through the 1980s, is widely seen as the major 
resource on which the country's solvency depends. In 1990, for 
example, the Solomons Government collected nearly SI$ 13 million 
on export duties and reforestation levies. 
Yet when we look at the costs, even as set out in the 
Government's own reports , which are based m ainly on data 
provided by the logging companies, the destruction of rainforest is 
going on at a terrifying and uncontrolled rate. The Central B ank 
of Solomon Islands Annual Report for 1991 is revealing: 
Management of the nation's forest resources . . .  continued to cause 
concern at many levels of the community. The government's demand 
for tax revenues was used to justify the granting of more logging 
licences, with no apparently [sic] assessment of the long-term 
economic and social costs of rapid deforestation. Improvements to the 
authorities' abi lity to police logging methods to minimise 
environmental damage have been painfully slow. And bitter divisions 
at village level continue between the advocates of selling the standing 
rainforest to logging companies, and those who want slower, higher­
value-added methods of using the forest, based on small local 
sawmills (CSBI 1 99 1 : 14). 
A previous report had commented that: 
[T]he 400,000 cubic metre level . . .  of output will be removing the 
mature trees from 8,000- 10,000 hectares of natural forest annually, 
with substantial cumulative effects on the environment and the micro­
econom y of the surrounding areas ( CBSI 1989: 13). 
The CB SI Annual Report of 1 991  makes clear that the situation is 
worse than that, and accelerating. 
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Licences in force now are reported to allow about 1 .2 million cubic 
metres a year of log exports, several times bigger than any estimates 
made so far of the maximum sustainable yield of the natural forest 
( 199 1 : 14). 
It now seems clear that the worst-case scenario is  the one that is 
coming true. The World Bank report of 1 99 1 , while commenting 
that 'it is estimated that Solomon Islands' forest resources will be 
exhausted in 1 0  to 25 years' ,  carries a footnote that C S IRO,  the 
Australian scientific research organization, notes that at 1 986 
logging rates the rainforest will be eradicated by 1996. This seems 
distressingly close to the mark. Anthropologist Ian Frazer, who has 
just completed a reforestation study for the New Zealand 
Government, doubts that any rainforest will survive in the 
Solomons beyond the late 1990s. 
But the implications of the island interiors that were once 
densely forested being reduced to scrubby and eroded wasteland 
have scarcely been talked or thought about. Where are the rapidly 
expanding village populations that are already packed along the 
coastal strips going to go to expand living areas and subsistence 
agriculture? 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT, ROADS AND RAINFOREST 
One of the positive signs I have observed in a generally 
depressing scenario of change during the years of my research in 
the Solomons has been the way roads catalyse rural revitalization 
- social and economic. In some areas, the roads have been along 
the coast. B ut where roads have actually opened up rainforest 
interior - a rare occurrence in the Solomons - a dramatic 
intensification of rural production and village development has 
taken place. Most striking has been the Tuni Road across the 
central mountains of northern Malaita; and, to a lesser degree, road 
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construction in West Kwaio on the other side of the island. New 
villages have sprung up, populations have moved inland again, with 
access to rich agricultural land but having a connection to urban 
markets. In that, I have felt, lay the key to a twenty-first century 
Solomon Islands where rural villagers could feed themselves and 
urban populations with modest cash earnings but rich lives (which, 
given modem technology, could be enriched materially with small 
local hydro schemes or solar power) .  In the mountains lay a place 
for the thousands of young children in the now-crowded coastal 
villages. In the mountains lay the retreats to which public servants , 
tired of the cost and confusion of town life, could reti re, able to 
fann for cash and for food. In the mountains were the hardwood 
trees that provide endless supplies of building materials and 
firewood, and the forest fibers and giant bamboos that met a 
thousand needs. 
But what mountains? They are being turned into wastelands by 
the day, with local landowners unable to defend themselves against 
bribes and temptations of greedy kin putting themselves forward as 
landowners. The fish in the lagoons, on the reefs and in the coastal 
lagoons have been drastically thinned by baitfishing. But it is the 
scars of the devastated eroding mountains - and with them, the 
poisoned and polluted streams, the vanished birds and small 
animals - that give me a bleak view of the future . The present 
generation of leaders , desperately striving to keep its books 
balanced and achieve a measure of Western-style prosperity, and 
taking counsel from the prophets of development, will leave to its 
children a tin with the meat taken out. 
WERE THERE ALTERNATIVES ? 
But were there ever any alternatives? I believe there were. It is 
not that Solomon Islanders could now be wealthy, in Western 
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material terms, if their country had followed a different course. But 
they could, given the inevitable material austerity, be much richer 
than they are in human terms, and much less dependent on forces 
they cannot control. The 'develo�inent' espoused by the British 
and by subsequent 'experts' has taken virtually no cognizance of 
the richess of a subsistence-based life that was already there, and 
has systematically attempted to dismantle it so as to replace it with 
a Western-style commodity economy and nuclear family-based 
social structure. 
Here we have a classic debating ground in which the admittedly 
romantic traditionalism championed by the anthropologist and the 
monochrome modernities envisioned by the development planner 
are counterposed. The development planner always feels hel l  has 
the winning argument in this debate: that what the 'natives' aspire to 
are Western-style houses and cars and videos (so who are we to tell 
them to settle for thatch?). 
There is no doubting the seductive attractions of  material 
modernity. However, even those relatively few Solomon Islanders 
who have acquired cars , permanent houses and videos seem to 
dream less of more material wealth than of being able to retire to 
quiet thatch houses on their home islands , with enough income to 
afford some luxuries; but with traditional modes of Melanesianness 
- the pleasures of kin, community, exchange, home-grown foods 
and village life - as the most important luxuries, which had to be 
sacrificed in the alienation of urban life and work. Perhaps that is 
their romantic dream ; but there is much substance in it. 
What could have been built up, had the planners understood and 
valued these traditional modes of Melanesianness, were, first of all, 
more efficient internal networks or channels for the distribution of 
traditional foods, particularly root crops and fish. What would have 
been crucial were ways to get village-produced agricultural 
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surpluses and fish into the provincial centres and Honiara. So poor 
are the present modes of distribution that, as Christine Jourdan has 
remarked, pineapples and sweet potatoes cost more in the Honiara 
market than they do in Montreal in the depths of winter. No 
attention has been given in economic planning to the distribution 
within the country of agricultural produce that Solomon Islanders 
themselves strongly value, notably areca ('betel') nuts, canarium 
almonds, and coconuts (for consumption, not copra export). 
Had the hardwood timber, once abundant in the Solomons, been 
viewed from the outset and valued as a means of enriching local 
life instead of foreign logging companies, and had the virtues of 
combining traditional and Western modes of housing been 
understood, Honi ara and the proviilcial capi tals could have 
developed a radically different aspect that was much better adapted 
to local conditions and the economy. With increased cultivation 
and distribution of the sago thatching that Solomon Islanders 
rightly value so much, vastly better and vastly cheaper houses 
could have been possible in urban and periurban settings, 
combining thatch roofs and walls with hardwood floors in creative 
ways. An interesting irony is that the most elegant building in 
Honiara is a French restaurant with a thatched roof; and when a 
Chinese millionaire entrepreneur built his dream house on 
plantation land west of Honiara, he used thatch and local 
hardwood. 
Had the importance of household gardens been recognized in 
planning Honiara, urban families would not only be partly able to 
feed themselves, but the alienation, soci al disintegration and 
anomie of urban life would have been considerably reduced ; the 
costs, especially to women, would have been far less. 
Had local timber mills been fostered, and skills in joinery and 
cabinetmaking promoted, Solomon Islanders could be using their 
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rich forest resources both to meet local needs for furniture as well 
as housing and as high-yield rather than low-yield sources of 
export revenue. Other forest products, such as rattan, are potential 
sources of export revenue as well as means of meeting local needs, 
but they have already been largely destroyed by mindless and 
uncontrolled logging. 
Had the planners had any appreciation of the riches of village 
life and subsistence self-sufficiency augmented by selective cash 
crops , the development of feeder roads into the mountains could 
have paved the way for resettlement of the island interiors, opening 
new areas for production (including cultivation of higher-altitude 
cash crops such as coffee, passionfruit and spices) and living space 
for rapidly increasing populations. There are hundreds and 
hundreds of miles of such feeder roads in interior New Guinea, 
through much more difficult terrain and maintained by volunteer 
labour from local villages serving their own interests. 
Had the planners understood the rich complexities of customary 
land tenure, they could have built on its strengths and encouraged 
the compilation and local legitimation and recognition of  
genealogically documented corporate land titles, long before the 
present outbreak of land disputes, with concomitant litigation and 
frequent violence. Instead, for years , the British Government held 
on to the hollow dream of the surveying, registration and 
individuation of land title . 1 2 As the World B ank report shows 
( 1 99 1 ) , customary land tenure is still perceived as an obstacle to 
economic development. So are networks of kin and obligations of 
clan and community, even while the report concedes that it is 
through this system that some 80 per cent of Solomon Islanders 
lead sustaining social and economic lives. 
Had the planners valued the extraordinary artistic skills of 
Solomon Islanders both in traditional crafts and new genres, such 
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as woodcarving, the export of art objects for international markets 
could be far more systematic and large-scale than it is, and less 
dependent on entrepreneurial middlemen, particularly expatriates, 
who rake off much of the profit. While ostensibly promoting the 
production of art objects for tourists , development planners and 
agencies have done vi tually nothing to encourage craft co­
operatives, develop marketing and exporting systems, or preserve 
and resuscitate traditional production of exquisite objects that 
could be a substantial source of revenue for the country. In this 
realm as well , the magnificent hardwoods of the Solomons could 
have been selectively used to bring jobs and money to local 
people, not mowed down to feed the gaping j aws of Japanese 
timber mills while destroying the environment. 
It is not that Solomon Islanders have been bereft of imagination 
and enterprise in the pursuit of economic opportunity. Yet some of 
the areas of possibility have been so culturally alien to the 
European planners of the Solomons economy that they have been 
viewed with a kind of smug amusement, if they have been noticed 
at all . A case in point is the export of 'shell money' from 
Langalanga, Malaita to Bougainville and other parts of Papua New 
Guinea. The 'shell money' business has been entirely locally 
created and expanded , and is  scarcely viewed as part of the 
country's economy at all .  The point is that the demand for shell 
valuables in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere revolves around the 
symbolic value of trad itional custom in a context of 
modernization, and the continuing valorization of bridewealth and 
feasting exchange ; hence thi s exemplifies  exactly the 
traditionalism that is seen by expatriate planners as an obstacle to 
modernity and the anti thesis of economic rationality (as if  buying 
Gucci haute couture or French perfumes or drinking champagne 
were rational) . Urban Solomon Islanders, too, continue to celebrate 
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and enact the traditional values of exchange, in bridewealth 
payments and feasting, but all this goes on entirely outside the 
social and economic agendas of a government committed to 
bookkeeping Western style. Custom is one thing, the economy is 
another. 
If there had to be a promotion of tourism, it could have built on 
the unusual resources of the country (only the World War II relics 
and history have been seen as such), and could have pursued 
emerging markets of eco- and adventure-tourism and village-level 
cultural centres and the attractions of the traditional, rather than 
emphasizing yet more 'tropical paradise' resorts (like Anuha) that 
reward foreign capital and fulfill Western fantasies. The latter may 
seem to bring more tourist dollars, but, in the end, most of them 
leave the country, leaving little behind other than widening class 
differences and alienation. 
IS IT TOO LA TE? 
In many respects, it may be too late for a Solomons government 
bent on development Western style to change its course. The 
rainforests are already largely gone, and with them the possibility 
of re-establishing and redeveloping village life and economies in 
the island interiors. The character of Honiara, Auki and Gizo is 
largely set, in terms of housing and spatial allocation. A country 
that cannot afford to maintain the infrastructures of education, 
health services and transportation, already built up in the period of 
decolonization and a post-independence foreign aid boom, will 
have no resources to build new roads. And where would they lead? 
Into the post-logging wastelands? 
In some respects , Solomon Islanders have always been going 
against the grain of development policy: in producing root crops, 
fish and areca nuts for the urban markets as best they can; in 
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building thatch housing in periurban areas; in producing craft 
goods for the few tourists who reach the Solomons; in developing 
their own local attractions in hopes of drawing tourists into village 
areas . This resilience and resistance and local enterprise may be 
small in scale, but it gives some hope that as the country slides 
further and further into a banana republic, its people will continue 
to find ways to survive and even to prosper, using traditional skills 
and values. 
Despite the progressive deterioration of the economy and the 
disintegration of the infrastructure precariously built up in the 
early days of abundant aid money and a temporary export boom, 
there is still considerable resilience at village level. There still is , for 
most Solomon Islanders , a fall-back position. If there is fuel for 
the outboard motor, you use it; if there is none, you paddle. If you 
can buy rice and tinned tuna and bread, you buy it; if you cannot, 
you eat your sweet potatoes and bush cabbage and coconut (and 
stay healthier) .  But here are limits to this resilience, given growing 
populations and the devastation of the island interiors through 
logging. 
There probably was never any hope that anthropological 
fieldworkers , who have lived in the villages for long periods and 
know the strengths and values of Melanesian sociality and 
subsistence affluence, would be listened to by those making the 
d eci s ions . They  are condemned to be woolly -he aded 
anthropological romantics, both in the eyes of the high-powered 
development experts in their tailored tropical suits and in the eyes 
of the Western-educated elites who now run their own countries. As 
the Pacific slides into greater pauperization and dependency within 
a world system that no longer needs most of its primary products 
and is rapidly wiping out those that it still wants , it is scant 
consolation that some of us saw it coming long ago and did and 
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said what we could, to no avail. I return to these topics once again 
because I feel it is still urgent that we do and say what we can. 
I am not optimistic about the future of Pacific Islanders - or, 
indeed, of my own children in California. But such optimism as I 
can muster for Solomon Islanders and their Pacific neighbours 
comes from the continuing commitment of most of them to values 
that may prove to be more adaptive in the twenty-first century -
to all humans - than those of the post-industrial West. 
NOTES 
My research and writing have been supported by SSHRC grant 4 1 0-92-0165. I 
am indebted to Ian Frazer, Christine Jourdan and Anna Paini for assistance in 
research for the paper, and to Ton Otto and other colleagues at the Nijmegen 
conference for helpful discussion. 
1 Recent critiques by Arturo Escobar constitute an important exception. 
2 In the most recent scandal, a cabinet minister has been implicated in the 
smuggling of tropical birds from Malaita into northern Australia . 
3 I visited the ones in northern Malaita, central Makirta (San Cristobal) and 
Ysabel in the course of anthropological reconnaissance in 1964. At the time 
I was doing research in east-central Malaita, the largest remaining pocket of 
interior settlement. 
4 This was a much less coherent ideology on the margins of the residual 
peripheries of the British empire than in areas more directly open to 
American influence and capital expansion , where ideologies of economic 
growth and modernization elaborated by Ros tow, Lerner and others played a 
more central role in political policy and investment. 
5 However, by the standards of Australia's massive investment in what was 
to become Papua New Guinea, the British investments were minuscule. 
6 In a country that had moved to substantial self-government and was on the 
brink of independence. 
7 The same agriculture officer, an old Kenya hand, told of his long patrols by 
Land Rover in the African bush, and of how he had had his Askaris fetch a 
tank of water for his evening hot bath even if this meant driving fifty miles. 
'I'm sure they respected me more for it,' he recalled cheerfully. 
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8 In 1989 the number of cattle slaughtered at official abattoirs was down to 
921 ,  half the 1986 total: CBSI Annual Report 1990, p. 1 0. The cattle supply 
has apparently collapsed almost completely since 1989, although no data are 
available. 
9 Howard gives a survey of the up-and-down - mostly down - fortunes of 
the mining industry in the Solomons (199 1 :Ch.4) . 
1 O SI$53 million in 1986. In 1983 fishing provided 7 .6 per cent of gross 
domestic product; in 1988 this had declined to 6.6 per cent. 
1 1  I use the gendered pronoun advisedly in this context. 
12 See Fifi'i 1989 for an account of the violence that followed the award to 
a single individual of title to the corporately owned land on which Atoifi 
Adventist Hospital was to be built, and for a distinguished leader's reflections 
on land policy. 
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IS THE WEST THE MODEL FOR HUMANKIND? 
THE BARUYA OF NEW GUINEA BETWEEN 
CHANGE AND DECAY 
Maurice Godelier 
As an anthropologist specializing in the study of societies that are 
literally on the other side of the world from the West, in Oceania, I 
have had the opportunity since 1967 of observing the changing 
lifestyle and thinking of a tribe in New Guinea, one of those 
societies sometimes referred to as 'primitive' : the Baruya, who were 
'discovered' in 195 1 and subjected to Australian colonial rule in 
1960. In 1975 Papua New Guinea became independent, and the 
Baruya were transformed into citizens of a new state that was a 
member of the United Nations , furnishing further proof of the 
West's advance in that part of the world. 
But since 9 November 1989, the date when the Berlin Wall came 
down, it would surely be true to say that the process of  
Westernization has resumed inside Europe itself. The West, which 
was for several decades divided between the two Europes, is being 
reunified and in the future will exert an even stronger influence on 
the world's destiny, shaping it in its own image and in accordance 
with i ts own interests . Nevertheless,  we should note that 
Westernization is no longer an accomplishment of the Western 
peoples alone. It has also become a product of the East: of Japan 
and of the four or five little dragons . But, in these cases , 
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Westemization is no longer just the expansion of the West since it 
has been achieved in societies that have retained their political 
sovereignty and preserved their cultural identity, of which one 
major  component is certainly Buddhism . Westemization is  
spreading, but not every aspect of the West - or at  least not with 
the same degree of success as previously. 
What is the West today? What are its essential components? 
Components that occur in association in the West m ay be 
dissociated and appear in combination with different social and 
cultural components in other parts of the world. In my view, the 
West is a blend of the real and the imaginary, of achievements and 
standards,  of modes of behaviour and ways of thinking, which 
today make up a sort of ball of energy that either attracts or repels 
and revolves around three axes, three sets of institutions each with 
its own logic,  symbols and values : capitalism, parliamentary 
democracy and Christianity. 
Capitalism is the most developed form of market economy that 
has ever existed. Parliamentary democracy i s  a system of 
government that, no matter whether it takes the form of a republic 
or a constitutional monarchy, entrusts power to representatives 
elected by universal suffrage and recognizes that all citizens have, 
in principle, equal rights and equal duties in the eyes of the law. 
And Christianity is a religion that emphasizes the sins and salvation 
of the individual and also preaches that one should love one's 
neighbour as oneself and render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's 
and unto God that which is God's. 
In short, the West today derives its strength from a combination 
of three components that emerged at different points in its history 
and have only lately come together and fused. Christianity has 
exerted its influence for 2,000 years and predates the appearance 
of capitalism by many centuries. Capitalism first developed before 
the sixteenth century within the feudal and monarchical societies. 
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Originally,  therefore, it had nothing in common with democracy; 
indeed, as late as 1 906 Max Weber wondered whether there was 
any necessary link between capitalism and democracy. Taiwan and 
South Africa currently prompt the same question. But South 
Africa is Christian, whereas Taiwan is not. 
These unfavourable examples remind us that there is also a 
darker side to the West: the conquering, colonial , despotic West 
drawing its wealth from the resources of the rest of the world, 
closing its eyes whenever convenient to the lack of freedom and 
rights accorded by the regimes that serve it or are associated with it, 
encouraging not only individualism but also egoism. Such 
denunciations do not come only from the Third World: in the West 
equal rights coexist, sometimes successfully and sometimes not, 
with what are at times enonnous disparities in standards of living, 
and there are still those who believe that the accumulation of 
capital depends in part on the legal exploitation of labour. 
In short, the West is not a flawless or stainless model, but it is still 
today a source of attraction rather than repulsion. At the same 
time, like any historical phenomenon, it runs the risk of being 
demoli shed sooner or later by history as a result of its 
contradictions and ambiguities. But since the events in Berlin and 
Bucharest that day would seem to have been postponed for several 
decades or even several centuries. 
THE BAR UY A - A TRIBAL SOCIETY 
Having defined the West in these terms I shall now proceed to 
consider the Westemization of pre-industrial societies; however, I 
shall confine my remarks to tribal societies, which are still major 
components of many nations in Africa, Asi a ,  America and 
Oceania.  
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But, first of all, what is a tribe? A tribe is a local society 
composed of a set of kinship groups, united by the same principles 
of social organization and ways of thinking, interconnected by 
repeated marriages and co-operating in the defence of a common 
territory and the exploitation of its resources. Several tribes may 
share the same language and the same principles of social 
organization. What distinguishes them, then, and sets them apart is 
the control of a part of nature, a territory. 
Thus tribal identity is a composite reality consisting of a cultural 
and social framework and identification with a territory that has 
been conquered or inherited from tribal ancestors and must be 
passed on to future generations. Tribal societies have always been 
highly diverse. In general, however, they have been classified on 
the basis of two criteria: whether they were sovereign in their own 
territory or already integrated in a pre-colonial state governed, in 
most cases,  by the members of a dominant tribe; and whether 
power within the tribe was shared more or less equally between all 
groups or was concentrated in the hands of a few at the top of a 
hierarchy, hereditary or otherwise. In 195 1 an example of a tribal 
society with its own sovereign territory in which ritual and political 
power was held largely by a number of families descended from 
conquering groups was provided by the Baruya of New Guinea. I 
shall analyse the forms taken by the processes of Westemization in 
that tribal society and the stages those processes passed through. I 
shall proceed, not by making comparisons, but by drawing general 
conclusions from the processes that operated among the Baruya -
processes that, as will readily be seen, have also occurred and 
recurred elsewhere. 
Who are the Baruya? A society living in two high valleys (at an 
altitude of 2,000 metres) in a chain of mountains in the interior of 
New Guinea. They were discovered in 195 1 by an Australian 
officer who had heard of the Batiya (now Baruya), renowned as 
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salt producers, and organized a military expedition to locate them. 
In 1951 the island of New Guinea was divided into three colonial 
regions : Dutch New Guinea, now Irian Jaya, controlled by The 
Netherlands; New Guinea, a former German colony which had 
been placed under Australian trusteeship after World War I by the 
League of Nations; and Papua, a former British colony 'given' by 
Great Britain to Australia in 1906. 
In 195 1 the Baruya population amounted to some 1,800 people 
living in roughly a dozen small villages. The society was made up 
of fifteen clans, eight of which had been formed by invaders who 
had conquered local groups . The economy was based primarily on 
a form of extensive slash-and-bum agriculture, but the Baruya also 
practised more intensive techniques , ·  growing irrigated crops on 
terraces. Pig breeding was mainly women's work, and hunting, 
which was an exclusive preserve of the men, had a chiefly ritual 
significance and contributed to the assertion of male superiority. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century their tools were still 
made of stone, bone or wood, but the Baruya had no good stone 
on their territory to manufacture the tools. They obtained it by 
trading in salt, which they produced from the ashes of a plant. 
The organization of society was based on the interplay of 
kinship relations and the general subordination of one sex to the 
other, of women to men. Lineage was patrilinear and women were 
prohibited from owning land, bearing arms and possessing the 
magic and ritual objects that, according to the B aruya, ensured 
children's growth. Marriage involved a direct exchange of women 
among the men. Every three years great male initiation ceremonies 
were held, and the entire tribe, with all the villages and lineages 
taking part, built a large ceremonial house which the Baruya 
described as a gigantic 'body'. Each vertical post represented one 
of the tribe's young men who was to be initiated. 
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Summing up, what we have here is an example of a small local 
society, politically independent, with a partly autarkical economy, 
able to maintain itself but dependent on the salt trade for the 
acquisition of tools, weapons, ritual objects and other items; that is,  
its means of production, destruction and other objects essential for 
its reproduction. It was a classless society but not an egalitarian 
one. There were various kinds of inequality : a general inequality 
between men and women and another kind that set 'big-men' apart 
from others . These 'big-men' were great by virtue of either their  
function or their merit. They were either masters of rituals who had 
inherited from their  ancestors the sacred objects necessary for 
children's growth or the struggle against evil spirits ,  or else they 
were great warriors who had killed many enemies or were hunters 
of cassowaries. For the Baruya, the cassowary was not only a type 
of game: it was also a wild woman who wandered the forests of 
New Guinea. As for the universe, the Baruya had no concept of the 
creation of the world . They believed that after a period when sky 
and earth were one, and when animals and human beings lived 
together and spoke the same language , the present order of the 
world was born: the sun and moon broke away from the earth and 
rose above it, pushing the sky before them. For the B aruya, the sun 
and the moon are powers of remote deities whose actions are 
beneficial. For example, the sun acts in women's wombs together 
with male sperm to produce children. What concerns and scares the 
Baruya are the evil spirits of the forest and the caves, especially the 
spirits of the dead. 
I should note that in Baruya society there is no direct l ink 
between economics and kinship, between the production of wealth 
and the reproduction of life :  a woman can be exchanged only for 
another wom an. In many other societies in New Guinea and in 
Africa a woman is exchanged for wealth (bridewealth), and contact 
with the West has rapidly led to an enormous inflation in dowries. 
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This highlights the great variety of characteristics in the many 
societies on which the West has impacted. 
THE COLONIAL IMPACT 
The Westernization of the Baruya took place in four stages 
under the influence of various forces that acted either separately , 
one after the other, or jointly. 
The meeting of two worlds took place in 195 1 ,  but by that time 
the West had already transformed the lives of the B aruya, even 
though no European had appeared in the region. During the 
twenty years preceding this contact the Baruya, through their salt 
trading, had obtained steel axes and machetes made in Sheffield 
and Solingen in an industrial Europe of whose very existence they 
were unaware . Seeing the effectiveness of these new tools they 
threw their traditional stone tools away in the forest. With their 
more effective steel tools they saved time, which they spent either 
in fighting or in doing nothing. But they were obliged to produce 
more salt in order to acquire them. The women , who were 
excluded by tradition from the work of tree-felling, continued to 
make use of their wooden tools , and, inasmuch as the Baruya 
started to clear larger gardens and raise more pigs , the introduction 
of the white men's tools meant that the women had more work to 
do. Thus the Baruya, by abandoning their old stone tools , had 
already placed themselves, without realizing it, in a position of 
material and economic dependence on the West. 
But other suprising events occured during the years that led up 
to the arrival of the whites. One day the Baruya saw in the sky two 
large birds chasing each other and spitting fi re . They were 
terrified. This was an episode in the World War II , an air battle 
between Japanese and Australi ans that probably took place in 
1943 .  Sometime later a Baruya named Dawatnie, who had gone to 
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trade in salt among the Watchakes, a tribe living far to the north of 
Baruya, was led by his hosts to the top of a mountain, from where 
he was shown in the valley below several of these large birds :  
beings of human form were entering the stomachs of these birds. 
On returning home he related what he had seen and thus,  even 
although they had never seen any Europeans,  the B aruya 
discovered the existence of supernatural beings of human form 
and with light skin who lived in large firebirds. 
In 1951 the first white man, Jim Sinclair, arrived at the head of a 
column of soldiers and carriers. The Baruya were then at war with 
their neighbours whose fortified villages were positioned on top of 
the mountains on the other side of the same valley. The white man 
set up a camp, and in the centre he erected a pole on which he 
hoisted the Australian flag. He drew up his men and ordered them 
to present arms to the flag. The Baruya were dazzled by the 
flashing bayonets, and when the flag was raised the following 
morning a warrior .  named Bwarinmax fell into a trance. He 
believed he had been possessed by the white man's power, which 
had revealed itself in the flashing bayonets. A that point the 
Baruya decided to kill the white man and massacre his troops. But 
Jim Sinclair, who was completely unaware of their intentions, asked 
for a dozen very thick shields to be brought and invited some 
powerful warriors to fire arrows at them. He then drew up a 
platoon of soldiers and told them to open fire :  the shields 
shattered. This demonstration of force impressed the Baruya, who 
abandoned their plans for a m assacre. Thus, in 195 1, another 
dimension was added to the B aruya's material dependence on 
Western tools: their military subordination. 
Thirty years later, after independence, things would no longer 
be the same when the Baruya and neighbouring tribes resumed 
their warfare. The government sent an officer and a few soldiers to 
arrest the 'ringleaders' , and the officer made as if to order his men 
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to open fire on the crowd. The Baruya explained to him that they 
were not afraid: he would not be able to kill all of them as they 
were too numerous and, in any case, he and his soldiers would 
rapidly be overwhelmed. 
But let us return to 195 1 .  The first sight of a white man in flesh 
and blood produced a great change in the B aruya. They soon 
discovered that he was a man like themselves and not a 
supernatural being, a man who was superior but certainly not a 
spirit or a god. 
Several years went by during which no other whites appeared. 
Then suddenly, in 1 960, an impressive column of soldiers and 
carriers emerged into the Wonenara Valley on the border between 
the Baruya and their enemies. This wa·s a flat area where the tribes 
traditionally gave battle, and because it was flat the white men 
decided to build a landing strip there. A patrol post was set up at 
the end of the strip, and some of the soldiers went off to identify 
the tribes and inform them that they no longer had the right to 
fight each other. The officer in charge of establishing the 
administration later summoned representatives of the various tribes 
to explain the new order of things and sent them home after 
appointing them 'chiefs' of their villages on behalf of Her Majesty, 
the Queen of England. Unfortunately, one of these men was 
attacked on the way home by some warriors of the Yunduye tribe 
with which his own tribe had been at war when the whites had 
arrived. He was killed and his body was fed to the dogs. 
On hearing this news the officer organized a punitive expedition 
and three people were subsequently killed, including a woman; a 
column of prisoners was brought back to the post. One of the 
prisoners, a great shaman, believed that he could escape from the 
white men by flying away since the spirit of the shaman is a bird, 
and he therefore threw himself - in handcuffs - from the top of 
a cliff. He crashed to the ground but did not die and has been 
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terribly disabled even since. Another incident, this  time among the 
Baruya, gave the local tribes a fresh opportunity to gauge the white 
men's strength and determination. Following the suicide of a 
woman, a battle had broken out between the inhabitants of her 
village and those of her husband's village . When the officer was 
informed, he burnt the village of the people he believed to have 
been responsible for the battle - the dead woman's village. 
Unfortunately for the Baruya two sacred objects disappeared in 
thi s  fire : the dried fingers of a great warrior who had led their 
ancestors in the conquest of the territory and, much more 
seriously ,  the flints used to rekindle the sacred flame during 
initiation ceremonies, which disintegrated in the heat of the fire. 
The officer never knew anything of these losses. 
Thus,  very quickly, within the first months of being colonized, 
the local tribes lost a major attribute of their existence: the right to 
lead their own lives , the right to apply their laws on their own 
territory. In short, they simultaneously lost what we would call 
political sovereignty and cultural autonomy. 
As a state can exercise its authority only over a registered 
population, a comprehensive census of the population was begun 
at that time. Peace was imposed and the villages were relocated to 
the valley floor for census purpose and ease of control. The people 
were obliged to co-operate in the census and to submit to the law. 
They were prohibited from taking the law into their own hands. 
The Baruya had just come into contact with an institution that has 
played a great role in the development of humankind and is an 
indicator of civilization: the state. Of course, the state that had 
discovered them was colonial and authoritarian, but it was seen by 
the Europeans as representing a necessary stage in progress 
towards the democratic parliamentary state that would replace it 
after independence. 
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In 1966 another component of the West, Christianity, entered 
the field in force. Lutheran missionaries came to settle near the 
patrol post and built both a mission and a school. They brought 
with them evangelists from the coastal tribes,  which had been 
converted to Christianity long before, and placed one in each 
village to preach the word of the Lord. They preached in pidgin 
English, the language taught in the school together with the 
rudiments of arithmetic  and writing. The B aruya and the 
neighbouring tribes welcomed this move, and soon more than 100 
children were attending the school. Two years later the best pupils 
were sent to a mission secondary school in a town of the interior. 
One of the boys in this first class later became a forestry engineer, 
another a mathematics teacher and a third a policeman; one even 
became a minister. 
Throughout their stay at college the missionaries forbade them 
to return to their tribe to take part in initiation ceremonies. They 
were told that their ancestors had worshipped false gods and that 
they and their parents had previously been living in sin without 
knowing it. A split developed between most of the boys , who were 
to remain 'bush-Kanaka' like their parents, and the minority, the 
'schoolboys' ,  who had begun to 'evolve'. Some of the latter 
declared at that time that the customs of their ancestors should be 
abandoned and that they 'spat on the loin cloths' of their fathers . 
Fifteen years later, however, nearly all of them returned of their 
own accord to take part in the great initiation ceremonies. 
I should note here that Kanaka is the Hawaiian word for 'man' , 
adapted by the French as 'canaque' to refer to the tribes of New 
Caledonia. This term had been taken over by the Australian 
Administration to refer to the scarcely pacified bush tribes. The 
B aruya had therefore become 'bush-Kanaka' , primitive people 
living in the forests. But it was these same 'bush-Kanaka' who had 
so quickly decided to send some of their children to school. That 
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decision demonstrated a determination to integrate to some extent 
in the new world that had been imposed on them or offered to 
them; a world that, as they quickly realized, they could no longer 
escape. The soldiers, evangelists and carriers, black like themselves 
and coming from unknown tribes, were proof of that. They 
therefore sent their boys to school without initiating them or 
limited their initiation to several hours and a few rites,  whereas 
tradition demanded that boys be separated from their mothers and 
the world of women by the age of nine and that they should live in 
the house of men up to the age of twenty, when they would marry. 
This did not prevent the Baruya's leading shaman from sending 
his son to the school. Twenty years later the son returned to his 
tribe,  now a mini siter, and became deputy to the German 
missionary in charge of the Lutheran mission. At the time two 
Baruya clans had decided, with government encouragement, to 
establish a sort of sales and purchasing co-operative,  and they 
entrusted its management to him. He was expelled from the 
mission, however, for making his wife's mother pregnant. He later 
gave up his other position on suspicion of having misappropriated 
the shop's funds. Today, having taken a second wife, he lives in his 
village and still enjoys undoubted authority. 
In 1 965 the Administration began to recruit up to 30 per cent 
of the men in certain villages for work in the coastal plantations . 
Many Baruya who wanted to travel volunteered for this work and 
went off for a period of two years . At the ti�e the Administration 
did not allow natives to renew their contracts, as it was afraid they 
would begin to form organizations if they remained for too long at 
the same plantation. The men were housed in barracks, fed and 
paid a few dollars a week. At the end of their contract they were 
given roughly 200 Australian dollars each, which they could spend 
as they wished. Most of them spent part of this sum on tools ,  
blankets and umbrellas, which they distributed when they got back 
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to the village. The B aruya thus became wage-earners who had 
freely sold their labour. 
In actual fact, the money they earned and the food rations they 
received were not the equivalent of real wages. They had 
experienced the discipline of continuous piece-work under the 
supervision of foremen, an experience that was completely foreign 
to their  traditional labours.  They had encountered the sea (of 
whose existence they had not dreamed) and ships and aircraft. But 
on their return in 1967 many declared that they would not leave 
again even if asked. 
In 1 967, following the soldiers, the missionaries and the civil 
servants, an academic anthropologist arrived : that was me, bringing 
the Western presence up to full strength. Following Western forms 
of authority, there was now a Western form of knowledge. After a 
few months I was asked by the officer in charge of the post to tell 
him who the real fight-leaders were, since it was obvious that the 
Baruya had put forward men without importance as their village 
chiefs. The missionaries , for their part, would have liked to know 
what went on during the shamanist ceremonies and who the 
'sorcerers' were. Like any doctor, I then invoked professional ethics 
to justify my silence. 
In 1 968 the Administration, in its concern for development, 
organized huge campaigns to encourage the tribes to plant coffee 
and di stributed thousands of coffee plants free of charge. 
Agronomists came to explain what types of soil and what exposure 
were suitable for the crop. At the time coffee fetched a good price , 
as B razil was going through a production crisis ,  something of 
which the Baruya were completely unaware. As producers of salt 
they knew what it meant to produce for exchange or sale. But their 
salt was simultaneously both a commodity and their currency. 
Coffee was a commodity that they produced but did not consume 
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themselves, and the currency they received for it was made and 
controlled by others. 
The Baruya set to planting coffee trees, in the belief that they 
would be able to make money without leaving their valleys and 
without subjecting themselves to the discipline of plantation work. 
But a problem soon arose : certain families had good ground for 
coffee, and others did not. Initially the old rule of reciprocity 
between families allied by marriage applied, and those who had a 
large area of good land allowed their brothers-in-law to plant 
coffee trees on that land. But a coffee tree has a l ife of some 
twenty years. Allowing someone to use one's land to plant coffee 
was therefore entirely different from allowing him to plant sweet 
potatoes or vegetables , which are harvested at the end of a single 
season. Economic differentiation began to develop between 
families and between individuals,  a phenomenon that had not 
applied to subsistence agriculture although it had already existed 
for salt-producing land. In short, the Baruya began to wo k im 
bisnis ;  that is ,  to do business in the way the Administration did, 
which was widely emulated in those regions that had been 
colonized for a long time. But wokim bisnis meant selling to the 
whites , not - yet - to one's brother, to a member of one's own 
tribe, to a B aruya. 
That threshold was crossed on the day the B aruya decided to 
sell the meat of a pig they had killed. Among the Baruya, pigs had 
always been exchanged as gifts between relatives, allies, initiates, 
and so on. The selling of pig meat meant changing a gift into a 
commodity and accepting the idea that anyone with money could 
use it to purchase that commodity even though he had no personal 
link with the pig's owner. Impersonal commodities and an abstract 
homo economicus had just made their appearance in a society that 
had traditionally functioned on the basis of personal relationships. 
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At the end of 1968 Australia decided to organize elections 
throughout the country in order to establish an assembly of 
representatives from the various regions; the first step towards the 
parliamentary democracy that was designed to replace the colonial 
administration after independence. Parties already existed in the 
country, including the P A N G U  Party, which w as demanding 
independence and whose secretary, Michael Som are of the Sepik, 
was to become Prime Minister of the first government of the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea. But in 1968 the B aruya 
were entirely unaware of these parties and of the significance of 
the elections . By chance I was present when the elections took 
place.  
The v arious tribes of the region were assembled in the 
mountains at several points that were easy to reach. A white officer 
arrived with his interpreters and set up a polling station in a tent. 
He explained that all the registered adults should vote and that by 
so doing they would send to the capital people who would speak 
up for them to the government. Then, as almost everyone could 
not read and therefore could not choose between names on the 
ballot papers, the crowd was shown posters with the pictures of nine 
candidates , black and white, who were unknown to the tribes . The 
officer provided some information about the candidates and their 
programmes. Each man and woman was then called by name and 
asked to point to one of the photos . Even the men were shy - and 
the women were terrified. For example, one of the women who 
placed her finger between two photos was shouted at; she then 
pointed to one photo at random. She had 'voted' .  Such were the 
first steps in learning about parl iamentary government . Since then 
the Baruya have come to be perfectly well aware of the importance 
of having their own representative in the National Parliament. But 
they have encountered two problems which they have not yet 
solved. It is essential for thei r  families to agree on a single 
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candidate and that other tribes be prepared to back that candidate. 
But each tribe wants to be represented by one of its own members, 
and each family would prefer to choose the representative from 
within its own ranks. 
INDEPENDENCE AND LATER DEVELOP1\1ENTS 
In 1975 the B aruya became, without asking or wanting to be, 
citizens of an independent nation that immediately became a 
member of the United Nations . This  was the period of 
decolonization, and independence had been granted to them by 
Australia, which was then governed by the Labor Party. For the 
Baruya, the colonial period had been extremely short, just fifteen 
years. A further fifteen years have now passed since independence. 
What has happened to them in the interval? 
Several months before the proclamation of independence 
Richard Lloyd, a missionary from the Summer Institute of 
Lingui stics, who , since the end of 1 95 1 ,  had been the first 
European to live nearly continuously among the Baruya and learn 
their language, returned with the first book printed in that 
language, a remarkable translation of the Book of Genesis. At the 
time only two of the small number of Baruya who knew how to 
read and write had become Christian, since in order to be baptized 
it was necessary for polygamous men to repudiate all but one wife. 
But repudiating a woman meant breaking an alliance with people 
to whom a man had given his own sister; it also changed drastically 
the status of the children of the woman concerned . The B aruya 
found this too difficult; they also did not really understand why 
the white missionaries from the various Protestant sects - the 
Seventh Day Adventists, the Lutherans and the New Tribes Mission 
- fought among themselves to recruit them. 
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At that time the Lutheran mission, led by a German who had 
escaped from the German Democratic Republic, opened a trading 
post beside the mission. Two hundred dollars was invested to 
purchase the usual range of goods: knives, rice, umbrellas , etc. 
When this first batch was sold the money was reinvested to buy a 
second batch, and so on. At the end of the year the missionary had 
A$ 14,000 worth of cash and stock. He was criticized for running 
this flourishing business by the American missionary from the 
New Tribes Mission, who boasted of living in poverty. The rate of 
profit was quite appreciable but nothing compared with that of the 
large Australian commercial companies in the towns, Bums Philp, 
and Steamships . 
Fresh elections were held to elect the first parliament of 
independent Papua New Guinea. The B aruya voted succesfully for 
a brilliant young man, 'Peter', a medical assi stant who was a 
member of a traditionally hostile tribe, the Andje. At the same time 
they also provided him with a wife. Unfortunately Peter was killed 
three years later in an air crash, and his successor came from a 
tribe with which the Baruya had little contact. 
After independence increasing num hers of children were sent to 
school, including girls , who, for the first time in the history of the 
B aruya, competed directly with the boys in learning to read , write , 
count and even run. Many young men went off to work in the 
plantations or looked for employment in the towns. The older men 
remained in the village and continued to plant coffee. B ut much 
was now changing in the country . Many of the coastal plantations 
had been sold by their European owners, who were wary of the 
consequences of independence and left the country en masse. The 
plantations had been bought up by the big-men of the local tribes. 
The number of Europeans actually liv ing in the country was 
dwindling. In the towns insecurity and delinquency increased. 
Alcohol , which had formerly been reserved for the consumption of 
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whites or for the few natives allowed to enter their pubs, was now 
freely on sale . The initiation ceremonies - which had never been 
discontinued among the Baruya during the colonial period but had 
merely been held far from the gaze of the missionaries and the 
soldiers - increased in scale albeit still without the rituals 
associated with war, whi ch was now forbidden, and with 
homosexual relations between the initiates,  which were on the 
decline . At that time some Baruya who had studied and become 
policemen, nurses and teachers returned to take part in the 
initiation ceremonies. These were the same people who twenty 
years previously had scorned the customs of their ancestors. And it 
was one of them who in 1 979 publicly explained to all the men of 
the tribe and the young initiates that the initiations had to be 
continued because strength was needed to resist the life of the 
towns and the lack of work or money; people had to depend on 
themselves .  In my presence he shouted : 'We must find strength in 
our customs;  we must base ourselves on what the whites call 
culture' . 
Things continued to develop in this contradictory fashion, with 
the B aruya drawing on certain elements of thei r  culture and 
abandoning others . They began to combine what they retained 
with ideas and practices from the West. Thus , in 1980, the B aruya 
decided to intitiate new shamans and organize grand ceremonies, 
which are usually held every eight or ten years . There were few 
volunteers , s ince a person who becomes a shaman among the 
Baruya must remain in the tribe to protect it against the attacks of 
evil spirits and to conduct a struggle every night against the witch­
doctors of neighbouring tribes, who seek to lead the spirits of the 
Baruya astray or to devour their livers. The young men preferred 
to travel or else had less confidence than their elders in the powers 
of their shamans . They, in tum, admitted that their powers had not 
been the same since the whites had come. And yet a compromise 
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was reached with the medicine of the Europeans . People attended 
the small medical post for the treatment of fractures, wounds and 
infections; the shaman was consulted for internal pains, which were 
signs of poisoning by means of sorcery. 
That was the situation in 1 98 6  when a problem unresolved 
during the colonial period suddenly re-emerged, a problem 
concerning good coffee-growing land lying along a river. The 
Yuwarrunatche, neighbours and enemies of the B aruya, who had 
just lost a war and the land in question at the time that Jim Sinclair 
arrived , decided to recover it by force of arms once they realized 
that the new state lacked the strength of the colonial 
administration. War broke out again. The enemy tribe burnt the 
B aruya village nearest to their border and fired arrows into a 
Baruya warrior, telling him to return to the land of his ancestors 
who had taken the land away from them . All the schools closed 
down and the villages were re-establi shed on the mountain tops 
and protected by impenetrable stockades . The hospital and the 
airstrip could no longer be reached by the Baruya because of the 
proximity of their enemies, who maintained a permanent presence 
in the area. No aircraft would agree to land to load the Baruya's 
coffee. The road that the colonial administration had built with the 
labour of the Baruya and their neighbours was cut by the latter and 
the bridges destroyed. The road became unusable after the first 
rainy season. A kind of retrogression then set in and continued up 
until 1 988 .  
Six or  seven of  the B aruya were killed in various battles,  and 
four of their enemies were killed - including their great fight­
leader. But it was not the same kind of war as in the old days . 
Women and child ren were no longer ki lled, because that usually 
led to police intervention. Indeed the police came on two occasions 
by helicopter to arrest the 'ringleaders ' ,  but each time the villages 
were empty and the pol ice merely burnt down a few houses. 
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At length, in 1988 , a long truce was established, but without a 
genuine peace. The airstrip became accessible again, but the 
B aruya had drawn a lesson from the war and had started to build 
their own landing strip in 1 9 87 m the neighbourhood of the 
village furthest away from their enemies, on a high mountain 
terrace. The strip was operational in 1 990. In short, life began 
again, and the changes briefly interrupted by the war resumed with 
a new momentum. 
The B aruya planted increasing amounts of coffee, which is 
men's work. But the bulk of the subsequent work - harvesting, 
drying and hulling the coffee berries - is done by the women and 
young girls. Some men also perform this work: those for whom 
coffee production and moneymaking have become a sort of 
passion. Several of them have already managed to save the 
equivalent of A$500 to A$ 1 ,000. They have learnt to sell at the 
right time and use transistor radios to keep in touch with the coffee 
prices in Goroka, a town that is half an hour away by air. Up until 
now they have done practically nothing with their money. In order 
to prevent it from being stolen, the Government has advised them 
to place it in savings banks , for which it supplies bank books. The 
money is then taken to the town. 
The Baruya continue to open small shops, usually with several 
individuals banding together in order to do so, in which they resell 
at extremely high prices the usual range of goods - rice, soap, 
kerosene and matches - which they have flown in on the mission 
aircraft. But these businesses often go bankrupt,  as the people 
working in the shops help themselves or give presents for which 
they do not pay. Increasingly the Baruya kill pigs in order to sell 
the meat at extremely high prices. The rule is to make as much 
money as possible, wokim bisnis. The women have also entered the 
market economy. Almost every day a hundred or so of them come 
to sit near the medical centre, laying out in front of them several 
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kilos of sweet potatoes and bananas and exchanging recent gossip 
while waiting for customers . Towards midday they return to their 
villages , most having sold nothing. They then eat what they had 
come to sell - which had not, in any case , been produced for sale . 
Economically these exchanges are marginal , but at the social and 
psychological level they demonstrate a desire to imitate the 
Western world and even to become a part of it, if only in symbolic 
rather than real terms. 
It is this same desire to integrate that, I believe, explains a new 
phenomenon of major importance. It will be remembered that in 
1975 no more than two Baruya had been baptized. Since 1988 ,  
however, although there are no  more European missionaries in  the 
region, churches made of wood and thatch, haus lotu, have been 
built in nearly all the villages. Many young people and some old 
women gather in these churches on Sundays. Someone who can 
read pidgin English 'recites' the B ible, and people sing in pidgin 
English or in B aruya, thanking God for having brought light and 
life and asking him to forgive the sins of his creatures. In 1 98 8  I 
was shown long lists of the names of Baruya who were preparing to 
be baptized. Most of them wished to join the Lutheran Church, but 
some wanted to belong to an American sect, The Church of Christ, 
which had recently arrived in the country. Among these recruits 
were many polygamous men. When I expressed astonishment, I 
was told that polygamists could now be baptized. I do not believe 
that this is so, but the Baruya themselves think so and it seems to 
make their conversion to Christianity somewhat easier. What is the 
explanation of this increasing desire for bapti sm? I am not very 
sure. The Baruya do not seem to understand the concept of sin, 
and their new Christian feelings do not prevent them from 
applauding when their enemies are killed , their villages burnt or 
their pigs stolen. I see in this another aspect of their wish to 
become a part of the Western world, the world of their time. It is 
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perhaps significant that the Baruya put on Western dress when they 
go to pray and that the women cover up their breasts . Those 
preparing for baptism give much thought to the Christian name 
they are to receive : John, Samuel , Mary, and so on. 
What has certainly changed most among the B aruya are 
relations between men and women and between generations. 
Although the boys who remain in the village are still initiated and 
live in the men's house, which they should only leave to go into the 
forest, avoiding all contact with women, they can now be seen 
crossing the village and talking to the girls. Remarkably, the girls 
in one village have even set up a basketball team like the boys and 
are practising on the same playing ground at the edge of the 
village . Jokes and glances are freely exchanged, something that 
would have been impossible five years ago. 
That i s  the situation in which the Baruya find themselves forty 
years after the day when a white man at the head of a column of 
soldiers and carriers appeared on one of their mountain tops and 
planted his flag in the middle of their valley. Their society has not 
collapsed : it is still there, and the Baruya have even increased in 
number. But  their lifestyle and ways of thinking have been 
transformed, turned upside down - and the process is irreversible.  
The B aruaya have not accepted these changes passively but have 
been partly responsible for them. This applies equally to the great 
shaman who sent his son to school and to the orphan who became 
a mathematics teacher at the University of Papua New Guinea in 
Port Moresby after being sent by the Australians to study in 
Sydney, Melbourne and Auckland . But although they know how 
to adapt and thus to 'create' a society, the Baruya no longer control 
the development of their own society. It is now subject to 
enormous external forces that have penetrated their society and 
direct it, forces that have all come from the West and have already 
made the small society a part of the West's ever-expanding process 
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of development. In the Pacific the West i s  not identical with 
Europe: half the goods sold in New Guinea come from Japan. 
THE PROCESS OF CHANGE 
Let us briefly recapitulate the various aspects of these now 
irreversible processes : submission to the West and integration with 
it. The B aruya no longer produce their own tools and would no 
longer be able to make the old stone tools and use them. They 
need a currency that is not their own; they must become unskilled 
and poorly paid wage-earners in order to earn it or else become 
small producers of coffee, which they do not consume and which 
others export onto the world market. 
The B aruya have become citizens of a state whose principles 
and models are of Western origin. Indeed, it was the West that 
introduced them before granting independence to this artificial 
nation. And since independence Australia has continued to provide 
a third of the budget of the new state, which does not mean that the 
latter simply takes orders from its former colonial master. But all 
this i s  still way over the heads of the Baruya. We should note in 
passing that it is probably the existence of over 750 tribes of 
different sizes and speaking different languages (in a country of 
mountains and jungles where travel has always been extremely 
difficult) , none of which had ever been able to establish its 
hegemony even over several others, that has made it possible to 
establi sh and maintain a form of parliamentary democracy .  
Elsewhere,  in Africa and Asia, i n  places where one ethnic group 
wielded power over others before or after the period of European 
colonization, many one-party states and puppet parliaments were 
established after independence. 
But the very factors that faci l i tated the introducti on of 
parliamentary democracy in New Guinea have reduced its 
MAURICE GODELIER 79 
effectiveness. The post-colonial state does not have the material 
and human resources necessary to maintain a universal presence 
and to enforce its laws. The tribes quickly realized this · and have 
returned to the use of violence in settling their problems with their 
neighbours , as in the good old days. The war between the Baruya 
and the Yuwarrunatche is an example of this general trend. The 
state is seen both as an abstract and far-off power that is best 
avoided and as a mysterious near-inexhaustible source of money 
and various forms of assistance that should be exploited as much 
as possible. Each tribe invokes its right to obtain as much as the 
others, and each attempts to obtain more than the others . The 
Baruya have also learnt the rules of this game. 
They are culturally subject to the West as well as being 
subordinate to it in economic and political terms.  They have 
learned to read and write in pidgin English, a colonial language 
similar to the French and English Creoles spoken today by the 
black populations of the West Indies. Those who receive secondary 
or higher education must learn English, the only language that 
enables them - as it does us - to communicate with the rest of 
the world. But the most important change is the general erosion 
and di sm antling of the B aruya's innermost culture and the 
irremediable destruction of some of its components . And this has 
happened in spite of the fact that many Baruya are proud of their 
customs and have not reacted passively or with indifference to their 
disappearance. But of all the forces acting on their society, two 
make direct attacks on their culture: the state, which prohibits war 
and assumes the right to dispense justice; and Christianity , which 
asserts that the sun and the moon are false gods , that the true 
religion is the religion of Christ and that people live in sin, 
especially if they are unaware that Christ died on the Cross to 
redeem the sins of people of all races and all colours. Like Islam 
and Buddhism, Christianity is a religion that seeks converts, and the 
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B aruya will probably all be Christian in a few generations, 
espousing a form of Third World Christianity that may differ 
considerably from European Christianity but still draws its 
inspiration from the latter's great visions and symbols . 
Some of these changes are welcomed by the B aruya themselves. 
They do not wish to see the reappearance of constant, endemic 
warfare between themselves and their neighbours.  But if war is no 
longer seen as a normal necessity for men, for which they must be 
prepared when they are very young, and as an opportunity to 
become a 'big-man', this means the collapse of some traditional 
values and of the traditional social hierarchy. 
In addition, the Baruya men no longer like to spend their entire 
lives in the two valleys where their ancestors lived and in the four 
or five others they visited at the risk of their lives. They like to 
travel by air, to stay away for several years, to play cards, to drive 
trucks. One of them even joined a Japanese factory ship. Two or 
three have married women from the coast, announcing that they 
would not be returning to the village and that the women who had 
been promised to them could be married off to other men. 
But, most importantly, there has been a major change in the 
deepest structure of Baruya society, the relations between men and 
women: a movement away from the traditional denial of women 
and affirmation of male dominance. Not that these changes have 
been accepted without violence. Seven or eight women were beaten 
to death or executed by husbands who could not tolerate the fact 
that they were no longer shown the obedience and submission to 
which tradition entitled them. But the men today are less afraid of 
women's uncleanness and, in tum, the women are less afraid of the 
symbols of male superiority . Young fathers can now be seen 
playing with their babies even when those babies are gi rls .  
Previously , the very idea would have made them spit in disgust and 
shame. One thing has not changed however: marriage is still based 
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on the direct exchange of si sters between two men and two 
families . But the girls increasingly have a say, and they are not 
forced to marry against their will. 
That is my view of the forms and mechanisms involved in the 
Westernization of a tribal society . For the Baruya, a white person is 
no longer a supernatural being but does remain a superior being, 
albeit, since decolonization, one from whom they will no longer 
accept orders or kicks. But in one sense it is the whites themselves 
who, by granting independence, have denied themselves such 
liberties. And, on a higher level, it is the whites' religion that asserts 
that all men are equal before God . 
Will these processes continue? Yes. Are they irreversible? Yes . 
Will they spread throughout the entire world? Probably, but here 
we must return to the idea that Westemization will continue to 
spread, but that its present three components will not spread with 
the same degree of success. Ja pan is today the most dynamic 
capitali st country, but it has become so without losing either its 
political independence or the basis of its cultural identity. Indeed, 
Japan was never a colony, and Christianity has not long been 
allowed to vie with Buddhism there. But the tiny society of the 
Baruya is as nothing alongside Japan, and there are hundreds of 
such societies. 
The West's first triumph will be in Europe, where it will finally 
conquer Eastern Europe, a task begun in the sixteenth century well 
before the advent of the communist regimes. It will also spread in 
the Orient, even if the West is not synonymous there with Europe.  
Must we join in the applause or tiptoe off the stage? Leaving aside 
the people of the Third World, why should silence be required of 
those in the West who continue to believe that Christianity is not 
the only true religion and that there is indeed no true and no false 
religion; or of those who see that political democracy does exist 
and welcome it, but know that there is much to be done to extend 
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social democracy and that nearly everything remains to be done to 
ensure that the wealth produced by capitalism or appropriated by it  
is shared out more fairly in the West itself and elsewhere? Why 
should we refuse to see these bad aspects, which are there and do 
affect our lives? What reason could there be for putting up with 
them? Could it really be because the end of history has arrived and 
we are at last living in the best of all possible worlds? 
NOIB 
This paper is a partly modified version of a lecture delivered on 13  May 1990 
in Vienna, as part of the Wiener Vorlesungen organized by the municipality 
of the Austrian capital. 
REFLECTIONS ON HISTORY IN POLYNESIA 
Alan Howard 
I would like, in this paper, to reflect on some key issues of history in 
Polynesian studies. Historical approaches in anthropology have come 
into vogue again after a hiatus during which functional, structural and 
cognitive studies predominated. The new historiographies have 
brought with them new problems and dilemmas which I will try to 
identify and comment upon. I would particularly like to draw 
attention to issues of discourse, that is , the language - including 
underlying assumptions - in which historical approaches have been 
embedded. 
Anthropological history began in Polynesia with attempts to 
reconstruct the great migrations that resulted in the settlement of the 
island archipelagos. Diffusionism focused on the artefacts and 
customs that were the presumed residues of an inferred history. In this 
context 'history' was synonymous with sailing from one island base to 
another. Humans were largely omitted, except as conveyors of 
material culture, language and customs. 
The main competitor to diffusionism was evolutionism . Humans 
were also generally omitted from evolutionary accounts , which 
attempted to explain the varying levels of political and economic 
development evident in Polynesian cultures at the time of European 
intrusion. For evolutionists , 'history' was equivalent to 'processes of 
development' that were stimulated or constrained by ecological 
conditions. The forces that drove development were essenti ally 
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impersonal, although human actors were sometimes given a role in 
promoting movement from stage to stage. For example, in Irving 
Goldman'  s account ( 1 970) , specific Polynesian chiefs are credited 
with conquests and political activity that brought about changes of 
scale. But they are portrayed by Goldman as players in a cultural 
game motivated by status rivalry rather than as flesh-and-blood 
human beings absorbed in historical events . To be fair to Goldman -
fairer than Nicholas Thomas was in his critical essay Out of time: 
history and evolution in anthropological discourse ( 1 989) - he was 
not claiming to write history, and contributed much to our current 
understanding of political development in Polynesian societies. 
Evolutionism is, of course, alive and well in Polynesia, informing 
much of the archaeological work currently being done . Kirch 
summarizes the accomplishments of this approach in his book The 
evolution of Polynesian chiefdoms ( 1984). 
In the 1 930s anthropologists such as Felix Keesing and Ernest 
Beaglehole initiated studies of 'culture change' in Polynesia. These 
were premised on a reconstructed base-line culture that had been 
altered by European intrusion. History began with the European 
explorers who, along with missionaries, traders, beachcombers and 
colonists, set off a chain of causation that led to the transformation, 
and sometimes 'breakdown', of so-called 'traditional' cultures. A key 
concept in culture change accounts was 'acculturation' , which 
originally was defined as a two-way process of exchange between 
interacting cultures, but in practice almost always referred to ways in 
which dominant Western cultures changed subordinated non-Western 
cultures .  The documentation that supported such studies was 
generally compiled from European-centred accounts - from the 
records of missionaries, colonial administrators and the like. 
While culture change studies continued into the post-World War II 
era, they took a back seat to accounts inspired by functional, cognitive 
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and symbolic anthropology. Raymond Firth's  functional studies of 
Tikopi a were an inspi ration to Polynesiani sts , and set an 
exceptionally high standard for fieldwork. Kinship, political systems, 
land tenure and economic organization became focal points for 
investigation. In these accounts history was sometimes ignored, 
sometimes included as background to a particular institution. But i t  
was marginalized at best and, when included, played a similar role to 
the role of history in culture change studies. That is, it performed the 
task of providing a logical transition from reconstructed 'traditional' 
forms to the forms being described by contemporary ethnographers. 
An implicit goal of many functional-cognitive-symbolic accounts 
was to dispel some of the stereotypic misconceptions in the earlier 
literature and in Euro-American public culture. Polynesians had been 
excessively romanticized on the one hand and disparaged on the 
other. Images of natural humanity and noble savagery were mixed 
with notions of irresponsibility and laziness to compose a cartoon of 
Polynesian personhood. Ethnographic accounts by anthropologists 
from the 1960s onwards have done much to refute these stereotypes, 
but I sometimes wonder if we have not generated new stereotypes in 
place of the ones we have dispelled. I have the feeling that we have 
created a new standardized image of Polynesian personhood: more 
sophisticated and superficially more benign, but every bit as 
stereotyped . These new caricatures will only begin to unravel , I 
believe, when we approach Polynesian societies as historically­
dynamic systems, with real actors doing important things in real time. 
Only then will appreciation of the complexity of persons-in-situations 
replace the facile generalizations that embed these new stereotypes. 
In 1 959 Raymond Firth introduced a new approach to history in 
Polynesia. Visiting Tikopia after an absence of twenty-three years , he 
documented the changes that had occurred, interviewed previous 
informants and reconstructed events that had transformed Tikopia in 
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the interim (Firth 1959). This was a new kind of history in several 
respects : it was relatively short term; change was calculated from a 
well-documented account of the earlier culture; the people who 
participated in historical events were clearly identifiable and large as 
life; and, of considerable significance, most of the data were provided 
by the Tikopia themselves. European accounts were used but were 
clearly secondary. 
At the time , Firth's restudy of Tikopia was seen by anthropologists 
more as a unique opportunity than as a revival of anthropological 
interest in history. Not until the early 1980s, when Marshall Sahlins 
( 198 1 )  and Greg Dening (1 980) published their studies , on Hawaii 
and the Marquesas respectively, did history again come into vogue in 
Polynesian anthropology. Informed by structural and symbolic 
frameworks, Sahlins and Dening focused on early encounters between 
Europeans and Polynesians. Unlike most previous accounts - those 
in the culture change genre, for example - they paid almost as much 
attention to the culture of the European intruders as to the culture of 
the Polynesians affected. In this respect Sahlins's and Dening's work 
marked a major step forward, but their studies were limited in scope. 
In some ways, by confining themselves to the period of 'conjunction' 
(in Sahlins's phrasing),  their projects had more in common with 
reconstructions of pre-European Polynesian societies than with post­
contact historical accounts familiar to historians. 
By drawing attention to the cultural background of European 
intruders , Sahlins and Dening have raised a number of issues of focal 
concern for historical scholars in Polynesia. The language used in 
historical documents , for example, now becomes a matter of 
problematic concern. As Borofsky and I have noted in our chapter 
'The early contact period' in Developments in Polynesian ethnology 
( 1 989),  the characterization as 'theft' by European explorers of 
attempts by Polynesians to appropriate shipboard goods is heavily 
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loaded with cultural assumptions . Documents, therefore,  need to be 
read with a wary eye for both European and Polynesian cultural 
agendas . 
Parallel to a growing interest in early contact history has been a 
revitalization of reconstructionist projects. Douglas Oliver' s Ancient 
Tahitian society (1 974) and Valerio Valeri 's  work on Hawaii ( 1 985) 
are two outstanding, though drastically different, examples. Perhaps 
even more important is the work being done by a new breed of 
archaeologists who are integrating historical accounts with studies of 
environmental transformation, historical legends,  and changes in 
material culture and language. Their work promises to provide a sense 
of Polynesian real-time history prior to European intrusion, replacing 
notions of relatively fixed 'traditional' cultures or sequential 
evolutionary stages. As the collaboration of Kirch and Sahlins ( 1 992) 
on the Anahulu Valley project in Hawaii clearly demonstrates, the 
early post-contact period provides some unique opportunities for 
archaeologists and cultural anthropologists to work together. 
The period following early contact, and particularly the colonial 
era in the Pacific, has also caught the attention of contemporary 
anthropologists. Many of us are now competing directly with Pacific 
historians in a quest to understand the political economies that 
resulted from colonization. Documentation for thi s period is 
extremely rich, thanks to the colonial powers' compulsiveness for 
keeping written records. But the documentation is strongly biased in 
favour of European administrators' values and concerns. It  inevitably 
reveals far more about the culture of colonialism than it does about 
subjected peoples. If we are to write credible histories of Polynesian 
societies during the colonial period, however, we have to do more 
than take European biases into account. We have to do something to 
compensate for the silencing of Polynesian voices. In my opinion, one 
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of the best ways to do this is through biography, and by assisting and 
encouraging Polynesian elders to record their own autobiographies. 
I have recently completed a biography of a remarkable Rotuman 
man by the name of Wilson Inia. He was trained as a school teacher 
and became a leader who served as a bridge into the modem era. He 
started the Rotuma High School and was responsible for training a 
whole generation of individuals who went on to become teachers , 
ministers , doctors and government officials. Without compensation, 
he nurtured the Rotuman Co-operative Association into the most 
successful co-operative venture in Fij i .  In his later years he was 
elected Rotuma's first senator to the Fiji Legislature and served with 
distinction from 1 970 until his death in 1983. 
What I found when researching Inia's biography was that although 
his record of accomplishments was known to most Rotumans he was 
not seen by them as a figure of historical significance. Nor was he a 
historical figure to the British colonialists. He had often proved an 
irritation to them by defying their authority, and they were content to 
bury him in their voluminous files. 
What I came to realize through this research was that in some very 
important respects Rotumans, along with many other peoples who 
were colonial subjects, have been deprived of their history .  The 
colonial powers, Great Britain among them , had little interest in 
glorifying indigenous individuals , especially any who defied their 
authority. 'History' in colonial schools was mainly European history, 
and only a few indigenous individuals - usually rulers or warriors -
were ever identified, mostly for the roles they played in abetting or 
thwarting the dominant society ' s  agenda. Rarely are they represented 
as flesh-and-blood human beings; their biographies, if known at all, 
are more often than not superficial and shallow. Virtually without 
representation arc those individuals, like Wilson Inia, who -
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unobtrusively from the viewpoint of their colonial masters - led 
their people into new social, economic and political territory. 
It is no wonder, then, that the only histories available to ex­
colonial peoples are so often short on biography. But history without 
biography is cold and impersonal; it fails to provide the substance for 
empathetic identification. It lacks the immediacy needed to make a 
people 's  history their own, to make history personally meaningful. 
Heroes - historical models who exemplify the virtues of particular 
cultural traditions - are a vital part of every group ' s  sense of 
themselves.  I have written Wilson Inia ' s  biography in order to 
identify such a hero for the Rotuman people, in the hope that it will 
help to awaken their concern for their history. 
IN SEARCH OF POL YNESIANS' HISTORY 
All of the approaches to history I have discussed so far have been 
from a Western perspective, embedded in forms of discourse that 
emphasize chronological sequencing, cause and effect, developmental 
stages , and the like . Events and processes with pronounced political 
or economic effects are routinely privileged. But what of the ways 
Polynesians 'do history'? What forms do their discourses take? Were 
their traditional approaches to the past 'historical' in our sense? Are 
their current perspectives different from ours? 
Some forms of traditional Polynesian knowledge, especially 
legends, were widely presumed by European scholars to be historical 
discourse as we know it. Many early commentators treated legends as 
essentially accurate oral accounts of 'real events', slightly embellished 
with metaphors and colourful exaggerations . Their assumption was 
that Polynesian story-tellers were repositories of time-chronicled 
events that were important to each group - that they were 'doing 
history' in our sense . Some current scholars take a similar view and 
attempt to date accurately legendary events. But more recently there 
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has been a good deal of debate in the anthropological literature about 
the historical veracity of Polynesian legends. Personally I am 
somewhat sceptical .  As I have stated elsewhere when discussing 
Rotuman legends (Howard 1985), Polynesian story-telling appears to 
be couched in strong semiotic codes in which sequencing plays an 
important part. The structuring of legends thus seems to be less 
oriented to chronicling history than to documenting recurrent cultural 
truisms. In other words , Polynesian myths and legends seem to be 
forms of discourse designed to explicate cultural logic. I have no 
doubt that real historical events are often incorporated into legendary 
accounts, but I do not believe the assumptions underlying Polynesian 
legendary discourse are of the same order as those underlying 
Western histories, written or oral. 
Genealogies probably come closer to historical discourse as we 
know it. They are ordered chronologically and often significant 
events are attached to various personages. They may be mythicized to 
a greater or lesser degree as they recede in time and, to the extent that 
they provide legitimacy to authority, are politically manipulated; but 
these are processes familiar to Western historiography as well. 
In an effort to learn more about historical discourse in Polynesia I 
recently embarked on a project to discover how contemporary 
Rotumans 'did history'. I purposely chose a sample of educated 
individuals initially, thinking they would be sensitive to contrasts 
between Western and Rotuman approaches. I was shocked to discover 
that although they were all familiar with history as a subject taught in 
school (which included British history, the history of Australia and 
New Zealand and, in some instances, the history of Fiji), none had 
thought about Rotuma 's past within a historical framework. When I 
asked which events in the past they regarded as especially important, 
I drew blanks . If I suggested events I knew to be important, they 
would usually agree, but it was apparent they had not thought about 
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them in historical terms. When I asked about people whom they 
admired, or who had done the most for Rotuma, they invariably 
named a close relative or near ancestor, never an unrelated individual 
who, from an outsider' s point of view, had been a historical figure. 
These interviews gave me the clue that I needed. For Rotumans, 
history is embedded in family lines, not in the polity as a whole. My 
informants ' responses reflected the fact that personal identity is still 
much more strongly attached to kin groups and locality than it is to 
Rotuma as a whole, or to the expanded Rotuman community. This 
helps to explain why genealogies remain the closest approximation to 
Western historical discourse in many Polynesian communities. 
Genealogies are, in essence, family histories, which coincidentally at 
times are also political histories. 
Once this realization took hold, it was much easier to identify 
forms of discourse that encoded information about past events. Most 
of the forms require some previous knowledge of persons and events; 
familiarity is assumed and so much of the potential narrative is not 
made explicit. The cryptic nature of these oral accounts is one reason 
it is so easy for an outsider to miss their historical essence. Some 
examples of the tropes that encode history are: 
1 .  Family jokes (te samuga) 
These comprise jokes about families that usually refer to a humourous 
event involving an ancestor. They are usually condensed to a single 
word (for example, biscuit, button) or a short phrase, and are known 
by nearly everyone. For example, the descendants of one man are 
known as 'shake hands with the mirror' ,  in reference to his reaction 
when he was first shown a mirror by European visitors. 
2. Sayings 
Some sayings encode prototypical events that serve as commentary 
on current affairs; for example, fak se Michael refers to a story about 
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a district officer who, in a fit of rage, threw hot water on a man who 
had been a faithful servant. The saying is used as a commentary on 
someone who turns on loyal supporters. 
3. Place names 
Place names carry with them stories and associations that are well 
known to people in a specific locality. Who owns a particular piece of 
land, who claims rights to it, disputes associated with it, social dramas 
played out on it are all embedded in the name of the land. 
4. Chiefly titles 
As with place names, titles are cultural shorthand for encoding 
ancestral persona, wars and conflicts, triumphs and tragedies. Titles 
are located within particular districts and families and as such are 
circumscribed rather than general to the Rotuman community at large. 
So, in contrast to Western historical formats, which are oriented 
towards providing readers or listeners with information they are 
presumed not to know, these Rotuman tropes assume a listener 's prior 
knowledge. They aim at recall - at directing a listener's  attention to 
the relevance of their knowledge to a contemporary context. If a 
listener is uninformed he must ask knowledgeable kin or a friend in 
private of the associations involved. Only rarely will the historical 
knowledge embedded in these codes be made explicit in public 
arenas . 
Still another trope for encoding history is songs which are 
composed to honour specific events such as weddings, funerals, the 
Methodist Conference , when important guests visit, and so on. These 
songs are often sung in conjunction with tau maka (group dances) , 
but they are also composed by individual singers in modem formats . 
They are composed as commentary on current events rather than as 
records for future reference. Most songs arc therefore ephemeral , 
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relating to the current context and later forgotten, although some 
survive in people's memories and thus have historical significance. 
I am well aware that in other contexts educated Polynesians have 
joined academic discourse concerning their history. Some have taken 
radical stands disparaging all Western scholarship. They argue that 
only persons with 'Polynesian blood' are entitled to produce 
representations of Polynesian culture or narrate Polynesian history. 
Usually this is stated in more parochial terms; for example, only 
people with Hawaiian blood or Maori blood are entitled to write about 
Hawaiian or Maori culture and history. They argue that we have 
demeaned them in our characterizations and have undermined their 
political power in the face of Euro-American domination and 
oppression. 
While such arguments deseive a hearing, and are based on serious 
grievances, I find them unacceptable. For one thing, I have a strong 
aversion to the racial premises underlying such pronouncements. Any 
attempt to legitimize or de-legitimize scholarship on the basis of race 
or ethnicity should not be tolerated. It is through a multiplicity of 
views that we are most likely to gain a satisfactory appreciation for 
the human experience in general. Likewise, it is through a multiplicity 
of views that we are most likely to do justice to the full richness of 
any single group's  humanity. 
What would be a step forward for anthropology, however, would 
be to broaden the scope of our discourse so that it is more accessible 
to , and appropriate for, the people we study. I am, therefore ,  
extremely sympathetic to the efforts of  Polynesian scholars like 
Albert Wendt from Samoa, Epeli Hau 'ofa from Tonga, and Vilsoni 
Hereniko from Rotuma. They have incorporated Polynesian tropes 
into their writings - humour, mythical imagery, redundancy -
lending to their  work an insider ' s  subjectivity that enriches 
everyone' s  understanding of the Polynesian experience. To treat such 
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writings as somehow less scholarly, because they may not conform to 
current academic standards of discourse, would be a grave injustice. 
In other words , I am arguing for inclusiveness rather than 
exclusiveness . For too long academic anthropologists have 
·overvalued esoteric discourse designed to prove their intellectual 
superiority. We have correspondingly undervalued communication 
that is clear, straightf mward and accessible to a public that includes 
the subjects we study. 
HISTORY IN THE MAKING 
Finally, I wish to address a form of history that is being thrust 
upon us by changes in the way we . do fieldwork. In the past, 
anthropologists would usually go into the field, spend a year or so 
there, then return to their home society, and that was it. Return trips 
were rare, and 'the ethnographic present' was represented in writing as 
an experience frozen in time. Today, however, many anthropologists 
stay on location for much longer periods, or return to their field sites 
over and over again, year after year. They come to see history in the 
making and gain a very different perspective from their predecessors, 
whose ethnographies were based on single visits .  The more time we 
spend in the communities that we study, the more blurred the 
distinction between 'us' and 'them' becomes. The notion of 'the other' 
as the subject of anthropological investigati"n and discourse comes to 
make less and less sense. Ultimately we '"'ome to realize there is no 
other, only us. 
I did my first fieldwork with Rotumans from 1959-1961  and did 
not return for twenty-six years. During the interim my field notes 
constituted for me an ethnographic present devoid of history. But in 
the period between 1 987 and 1 991  I returned every year to Rotuma 
for field sessions lasting from a few weeks to six months. So I not 
only have a thirty-year perspective on recent Rotuman history, I have 
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been seeing history unfold before my eyes. Each time I go back I gain 
deeper insights into ongoing disputes, shifting alliances, and political 
and economic manreuvering by individuals I have seen in many 
guises. 
Modem technology also has contributed to a constant flow of news 
and gossip being accessible to the anthropologist. In addition to 
letters, I now get periodic faxes from my Rotuman friends in Fiji .  I 
talk regularly, in person and on the telephone, with Rotumans -
including some who live in Europe - who relate the latest news from 
home. Other important sources of ethnographic data are the Fij i 
newspapers. One can find articles about Rotuma ranging from results 
of cricket matches to political upheavals. So there is no ethnographic 
present any more, only perpetual change and ongoing process; only 
history in the making. And the anthropologist often becomes an 
integral part of that history. 
Being witness to, and a participant in, history creates new ethical 
problems for anthropologists. When analysing the colonial period, or 
earlier forms of European intrusion such as missionization, we have 
felt perfectly justified in mercilessly criticizing Europeans who had 
abused power in pursuit of their own self-interests. In the struggles 
between Europeans and Pacific Islanders our sympathies have been 
unabashedly with the latter. Europeans had the power; Pacific 
Islanders were powerless. We were the oppressors; they were the 
victims . 
I believe we have pushed that particular imagery too far, 
sometimes portraying Polynesians as though they had no agendas of 
their own, as if they were only passive reactors to European initiators. 
But the point I want to make here is that in the post-colonial period 
power abuses continue. We are now confronted with instances in 
which Paci fic Islanders in positions of authority abuse power in 
pursuit of political or economic gain. How do we deal with such 
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occurrences? Should we report them with the same ruthless candour 
we have used to expose power abuses by Europeans? Or are we to fall 
back to a position of moral relativism that justifies tyrannical 
behaviour on the grounds that it is acceptable within Pacific cultures? 
Just what kind of 'history' should we be doing? 
I wish to stick my neck out here and make my own bias clear. In 
my opinion we have more to lose, both as anthropologists and human 
beings, by accepting extreme forms of moral relativism than by 
adopting a universalistic approach, albeit a culturally sensitive one, to 
power and its abuse. I think the time has come for anthropologists to 
muster the courage to confront tyranny in no uncertain terms, at every 
level, and regardless of the ethnicity of its perpetrators . Such an 
approach will no doubt involve ri sks. It may mean being denied 
access to field sites. It may mean getting politically involved despite 
attempts to avoid it. But it will result in more credible accounts and, 
hopefully, more social justice, than ignoring such goings on. 
To conclude, I believe that anthropologists can no longer avoid 
paying attention to historical processes, whether analysing earlier 
cultures in the Pacific or recent ones. The only question is what kind 
of history we should be doing. We can be timid, falling back on 
comfortable stereotypes and glossing over rough edges. Or we can 
confront the worst as well as the best head on, in the m anner of good 
investigative reporting. I suggest that in the long run we will provide 
a greater service to anthropology, to the Pacific peoples and to 
humanity if we have the courage to opt for the latter. 
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UNSTEADY C ONCEPTS IN THE SOUTH SEAS 
Jean Guiart 
A usually unheralded aspect of the history of anthropology is that 
the lessons learnt by each successive generation have not always 
been heeded by the next. From this standpoint, Malinowski 's  
influence was certainly better sustained than that of  one of the 
pioneers of British Social Anthropology, W.H.R. Rivers. Rivers had 
understood two things : that field trips should be of long duration1 
(wise counsel forgotten for some time afterwards) ;  and that the 
changes in population numbers had an impact on the field 
situation. 
In his pioneer study Essays on the depopulation of Melanesia 
( 1 922) Rivers outlined a psycho-social explanation for the very 
high male sex ratio then found in the Melanesian islands, and at 
the time expressed general anxiety that Melanesian people would 
simply fade out of the picture, as had almost happened with the 
Marquesans and the Tahitians. The collective lack of a will to live 
on, the despair shown by so many people then - Maurice 
Leenhardt has given us vivid instances of this ( 1 929 :27) - was 
thought by Rivers to explain the continuous population decline 
long after the spread of introduced diseases. This combination of a 
numerical factor and a feeling of doom disappeared with the 
population rise in the 1960s. 
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DEPOPULATION 
Dwindling numbers have been often explained by historians , 
firstly,  in terms of internal strife ,  stemming from prestige 
competition, leading to internecine wars using firearms (see 
Derrick 1 946; Layard 1 942), which were soon much more deadly; 
and secondly, by the introduction of foreign diseases in epidemic 
proportions: smallpox, influenza, whooping cough, tuberculosis ,  
leprosy, and so on. 
Precarious unions , or lifelong marriages , with Europeans have 
been a fixture of everyday life in even the smallest islands in the 
South Pacific, each of which has had a whaling sailor jumping ship, 
marrying and settling locally for some years or for the rest of his 
life. These sexual relations, the offspring of which married anew 
inside the local population, have brought in antibodies to the 
introduced diseases. After a few generations these antibodies were 
carried into the blood of every single islander and explain their 
physical survival .  Nevertheless,  the demographic decline lasted 
much longer than might be expected if this factor alone was taken 
into account. Rivers ' s  published genealogies, checked in the field, 
show, at the onset of the present century, generation levels with 
very few children, or with none at all (Rivers 1 9 14) .  
Missionaries and other authors have often implicated the 
introduction of syphilis (see Deacon 1 934 ). That was a mistake. 
Syphilis does not prevent children from being born in numbers . 
Pacific Islanders did not catch syphilis easily, for the reason that 
they nearly all had survived attacks of yaws in their youth or were 
still carriers of yaws , a disease which is characterized by a cross 
immunization with syphilis ,  the agent, a treponaema,  being the 
same. Local hi stories of the sickness in the Pacific Islands and 
Ameri ca have been quite different :  yaws have no sexual 
connotations whatever, they are caught by walking barefoot on the 
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ground , and are transferred from the deeply scarred soles of the 
feet to the face , eating up parts of the nose and the ears , and 
because of this have often been confused at first glance with 
leprosy. 
The real agent of the continuous depopulation process has been 
gonorrhoea, brought in by the sailors of the different navies,  
English, French, American, German, and the different corps of 
marines used to enforce the white man ' s  peace over the islands . 
Gonorrhoea , being a very old pre-Columbian European disease, 
was introduced early:  by the Spanish in the Marianas; by the 
Portuguese and the Dutch in the Eastern Indonesian spice islands ; 
maybe even by La Perouse 's sailors, which explains the very early 
cases of depopulation in Guam, among the Marind-Anim in the 
south-eastern comer of West New Guinea and maybe on Vanikoro. 
Gonorrhoea provokes metritis in women, who then find themselves 
unable to conceive children, their fallopian tubes being closed. The 
continuous attraction of port towns , keeping numbers constant 
locally, served to hide the powerful depopulation factor linked to 
this physical presence of sailors and soldiers. 
The very specific origin of the disease made for an irregular 
pattern of its diffusion in the islands , going from one lineage to 
another according to the marriages taking place and the amount of 
physical contact of individuals with the port towns. The system of 
forced labour introduced in New Caledonia was a factor 
accelerating its diffusion, as was the labour recrui ting for the 
sugar-cane plantations in Queensland and Fiji .  The sexual abuses 
of native female servants by European employers , or their sons , 
and the recourse on the plantations to a small number of women 
recruited to satisfy the sexual needs of a majority of  men have 
been other accelerating factors . The sm all island of Aneitium, at 
the southern tip of Vanuatu, has seen ships coming over and over 
again, 2 seeking the pretty clear-skinned girls and reinfecting them, 
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which explains why the population, which had fallen from more 
than 3000 to 300 in a matter of ten years under the eyes of the 
pioneer Presbyterian missionnary John Geddie (Miller 1 975) ,  
remained more or  less around 250 for  a century. 
CONTRASTING NUMBERS 
This constant and irregular depopulation factor, coming on top 
of all the others , is responsible for checkered consequences. 
Smallpox was introduced by a parcel of disease-carriers' clothes 
kindly left on one of the beaches of Espiritu Santo by a recruiter 
from Queensland, who thus practised an early form of bacterial 
warfare . It killed four-fifths of the population on the island in the 
second half of last century. 3 
Classical introduced diseases killed in a sort of egalitarian 
manner. All lineages were smitten in the same way. Gonorrhoea 
would hit those families with first contact with the European 
disease-carriers - the crews of men-of-war or later port-town 
garrisons - and would slowly expand without any capacity for 
quick diffusion throughout. Irregular or controlled contact - for 
instance, for all those islands which, for so long, only saw the 
Melanesian Mission ship Southern Cross twice a year and were so 
efficiently protected by the Anglican Church that they very rarely 
had European settlers on their coasts - or the simple fact that 
numerous expatriate workers , in Queensland or New Caledonia, 
tended to stay there and never come back - such being the case 
with many Tannese ,  the northern ni-Vanuatu workers being 
repatriated in greater numbers after 1 899 - m ade for this 
singularity of diffusion. Islands like Lifu, in the Loyalties , and 
Tanna, in southern Vanuatu , have kept their population levels 
steadier than Epi and Malekula. 4 The persistent refusal by the 
people of Aoba to go and work on plantations had the same effect. 
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Their clear-skinned women were much sought after by the 
planters, who tended to keep them as common-law wives and not 
send them back to their villages once they had fathered children 
by them.5 
Thus,  over more than three generations a s ituation was 
maintained by which the population content of each lineage could 
differ widely, much more than would be normal, the general trend 
being an unequal disappearance of the faculty of  producing 
children. The reason was medical. The consequences were cutting 
deeply into the social fabric.  Prescribed spouses were nowhere to 
be found and marriages had to be rearranged according to the real 
situations . Nobody was alive to take over thousands of lapsing 
social statuses . The culture was surviving through dwindling 
numbers of living adults. Villages too small and too far apart had 
to be combined with larger coastal communities under missionary 
protection and supervision. A man could have conferred upon 
himself more than one traditional name, more than one social 
status, and thus multiple land tenure rights. The fact that the 
traditional society had largely become unworkable because of the 
lack of numbers - the island of Epi in central Vanuatu being one 
of the clearest examples of this state of affairs - explains the 
general trend to take refuge in Christianity and hide the necessary 
adaptations through the outward use of Christian names. 
One of the consequences of the heavy but i rregular 
depopulation process was that prescribed wives disappeared. For 
more than a century Islanders married the spouses they could find, 
not unborn theoretical brides and bridegrooms. Sir B asil Thomson, 
in his too often forgotten book The Fijians: a study in the decay of 
custom ( 1 908), tells of a marriage census he made of the Tailevu 
Province through which he learned that the men would marry any 
girl there was to be found, and only then reorganize her genealogy 
so as to be able to call their wife by the kinship term applied to a 
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female cross -cousin. Was this tradition or the result of an 
adaptative process to the realities of demography at the time? 
Nobody asked the question, and nobody yet has offered a credible 
answer. It should be remembered that Viti Levu was not then the 
worst case of depopulation. 
One might be reminded that, in Rivers's time, the capacity of the 
Islanders to read their genealogies in more than one way,  and thus 
to place a given individual, preferably female if Ego was male, in 
the kin category that was more opportune, was an accepted fact 
which has since faded away from anthropology textbooks . The 
problem of what is really an incestuous relation remains to be 
specified . The Lakilia people, on Tongariki , had long found an 
easy way out. On a side of the public square a special stone serves 
as a way of deciding there is no incest, the couple having only to 
put their right feet simultaneously on the stone to escape this 
anthropological dishonour. 
The hoped-for reverse trend in  population decline came 
between the two world wars, at a time when the steady downturn of 
colonial economies obliged the Islanders to go back to their 
subsistence agriculture and use what small access they kept to the 
world market of cash crops as a simple adjunct to their time­
honoured way of life .  Such a situation is reappearing with a 
vengeance. 
After World War I, the Rockefeller Foundation chose the Pacific 
Islands as the best area for an attempt to eradicate certain di seases 
that were chosen for their relative simplicity of treatment (Lambert 
194 1 ). They worked, with some success, on hookworm, which was 
a parasitical debili tating di sease; then they started to try to 
eradicate yaws , treating tens of thousands of Islanders over the 
years with a mercury salts compound given by injection, the 
Salvarsan of the German firm Bayer. This was strong medicine. 
But its results showed in the population figures , which started to 
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level off, giving the first rays of hope in a century to the Pacific 
Island peoples living under direct colonial control. 
After World War 11, the World Health Organization took over 
and decided to eradicate yaws this time;  hookworm, still in 
existence, was considered a lesser evil. At the end of the 1 950s, the 
whole population of the Pacific Islands was treated with a single 
injection of penicillin in oil, repeated after two years .6 Yaws 
disappeared entirely, but gonorrhoea too, the name of which had 
never been even mentioned in official reports. Doctors knew of it, 
evidently, but, gonorrhoea not being an exotic disease, nobody 
would have been interested in organizing such a campaign. Results 
were immediate. Villages started filling up with children. Fathers 
gleefully put on each of their children's heads the names they had 
had to keep for themselves, thus reconstructing, as well as they 
could, their old society.7 At the same tim.� , with the increase in 
population helping, the pressure for the return of lands taken over 
by white settlement started in earnest throughout the region. 
Independence of the Pacific Island states is one of the far-reaching 
consequences of this sudden upward population trend, not yet 
abated, with some smaller islands being already overpopulated, for 
instance in  the Tongan group. These results changed the 
anthropological scene overnight, starting with medical decisions 
taken far away from the region and which had apparently never 
envisaged such far-reaching consequences. 
The return to the past noted by observers of the Pacific Islands 
is in part a mechanical consequence of the return of a healthy 
population growth. With increased population allowing for a 
normal functioning of the i sland society,  the necessity to hang 
onto the new structures introduced by the missions was due to wear 
off. At the same time the missionaries were leaving the area in 
favour of independent Churches that have a much more subtle and 
more liberal view of their former culture and society. Pacific Island 
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nations exist not as collective political entities but as a complex 
series of actors inside specific cultures and social institutions which 
are at the same time as close as possible to their traditional models 
and yet different from them through the erosion of time and the 
play of adaptative processes of change. In all places where 
established Churches have existed a good hundred years , the 
concept of heathenism as something to be destroyed has sunk to 
the bottom of  the Pacific Ocean. There is no need any more to 
hide from the white men who had been autocratically governing 
the Church for a good century the reality of what was happening 
in the villages, and how Islanders had kept underground so many 
fundamental ritual and mythical links with the invisible world and 
the realm of the dead. 8 Prophetic movements have in a way won 
the day and, being recognized for what they were - an attempt to 
gain independence of thought and of action for each island nation 
- are fading away too. They will come back if and when they are 
needed anew. 
The problem with anthropology in the Pacific i s  that its first 
good material dates from the end of last century and relates to 
coastal areas which were all more or less severely affected by the 
depopulation process.9 No one has been able to describe a real 
traditional society, which does not exist anymore, if it ever 
existed. 10 All those societies about which data was being published 
were in the throes of a hardening adaptive process that they would 
not explain spontaneously, even to inquisitive white men. 
Little attempt has been made to document what happened from 
the end of the eighteenth century in Polynesia or, for that matter, 
from the sixteenth century on the north-western coast of New 
Guinea. Anthropologists write learnedly of traditional societies that 
they have in effect never seen, and study surviving cultures in a 
constant process of change, not only as a response to culture 
contact factors (Christianization, loss of land, loss of any form of 
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independence for a century or more, police and military repression 
of any form of collective resistance). Fortunately the dates of each 
field study are known and thus it is possible to incorporate 
something of the relativity the author often did not imagine. The 
first culprit was Malinowski , offering us a masterly introduction to 
so many other incomplete descriptions and having wilfully rejected 
any concept of time. 1 1  
Due to his earlier exposure to Maori society and culture, and his 
capacity of working in the vernacular language, Raymond Firth 
gave us an early and much better balanced description (see, for 
example, Firth 1 936) .  He saw the importance of noting down each 
of the social statuses lacking a living titular holder, and what 
solution the people gave, day after day, to such problems. In 
Canala and Hienghene, I found that only two chieftainships 
practised cross-cousin marriage, once every generation, and that 
this was enough to justify the existing kinship system based on this 
type of m arriage; all other lineages marrying according to what 
suited their strategy at the time. But how can I know if this was 
already the case before James Cook's vessels skirted the shores of 
the New Caledonia? 
The structuralist school, born with Radcliffe-Brown, furnished 
theoretical reasons for not publishing genealogies, and we thus lost 
the precious and detailed type of information found in Rivers 's  
The history of Melanesian society ( 1 9 1 4 ) .  Field workers , who 
should have undertaken a complete genealogical coverage of the 
area studied, went on being sati sfied with working from one or two 
short genealogies - never published - and found themselves 
caught unawares in writing an a-hi storical description, in a 
sometimes worse fashion even than functionalists. Their hesitant 
treatment of so-called 'i rregular' marriages , or other cases not 
following the proclaimed rules, shows how much the theory was 
full of holes and anthropologists powerless to fit them in the real 
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social processes. These were adaptive at all points in time and 
space, and still are . 1 2 The better authors , however, did show this 
factor in action. 1 3 
LAND 
The subject matter least worked on by social anthropologists is 
land. None of the pioneeers offered any easy way of dealing with 
it. Asking what is the prescribed rule is a short cut of a nai've kind. 
Nothing proves that the rule is  in fact followed in any way. Its 
expression being couched inevitably in the white m an's  words, 
because they were already used in the formulation of the question, 
European observers were persuaded from the start that they were 
confronted with forms of 'ownership', be they individual or 
collective. The nineteenth-century Utopian socialists , followed in 
this by Friedrich Engels, were so eager to find in the Pacific forms 
of collective ownership, under the name of primitive communism, 
that they found what they wanted to find within the limited 
information available to them. 
A governor of New Caledonia who was a follower of the French 
social theorist Saint-Simon, published a decree recognizing the 
collective ownership of land by the tribe. He had no other 
definition of the 'tribe' than a collection of invididuals living in a 
given area, at the expense of which he wanted to redress imaginary 
wrongs suffered by European settlers through confiscating native 
land. This 'Order in Council ' was in fact a nasty colonial trick. 
Collective ownership meant it was easier to confiscate global 
stretches of land than to proceed plot by plot, individual by 
individual .  One had only to define the existence of a tribe on 
strictly geographical criteria, without any fieldwork, and accuse it 
globally of some wrongdoing in order to take over the lot in one 
stroke. 1 4 
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Land needs detailed survey work, which most anthropologists 
have not been trained to do, and a study - plot by plot, place 
name by place name - of the history of the system , with 
information being obtained on the spot and never in a far-away 
location. 1 5 A recently-built Christian village is the worst place to 
gather data, 1 6 the existence of the village itself being at the origin 
of new factors in land quarrels .  Detailed land survey is not so easy 
because of the implications people will put on it; for instance, the 
fear that the knowledge could be used for the introduction of a 
land tax system - the one in existence in New Zealand has been a 
reason for the loss of land by lineages who could pay neither the 
tax nor the subsequent arrears. 
Pacific Island societies do not produce any commodity allowing 
for the establishment of an accumulation process. No agricultural 
produce can be kept for more than a few weeks (taro, sweet potato) 
or months (yams) . When reared , 1 7 pigs do allow some 
accumulation because they are fed with vegetable refuse and 
special crops not always relished by man. They always end up 
being killed and eaten in pig-giving feasts where any pretence at 
accumulation disappears in favour of the obvious and spectacular 
search for greater prestige through giving away generously, albeit 
in a strictly controlled fashion. 
Manipulation of land rights is an age-old process in all peasant 
societies. 1 8 Prestige competition is, in all sorts of ways, the rule in 
the Pacific Islands. This institution allows I slanders to strive to 
attain greater heights rather than only being content with boasting 
the best worked gardens, which already are a constant factor in 
acquiring prestige . Bernard Vienne 's work on Mota Lava in the 
Banks Islands ( 1 984) has shown that what some authors had 
imagined to be a complex system based on oblique marriages 
between succeeding generations was in truth the result of an 
equally complex strategy allowing for the transfer of land tenure 
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holdings from land of lesser value for yam cultivation to the 
acquisition of garden locations on the best type of soils. 
Acquiring land through a sophisticated marriage strategy which 
has been pursued over many generations can create the basis for 
entering a successful prestige competition, because it means the 
potential capacity to feed, when needed, a greater mass of people 
for the number of days deemed necessary in each case (often 
enough this involves hundreds of visitors for five days) . Only a 
complete genealogical coverage and an exhaustive land survey can 
document such a process. But how many are there in the published 
literature? 
Personal experience in dealing with land tenure over the last 
forty years has shown that the concepts of 'ownership' could not 
be applied to the problem; they only tend to hide the reality. 
From the Isle of Pines to Epi and further north or east, land goes 
with names . 1 9 The name given at birth - after consultations , 
negotiations, and lengthy meetings of all concerned - defines the 
social status and the land tenure of the future adult. This name is in 
effect that of  a man, or a woman, who has lived or might still be 
alive and party to the transaction; the transfer of social status and 
land tenure rights is smoother because no new action is needed . 
One inherits what has already been held in the public eye for 
generations by all successive persons who have borne the same 
name. If  the name i s  taken from another lineage, this is a form of  
adoption. The child will be  reared by his parents , but the other 
party - the lineage which has given the name - will do what is 
necessary to teach him his future rights and obligations. This can 
be quite a convenient arrangement in helping a junior son to 
escape somewhat his elder brother's future authority. 
The territorial aspect of a lineage 's  claim to land is  none other 
than the addition of those land tenure claims that go with the series 
of names which belong to it. This could explain why Deacon in 
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Seniang, South West Bay, Malekula, as well as myself in Lifu,  have 
found that ownership - for the individual or for the lineage - is 
not about territorial claims as such, but first and foremost about the 
well-worn paths going through the land. 
WOMEN 
Missionaries and other white men came to the Pacific Islands 
with the preconceived idea that local women were not free agents 
but chattels of the men's  sexual urges , interests and strategies. 
They usually asked their own wives to train the girls and bring 
about a form of women' s  liberation through conversion to 
Christianity or to some of the ideas of . the Age of Enlightment. 
Like quite a number of other set ideas , this w as partly a 
misconception. Strongly patrilinear, but in a way Utopian, societies, 
where the maternal uncle plays a central role, have been described 
by anthropologists unknowingly repeating the missionaries' ideas 
about the unequal status of men and women, 20 even though some 
of the reality was already known to be different. One of the 
consequences was the usual assertion that if a woman of high rank 
inherited a title imbued with power, her husband or her brother 
would in fact wield this power, leaving her only a kind of prestige­
carrying honorary position. 
Between Efate and Nguna in south-central Vanuatu the system 
of titles governing land tenure and social status is matrilinear. This 
was considered evil by Presbyterian missionaries, who insisted that 
the people became patrilinear, and checked that they did , but only 
for the principal titles , forgetting about the mass of other titles that 
went on being transmitted from maternal uncle to sister's son. 
Since the independence of the Church and the departure of the last 
missionary, these principal titles have gone back to being 
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matrilinear. Because of this missionary insistence, the local society 
had been classified as being patrilinear for a century. 
Reality can be otherwise. Everybody knows of Salamasina, the 
heroine who engineered the removal of the Tongan yoke from 
Samoa four centuries ago. But other high-born women have been 
gifted with the capacity of wielding power themselves, such as 
Ka' ahumanu, the widow of Kamehameha I, who assumed the 
power of lifting the tapu system. This capacity of taking power 
unto themselves is more obvious when they are fi rst-born, which 
means their rank outstrips any living male in their lineage. William 
Mariner had already noticed this in Tonga in the first years of the 
last century ( 1 827).  A survey of the life stories of any number of 
first-born women, known and talked about around the Pacific 
Islands, would be an interesting project. In New Zealand, Maori 
successive female aliki nui and other women 's  most interesting 
case stories have already been published and it can be shown that 
certain Maori ha' apu (sub-tribes) such as the Ngati Porou allowed 
the women to speak at the marae (ceremonial centre) and exercise 
direct political leadership (see King 1 977; Mahuika 1 975). Also , 
independent Western Samoa recognized the eldest sister of the 
present chief of state, the titular head of the house of Malietoa, as 
the highest-ranked person in the nation. 
Life stories written by men, prominent people in the first stages 
of independence in Papua New Guinea, are revealing. They all talk 
in glowing terms of their mothers, showing them as having been in 
many ways free agents, neither submissive nor letting their  
husbands solely take decisions that concerned the well-being of the 
family. The Australian film First contact shows how Papuan 
women, having given birth to half-caste children by the first white 
men who came to the valleys of the Anga people (formerly called 
Kukukuku) - because their over-anxious brothers or even their 
husbands had sent them as tentative go-betweens once the 
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humanity of the powerful newcomers had been recognized -
refused to let their male kin kill their  babies at birth and reared 
them into adulthood against the general hostility of their own 
society .  
It can be understood how nineteenth-century academics , 
transferring their own view of gender differences in Europe , 
determined ideas about unequal social status in the Pacific. It is less 
understandable how archaeologists in recent years have continued 
to ignore the fundamental fact that potters were women. They 
always were at fi rst contact. Even if the men often claimed that 
their ancestors stole from their women the techniques of making 
masks and the myths dealing with the initiation of boys coming of 
age - the mythical being who devours and then regurgitates the 
initiates is often female - they have never claimed that the women 
acquired their knowledge of pottery techniques from the men. 
The change over from Lapita pots to other cooking traditions in 
the last thousand years, which has been noted by archaeologists 
(for instance, on Tikopia; Kirch and Yen 1 982) and which, in the 
1 950s, was already acknowledged by oral tradition in north 
Malekula in Vanuatu , could not have been done without women 
taking an important part in the decision. Lapita pots were made to 
cook sauces from a coconut-milk base incorporating animal, fish 
or shell meat that was not put aside for ritual or ceremonial 
purposes.2 1 Making parcels out of banana leaves allowed greater 
quantities of more sophisticated food (baked and mashed taro,  
grated yam, smaller parcels inside larger ones incorporating fowls 
or other birds stuffed with a red hot. stone inside, and so on) to be 
cooked. 
High ov al pots in New Caledoni a (one metre in height instead of 
the 30-40 centimetres in diameter and hei ght for the Lapita pots) 
allowed a woman to cook a fam i ly  meal for her husband and 
children. With these cooking arrangements there were single 
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houses for each wife and collective lineage houses which were 
more or  less the men ' s  privilege. 22 Malinowski has shown us, 
following authors such as the Hungarian B aron Ludwig Biro 
( 1 889-9 1 ), how women potters would make high conical vessels in 
which coconut oil, produced in the same vessels, was brought to 
boiling point in order to make taro fritters. Men only intervened at 
a later stage, proposing the use of large softwood vessels in the 
Solomons, or canoe hulls in Polynesia, which contained tubers with 
red-hot stones being put in the middle and parcels of banana or 
purao leaves covering everything until the food was cooked. 
Anthropology was formerly characterized by a form of rigidity; 
that is, it was thought that traditional societies had not changed for 
thousands of years. This negative factor tends to stand untouched 
where the role of women and the technologies created by them are 
concerned. Like men, women have gone from the original 
techniques they brought with them from Asia to technical 
innovations fitting a new environment and enriched by new social 
experience - going from the longhouse (kept in east and central 
inland Espiritu Santo) to nuclear family dwellings (Vanuatu, New 
Caledonia, the Loyalty Islands and later in Polynesia) . 
The first generation of female anthropologists tended to choose 
men as informants , because they were thought to be the only ones 
to know the tradition. A number of distingui shed women 
colleagues, from Annette Weiner ( 1 976) to B arbara Gloscewski 
( 199 1  ), have since brought us new knowledge about the capacity 
of women, not only to have dreams about the invisible world and 
show a capacity to prophesize - they have been active in both 
such ways in post-war millenarian movements - but to introduce 
new innovative ritual activities over those which were theirs in the 
past. A few older, but at times forgotten, field anthropologists had 
described in the 1920s female grade-taking social rituals in central 
Vanuatu without the importance of this fact being recognized. The 
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general v iew of Pacific Island societies is fortunately now in the 
process of becoming more balanced. 
Maurice Leenhardt was told how the wooden spade in New 
Caledonia was used to make yam mounds. 23 The kneeling wife 
held the back of the hardwood spade with her two hands , and the 
standing husband gave a hefty push with the bamboo handle he 
was holding. Thus, the functional unit was the couple. The same 
author published vernacular texts of myths showing that young 
women seeking legitimate marriage, and not men, were the active 
partner in provoking the very first sexual relations (Leenhart 
1932) . 
In 1924 Arthur Bernard Deacon was told of the value of love 
magic to the men. The maker of the magic had recourse to sand or 
dust wetted by the woman 's urine, mixed with ground taken from 
an ant's  nest. A bit of this dust was then silently blown in the 
direction of the woman at a time when she would be looking, 
because the essential part of the magic was to let her notice the 
action. Any first move on the part of the man was considered 
dangerous if the girl, or the married woman, was not agreeable, as 
she would then report the advances, resulting in a difficult situation 
for the man. There was the risk of being fined at the very least or, 
at the most, of being obliged to run for his life. I got the same 
explanation from young men interested in sleeping with one of the 
wives of a polygamous Big Nambas chief in north Malekula, and 
from elderly women describing how they were working as 
intermediaries between their younger female kin and the anxious 
would-be lovers. 
If the women are the decision makers in sexual affairs, this can 
also occur in many other walks of life, as long as they let the men 
reap the prestige of expressing themselves through fo rmal 
speeches made in public. The women who laugh between 
themselves, while they are telling each other stories about the men 
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around them , are using an extraordinarily strong instrument of 
social pressure.  Ridicule in front of the women can explain why a 
man may eventually feel he must go into self-imposed exile. 
RANK 
Progress in the analysis of ranked societies in the South Pacific 
has been stifled by two factors, more or less unconsciously 
nurtured over the years : the century-old belief that Polynesia 
differed widely from Melanesia; and the fact that anthropologists 
dealing with New Guinea have so often never read what has been 
published over two centuries about the Eastern Pacific. They tend 
at times to rediscover what has been already noted somewhere else 
to the east since the first European ship dropped anchor among the 
Pacific Islands. 
Margaret Mead would advise her students at Columbi a 
University not to read what had been published on their future 
field site so as to arrive with a fresh mind. She never imagined that 
set ideas and a priori judgements coming from one ' s  own culture 
do not create an open mind, but more often exactly the contrary. 
A critical reading of the existing literature by the teacher is a much 
better introduction than this falsely objective and passive stance. 
B ack from the field, researchers should read everything once 
again for the very simple reason that they will only then be able to 
see the exact value of other people ' s  data and to fit their own into 
a more general picture, using what remains valid of the knowledge 
acquired in the past, adding their own information and not 
pretending to have found what never exists anywhere today : a 
virgin field full of potential new discoveries. 
Since the days of Captain James Cook 's  precise information 
and sound judgements - he has been the only one , for a long 
time ,  to disprove the popular notion of the Pacific Islands as a 
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sexual paradise - a world of knowledge has been accumulated 
about conditions at first contact, with date and location. The 
greater part of the known reactions seem to have been 
extraordinarily repetitive. This can be explained partly by the 
fundamental unity of all these cultures. Who made decisions at the 
time of first contact i s  one of the points little studied by 
anthropologists . In one way or another it appears that decisions 
were made by men of rank. But how did they get others to agree to 
act in a coherent fashion, if such was the case? The often more 
detailed data obtained at the time of the first mass conversions to 
Christanity can be equally helpful in answering this question. 
Although at times difficult to read , missionary literature is 
crammed with information waiting to be interpreted . 
What we call rank is what elevates one man over others . Rank 
can be inherited, acquired through a mixture of complex strategies 
and sheer physical exertions or through a quasi-elective process. A 
century-old simplification says that inherited rank is Polynesian; 
acquired rank, in a sort of ingrained trend towards democracy,  is  
Melanesian. This is nonsense. 
The Samoan matai system is made up of two groups: firstly ,  the 
more or less hereditary regional ali' i who play a political role but 
are pitted against each other in a continuous prestige competition, 
with 'talking chiefs ' ,  tulaf ale , manipulating the scene; and , 
secondly, the elected matai, who are entrusted with the pule, that is, 
the power to control land tenure inside the local community ' s  
territorial limits , showing an elective process wherein hereditary 
rights are never really forgotten. The Shepherd Islands,  in south 
central Vanuatu, boast a complex and interesting elective system of 
titles governing access to land , roads for exchanging gifts and 
counter-gifts , and the availability of positions in  the power 
structure .  Informants will not give genealogies but present a 
JEAN GUIART 1 17 
succession of titles, some of which have even been reproduced in 
writing on a few, for us unusual, contemporary tombstones. 
Hereditary rank, so-called for convenience, appparently devoid 
of any electoral process, applies not only to Eastern Polynesia but 
to Tonga, Fiji ,  the Loyalty Islands, southern Vanuatu up to Efate 
and north Malekula, parts of the Solomon Islands, and evidently to 
the Trobriands and any number of other locations .24 B ut elder 
brothers, if unsuitable, can be replaced by junior ones. The lineage 
of the shelved hereditary titular head goes into self-imposed exile 
and is often obliged to change names. The chief can gain mana -
a Melanesian, as well as Polynesian, concept first described by 
Codrington for the Banks Islands in north Vanuatu - through 
war, well-calculated and negotiated marriages, or astute political 
manoeuvering comprising gifts of food and traditional riches. He 
will lose prestige by not repaying ceremonial debts, by losing 
battles, or by being divorced by his high-born first and legitimate 
wife. Often enough, before handing over a title to the dead chief's 
eldest son, this function will be taken over successively by each 
male sibling of the deceased (New Caledonia, New Zealand Maori). 
If a chief acts too much according to the European concept of 
chieftainship and its imaginary absolute power and heaps up 
abuses (trying to take over land or sleep with too m any married 
women) he can be exiled or murdered (the public murder of Jean­
Marie Tjibaou on Ouvea in 1 989, with nobody raising a hand to 
prevent it and tens of people knowing in advance of the risk or of 
the projected murder, can only be understood as one such 
instance) .25 
These 'chiefs' are surrounded by a 'court' , both in Western 
Polynesia, Fiji, the Loyalty Islands and south-central Vanuatu. This 
concept of court can be physically translated into a courtyard , that 
is ,  a fenced area - hag in Ouvea and Lifu - surrounded by 
monumental posts of the hardest wood, one post to a tree. Inside 
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this area the privileged members of the court, each representing his 
lineage, have certain duties : orator or 'talking chief (the Samoan 
tulafale, the Fijian and Tongan matapule,  the Wallissian mutu de 
aliki, the Melanesian Ouvean hnyimen than) ; warrior, executioner; 
priest, seer or diviner; carpenter; holder of the traditional treasures ; 
messenger to any place occupied by allied or enemy lineages 
(each possessing marriageable maidens) and so on. A careful 
assessment of these positions over a long period shows that instead 
of being subservient to the holder of the paramount title they tend 
to strive to be as independent from it as possible : they can act on 
their own, without consulting the titular head of the apparent 
hierarchy, and they can send the representative of a junior line to 
act in their stead, thus giving a theoretical homage, but remaining 
free agents as much as possible. Observation over more than three 
decades of the precise behaviour, and the strategies involved, of 
each of these dignitaries in a number of circumstances, and the 
interpretation on the same basis of former historically recorded 
events favours the same conclusion (see chapters on Lifu and 
Ouvea in Guiart 1992). 
The concept of the 'big-man' has been taken from the language 
of nineteenth-century recruiters working for Queensland 
plantations. It is a pidgin word, and as such lacks precision. It 
implied then the existence of a person benefiting from a rank 
acquired in unknown conditions. Contemporary anthropological 
usage applies the word to persons who usually live within a dual 
competition, each organizing for the benefit of the other the 
presentation of extensive quantities of food, involving tens or at 
times hundreds of pigs being killed. All this is conceived of as a 
kind of aggression which must be repulsed through mobilizing 
and handing over more pigs, food and riches in the same way to 
the very man and group responsible for the first gift. Any such 
presentation must be reciprocated, each former recipient giving 
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slightly more than he received initially : too much over the amount 
that has been received would eventually be bad manners; even 
slighty under would mean losing the competition and the prestige 
acquired or maintained over the years. Douglas Oliver was the first 
to give us a convincing description of the strategies of such men, 
known as muumi among the Siuai of Bougainville Island. 26 This 
example is, for the present, more convenient to use for comparison 
purposes with the rest of the Pacific, being geographically closer to 
the physical centre of things. 27 
My view is that if this description fits a model - models do 
exist, at levels sometimes more complex than has been thought28 
- this one would show at least two variants : one which tends to 
operate inside a fixed hierarchy of formal grades and one which 
does not. 29 The first option would be the grade-taking hierarchy 
of central and northern Vanuatu , called nam a n g g i ,  m a n g e ,  
ninmangki in the centre, and suk(p )we i n  the north o f  the group, 
where grades go from two to thirty according to place and time,  
each grade responsible for erecting a stone or wooden carved 
monument (see Codrington 1 89 1 ;  Deacon 1 934; Layard 1 942 ; 
Tattevin 1926-27, 1 928; Vienne 1984). In this case the sons of the 
principal pig owners , who do not need to rent pigs from others at a 
high price but have them readily available, are at a considerable 
advantage (Guiart 1 95 1 ) .  People in north Ambrym explain that 
these individuals are, for this very reason, asked to pay twice the 
going rate for each of the successive stages of acquiring a given 
rank. 
The other option is the one found in Bougainville and the 
Highlands of New Guinea, but equally in inland Malekula, 
Vanu atu ,3 0 where a man must build a dancing square, then a 
men's  house and later a battery of wooden gongs, before starting 
to send invitations for a food and pig feast to be reciprocated later. 
One must infer that sons of the richer pig owners are at an 
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advantage here too; 'commoners' lack resources and are obliged to 
borrow pigs or shell money at high cost. In the Highlands of New 
Guinea at least some of the newly elected representatives after 
independence have been sons of former big-men, following in 
their fathers footsteps but making use of new means of displaying 
and distributing riches (for instance , the so-called and now 
suppressed 'slush fund') . 
The inhabitants of the Big Nambas Plateau of north Malekula 
have used their great and early concentration of acquired firearms 
to prevent any European settlement in their area, and to maintain 
and elaborate the different facets of their grade-taking tradition. 
They boast hereditary chiefs working against one another, in war 
and in peace. These two chiefs, who always claim the same 
mythical origin, exchange human victims3 1 to mark the end of a 
war, as well as ceremonial presentations of pigs and food. They are 
the only ones to take higher grades in the process (Guiart 1 952) , as 
if they considered they had to demonstrate that every logical trend 
in the 'game' had been invented in Melanesia. 
Thus all the logical trends emerging from apparently 
contradictory principles will be represented somewhere ,  even to the 
point of appearing intermingled . All the logical intermediate steps 
should be found, in such a way that cultural differences are made 
of nothing else but the vari ants which in any case should exist 
somewhere. The South Pacific thus should be treated as a working 
whole for comparison purposes as well as theoretical analysis. 3 2 
There are no hard set frontiers anywhe re in the Island space , 
except geographical ones (distance being th e principal operating 
factor) . Pacific Islanders are masters of logic and do not share the 
fear of contradiction evolved by the European intellectual world 
since Hegel was so widely misunderstood . They know, better than 
us, how to manage a dialectical process, and can easily proceed to 
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the utmost consequences of a logical position and yet keep alive 
the contradictions they seem to thrive upon. 
Islanders have never perpetually repeated the same social 
behaviour, which is evidenced by their adaptation when and where 
they have been obliged to abandon their former environment (the 
Malaita island builders are a case in point and the adaptations 
where the white man took over extensive areas of land are 
another) . 33 They have constantly sifted the information available 
to them at a given time so as to set their behaviour inside the form 
of vernacular expression they themselves had decided upon. 
POLYNESIA VERSUS MELANESJA34 
The variations in the way social control is exercised over the 
islands has thus little to do with the oft-repeated idea, born in our 
colonial world , that hereditary chieftainship in Melanesia could 
only be the fruit of Polynesian influence. 
In the same way, the hypothetical influence of Polynesian 
outliers on nearby Melanesian societies should be reconsidered: 
firstly, because, as Firth has shown for Tikopia, these outliers are as 
much Micronesian as they are Polynesian, and the more so as one 
goes west; and, secondly, because the outliers may have been 
Melanesian speaking until some centuries ago, as in the case of the 
former Leuangiua (Ontong Java) people. They were obliged to 
abandon the i sland because of a tidal wave, becoming the 'island 
builders' of north-west and south-east Malaita (Ivens 1 930) and 
have since been known as non-Polynesian speakers . Later they 
were entirely replaced on their former atoll residence by a brand 
new Polynes i an-speaking people (Hogbin 1 934  ). Also ,  
Melanesians left Tikopia for  Utupoa or  Ndeni in  the Santa Cruz 
group to make way for the more recent paramountcy of the Te 
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Ariki Kafika lineage hailing from Funafuti (Firth 1 96 1 ; Kirch and 
Yen 1 982). 
In some other cases the outliers established themselves on an 
island peopled by a majority of Melanesian speakers, such as Emae 
in the Shepherds Islands (only the village of Makata being 
Polynesian speaking) and Ouvea in the Loyalties (Unec [Teuta] , 
Takej i ,  Heo , Mul i ,  Fayava, and Lekiny being peopled by 
Polynesian speakers) .35 In these instances the social structure of 
the Polynesian-speaking group is but a translation of the one 
reigning in the Melanesian-language-speaking majority, without 
any visible fundamental originality (Guiart 1 962, 1 973, 1 992) .3 6 
On Emae, those who still make offerings to Mauitikitiki are from a 
Melanesian-speaking village, in the same way as further south 
those who revere the same god are from Port Resolution in the 
south-east of Melanesian Tanna - Mauitikitiki being said to live 
on the top of nearby Mount Melen. They are not, today, from 
Ani wa or Futuna, the Polynesian-speaking islands in the nearby 
environment. This could illustrate the point that this institution -
revering Mauitikitiki - cannot be thought of as very recent. 
The number of such factors , or institutions, which appear 
ambiguous and difficult to place, if one accepts as a basic principle 
the opposition between Polynesia and Melanesia,  is quite 
important. Thi s is even more so considering the number of 
Polynesians - on specifically planned voyages or in drifting 
canoes - who have found their way into Melanesia, and have 
forgotten not only their knowledge of the return journey, but their 
language and their specific culture too, remembering only their 
place of ori gin. One find s Tongans , 3 7 S am o ans3 8 and 
Rarotongans39 all over the place, Wallisians40 and Futunians in a 
group of specific locations , and occasionally Fijians.4 1 Thus, this 
means that a good number of those who came were alone, or in a 
very small group of men, without wives of their own. Or they 
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started exchanging their classificatory sisters , having eventually 
come with them, against spouses chosen from the local people. 
Their bilingual42 children drifted slowly towards an acceptance of 
the local Melanesian social structure, which was never very far 
from their own. The Wallissian migration to Ouvea  Lalo and 
northern New Caledonia (B alade) i s  peculiar inasmuch as i t  
appears to be more of a maritime two-way relationship over an 
extended period than the sole result of a single voyage. 
This presence in small numbers of all sorts of other Polynesians 
is also found all ov_er Western Polynesia and Fiji ,  and is explained 
by the fact that in islands tending to be over-populated before 
contact adventurous young men would easily get a place on a 
return voyage - in exchange for those members of the crew who 
stayed behind because local girls decided to marry them43 - and 
then find themselves too far away to renew contact with their place 
of origin. 
In the post-war years I was one of the very first authors to 
propose the idea that Western Polynesian and Eastern Melanesian 
societies showed variants of  the very same social models and 
should be analysed comparatively and not be artificially 
separated.44 This meant, in my view, that Polynesian social models 
came from Eastern Melanesia. Today this hypothesis is confirmed 
by archaeological results. Even so,  some archaeologists are 
replacing Te Rangi Hiroa'  s version of a northern route for 
Polynesians , who should not be confused with lower-rank black 
Melanesians, with the idea that the Lapita potters were a roving 
trading people skirting the coasts of the larger Melanesian islands 
before they settled - this time happily alone and almost untainted 
- in Fiji and Western Polynesia (Bellwood 1978). 
The expansion of the Lapita pots does not need any migrational 
hypotheses. In the whole area, potters came from small specialized 
groups , some on the coast, some inland, according to where the 
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best clay was found. The potters themselves being women, a small 
proportion of their numbers always married afar, thereby 
transmitting their technical knowledge to their daughters and their 
sons' wives. This mobility of women could easily have dispersed 
the knowledge of pottery over a wide area in a matter of very few 
generations .  When we have the benefit of more inland 
archaeological digs - there are next to none at present, except in 
New Guinea - the picture will hopefully become clearer to all. 
The rel atively more coherent physical appearance of 
Polynesians has long been recognized. It  is easily explained in 
biological terms. The small groups settling in Fiji ,  then in Western 
Polynesia before going further east, brought with them only a 
fraction of the original set of genes one can find in Melanesia, 
where physical appearances are very much more v aried. If one 
adds the consequences of the 'founder effect' and of 'genetic drift' 
in small communities more or less cut off from their place of 
origin,45 there is no problem in understanding the relatively recent 
(2,000-3 ,000 years) and specific aspects of Polynesian people , 
societies and cultures. 
The number of canoes going to or from inter-island marriages 
(between east Fij i ,  Tonga and Samoa) and drifting to Vanuatu, the 
Loyalty Islands or New Caledonia, was important in the first half of 
the last century, before the commanding officers of men-of-war of 
the different nations interfered and, at the demand of missionaries, 
prohibited these long-distance inter-i sland voyages .46 European 
ship owners in fact could then reorganize the sea routes around the 
South Pacific, Islanders being left with only the option of choosing 
between San Francisco, Sydney or Auckland . There had been an 
earlier period where Pacific ports of call were the Bay of Islands in 
New Zealand, Pape 'ete in Tahiti , Lahaina in Hawaii and Valparaiso 
in Chile and because such destinations appealed to the adventurous 
young men, they switched from roving canoes to whaling ships. 
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During this whole period, European observers, and in particular the 
London Missionary Society expatriate European staff, considered 
that Vanuatu, New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands were part of 
Western Polynesia.47 The concept of Melanesia as opposed to 
Polynesia had not crossed their minds, and visual impressions at 
direct first contact - appearances, hair styles, clothing, body 
adornment, gesturing - supported the idea of a general unity o f  
the Eastern Pacific. Differences were later underscored because 
they fitted better the colonial policies aimed at dismembering the 
region. 
Stressing the opposition between two imaginary worlds -
Polynesia and Melanesia - is not establishing a concept with any 
operational value, but continuing to play the colonial trick of 
contrasting clear-skinned and semi-civilized Polynesians with dark­
skinned, cruel and savage Melanesians. The reason is that the 
explorers and colonizers came from the east. They did not come 
from the west because of the opposition of the Dutch -
entrenched in Indonesia - to any exploration proceeding from 
west to east; they would hang officers of ships considered to be 
poaching on their trading rights. Subsequently Western powers 
began using Polynesians to help them conquer and control 
Melanesian islands, as sailors, soldiers, petty administrative or 
commercial clerks, and mission teachers. These Polynesians had to 
be given some recognition for their labours, having been entrusted 
with the task of bringing 'civilization' and the lotu to the natives of 
the Melanesian islands, where the job might have been physically 
too dangerous for lone Europeans. They had also been used as the 
complement for ships' crews, whalers or sandalwooders, even men­
of-war, in unknown waters where unkind savages were thought to 
lurk behind every coastal bush. 
With no local interests to protect, the whalers were at an 
advantage: they recruited sailors from everywhere and did not 
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worry if they were Polynesians or Melanesians. But they tended to 
dump them at any location and let them find their own way back 
home. Melanesian as well as Polynesian sailors experienced 
extraordinary adventures at the time.  Some were of chiefly rank, 
but many were not and had gone on the ships for this very reason. 
Similarly, of those who were LMS (London Missionary Society) 
teachers,  quite a number were commoners or people of rank in a 
difficult situation for traditional reasons, who strove to acquire 
renewed or brand new mana through working for the powerful 
white man. This might still be true of a sizable part of those 
Islanders who choose to become clerics in Melanesia. 
The Greek words used for differentiating Melanesia and 
Polynesia are usually misunderstood� if only in an unconscious 
way. Melanesia means 'black islands' - black because of the 
massive aspect of their vegetation, not black because of their 
inhabitants. Most Melanesians are light coloured; the east coastal 
Papuans were clearer skinned than any Polynesian at first contact, 
the only dark-skinned people being the inhabitants of Bougainville 
and Buka. 
The Polynesians enthusiastically mixed with the Europeans in 
order to obtain children with lighter skins. However, this also 
applied to the Loyalty Islanders - except specific priestly families 
who had inherited a tapu (kep) on light-coloured skin - as well as 
to any number of more or less ranked lineages in New Caledonia 
and Vanuatu. The later colonization of Melanesia,  and the 
reputation ascribed to Melanesians of being dangerous to handle 
- although Maori have killed more white men in New Zealand 
than were murdered in the whole of Melanesia - reduced such 
intermingling. Except for the killing of Bishop Patteson, the 
Anglican Melanesian Mission never had any trouble in the tens of 
islands where it managed to prevent any European settler from 
taking over land. This  means that there was less sexual 
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intermingling with Europeans on such islands.  However, it was 
enough to introduce to the bloodstream antibodies against 
introduced diseases , but not enough to change fundamentally the 
physical appearance, such as happened in the Society Islands and 
the Marquesas. Melanesia was taken over more or less at the same 
time as the concepts of the 'white man's  burden' and the 'loss of 
caste' through a common-law local marriage evolved. Polynesia 
managed to become somewhat 'civilized' before that. 
Opposition between the two worlds is the result of a colonial 
strategy which, over two centuries, has thus created, on the surface 
of things , some appearance of a justification. It has been, and still 
is ,  a methodological trap. Islanders are slowly bridging the gap as 
they see that the whole thing was a manipulation which did not act 
in their favour. 
The correlative idea that Melanesian hereditary chieftainships 
were of a lower order and a smaller scale, covering seventy to three 
hundred people at most, is just bad information. The largest 
chieftainship in Lifu reigns over nearly 8 ,000 people, and each of 
the two quasi-military confederations which share the paaci  
language area in central-north New Caledonia represents over 
1 5 ,000 people, which is  much more than the 3 ,000 given as being 
the mean number for the best organized Polynesian chieftainships. 
The misconception about these aspects of Melanesian hereditary 
chieftainships can be attributed to the survey publi shed by Ian 
Hogbin and Camilla Wedgwood ( 1 952-53)48 of the literature for 
Eastern Melanesia,  which only covered the anthropological 
publications in English and not those in French. Moreover, one 
could be confused by information emanating from the French 
colonial authorities presenting their administrative dissection of 
Kanak social structures into the smallest possible politically 
manageable units - the so-called 'tribes' or 'districts' - as being 
the result of local tradition. 
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HORIZONTAL STRUCTURES 
Marxists have never managed to fit the Pacific Islands into their 
universe for the very simple reason that the trend to build 
something looking like a state is a Western import, through the 
system of socio-religious concepts introduced by the different 
shades of Christianity . Prestige competition was a difficult 
institution to classify in the partly imaginary time of the pre­
contact situation. It belonged to the world of the superstructure, 
but affected all types of structural factors , and particularly the 
ci rculation of goods. Materialistic explanations have tried to 
replace the economic ones which did not work, although they can 
be easily seen to be preposterous .49  A recent attempt, in an 
otherwise excellent work, to transform women into a subordinate 
category (Godelier 1 982),50 lacks convincing strength. 
Theoreticians forgot an essential point in that no culture can 
strive towards an aim that its technological level cannot sustain. 
Pacific Islanders , lacking the wheel, could not transport heavy 
amounts of produce over land . They could only do it by sea, and 
then only in the most locally-efficient way. This is the fundamental 
reason for political systems being more complex - in terms of 
rank hierarchies, of the subtleties of lineage statuses, and of 
relations between them - when there is a length of navigable coast 
involved or opposite coasts covered by the same trade systems. 
There is no need to imagine a sea-based people migrating as 
carriers of more sophisticated and hierarchical social structures. 
The only commodity which can be transported in any quantity 
along inland paths is pigs. They can walk slowly and along part of 
the road, and they present their owners with the advantage of living 
long years and with a capacity to reproduce themselves in great 
numbers. But they are heavy when carried on the shoulders of two 
men or more;  they may be unable to walk along some paths when 
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they are too fat and most valuable. They must be fed, which is 
partly the work of women, mostly at the time of their last fattening, 
and cannot be killed without the agreement of the wives who have 
done the work. Wealth in pigs goes with polygamy, which, as an 
institution, cannot be generally practised in small-scale societies as 
there is an obvious limitation to the total number of wives, and it 
becomes unmanageable in times of high depopulation and a high 
male sex ratio .  This is one explanation for the success of the 
Christian message. 
Traditional riches are an able part-substitute for pigs , carrying 
more symbolic and social value for a much smaller weight, being 
worked in units which can be easily counted, and incorporating the 
prestige of their successive proud possessors, rather like works of 
art that have belonged to famed collectors. They can be exchanged 
over wide areas ,  feeding an extensive inter-island trade which is 
controlled by ever-changing marriage alliances and ever-higher­
prestige-seeking strategies and rivalries. The persistent trend of 
Pacific Islanders towards form ali zed speeches ,  actions and 
relations , has incorporated each individual or collective behaviour 
in what can be called a horizontal structure - a complementary 
structure to the , so often more apparent than real , vertical 
hierarchies. 
Some years ago I demonstrated the existence of two m arriage 
moities named Bay and Dwi (Guiart l 992 :ch 2) among the eastern 
paaici language speakers of north-central New Caledonia, the most 
numerous group on the island . Later I found that a number of 
lineages on the west coast, belonging to the same language group, 
di splay what was effectively a third marriage class (only 
recognized there as such) called Gorote . Consequently it was 
apparent that the same people who married inside the two, or three, 
factor system , married equally outside - a fact forgotten by 
theoreticians - and that no analysis could exclude these marriages 
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without becoming artificial. In reality this was a three (in the east) 
or four (in the west) factor marriage system; it allowed great 
freedom in choosing a spouse, who could come from one-third, or 
one-fourth, of the male or female population in the whole area. 
This system was a way of introducing greater coherence 
throughout a strong and assertive linguistic area,  expanding 
consistently to the north-west. The very l ight-weight New 
Caledonian shell money circulated throughout the innumerable 
possible routes while the disk-shaped stone clubs, carefully hafted 
with a mounting of braided flying-fox hair (hache-ostensoir: gi o 
kono ) , were exchanged solely at m arriages between chiefly 
lineages'  first-borns. 
For the Houai1ou Valley, in central New Caledonia, I have 
recently shown that both the rituals which are linked to the 
beginning of the yam crop and the first fruit ceremony, and the 
beliefs related to the control of the fertility in land and women, as 
well as semi-political alliances and systems of solidarity,5 1 were 
based upon the existence of two unnamed, non-marriage quasi­
moieties covering two-thirds of the inhabitants of three parallel 
valleys . The rest of the population is out of the system, although 
they may intennarry with its member lineages (Guiart 1 992:ch 1) .  
I have checked the existence in the whole of northern New 
Caledonia of two non-marri age moieties noted by Maurice 
Leenhardt ( 1 930; see also Guiart 1 987), called Hwaap and Ohot, 
which played a role in all hi storical events since contact. Again, I 
found the existence of a third group, known by the name of 
Gwalap .  The members of this group explained that they all 
fundamentally belonged to the same allied lineages, constituting a 
string of villages, made up of fishermen and occasional makers of 
shell money, who settled all along the west coast. These people 
played a central role in the 1 87 8  insurrection by carrying 
messages from one insurgent inland area to the other, striving to 
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spread the movement. 52 They paid a high cost for this involvement 
and consequently their descendants were difficult to track down 
because they had to hide to escape military repression and mass 
murder at the time. 
A parallel system existed on the island of Tanna between two 
warring groups called Numrukwen and Koyometa. The usual 
scenario was that the group which lost went into exile on the other 
side of the mountain range and negotiated its return in the next 
generation. The go-betweens were the members of a third minority 
group called Kowut Kasua (Guiart 1 956)53 that was dispersed all 
over the island and whose members never participated in the 
fighting, and a dignitary called yani nengoo, that is 'master of the 
canoe' .  His function covered both the intrigues which brought the 
two sides to war, and leading his exiled group in the negotiations to 
allow them to come back home. Blocks of land , from one 
mountain range to another or ascending a mountain range, were 
alternatively Numrukwen and Koyometa. Exchange routes went 
from one to the other according to circumstance. But both the 
Numrukwen and Koyometa came together for the large pig-killing 
ceremonies , nekowiar. Here were two ritually complementary sides, 
in the same way as the Ohot and Hwaap in New Caledonia, entering 
the dancing square alternately clockwise or counterclockwise. 54 
In New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands these structures (let 
us call them horizontal for convenience) do not justify all the 
journeys recorded over the past half century. Another essential 
factor is the number of lineages that explain how they are the 
offshoot of another lineage through reference to apparently 
mythical migration routes criss-crossing wide areas of land and 
easily going over to the next island. My first reaction was to draw 
the semi-genealogical figures which linked together a number of 
residential locations, marked by raised mounds (tertres) supporting 
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round houses, and translate this  principle on the ground. I 
discovered that none of these tree-shaped figures ever stopped 
anywhere. 'Roots' and 'branches' alike went on endlessly , all these 
arborescences linking with other ones over land and sea. In 
biology (for instance, in the physiology of the brain) , as well as in 
the computer world, these are called 'networks'. It has taken me a 
lifetime to map the networks covering New Caledonia and the 
Loyalty Islands, which were linked in pre-contact times to south 
and central Vanuatu in the same way as the Banks Islands were 
linked with Tikopia55 and the Santa Cruz Islands, closing the only 
geographical gap of some importance in the structured relations 
over land and sea which cover the Melanesian chain of islands. 
The problem is  how many networks there are . There are 
obviously more than one, as the prestige competition between 
networks immediatly becomes evident. The idea of having two 
networks covering the area has the advantage of being 
intellectually satisfying, but appears to be non-operational . The 
way relations work and gifts flow through the traditional routes 
indicates that there are at least three, and possibly more, networks 
criss-crossing each other as much as working in parallel .  Their 
existence can only be made clearer, and mapped, by noting all 
individuals  going forwards, backwards and sideways over more 
than a single generation. Only a fraction of this data can be 
obtained by direct observation, the rest must be acquired from 
countless interviews . The problem can be put in the reverse 
formulation: Who receives whom? Who gives shelter, food, clothes, 
money, eventually a wife and ] and , to whom ? Who feels an 
obl igation of sol idarity wi th whom ? Thi s  transl ates into the 
constant journeying of Pacific Islanders , who bring their children 
and their wives to every spot where they have such an obligation or 
can benefit from such a privilege. They give the available 
information in solemn tones and insist on the exact location and 
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names of the people involved. These names are not modern 
Christian names, but those that so often before could not be 
publicly uttered - not strictly secret, as every adult knew them -
except in very exceptional circumstances. 
The forms that networks take can fluctuate. On Tanna the 
solidarity links that derive from sharing the same nekaua (kava) 
yimwayim (drinking place) and , at a further level , sharing the same 
dancing place between a number of yimwayim, are found through 
the sharing of specific routes drawn outside of the residential areas 
- there are essentially three, kw o texe n ,  n a hmy e rep and 
mwa takayu ,  which follow the greatest length of the island in a 
more or less parallel way. These were the very same routes used to 
carry the messages that spread the John Frum prophetic cult and 
led to the move away from the Christian Churches in May 1 94 1 .  
In south-central Vanuatu there are no marriage o r  non-marriage 
moieties, but a complex horizontal system of ties ,  criss-crossing or 
circuiting the larger islands, such as Efate and Tongoa, linking in a 
general south to north direction all those who claim descent from 
the crew of a given canoe. This is in addition to a m atrilineal 
marriage and solidarity system which is coded by the names of 
different vegetable and animal foods and is claimed to have been 
instituted by the mythical chief Roy Mata. This hero - no living 
person has dared since to claim his title - became a historical 
figure when his tomb was excavated by Jose Garanger and dated at 
A D  600 (Garanger 1 972) . All those claiming descent from a 
scattered lineage (naflak, nakainanga) , owning a given food 
symbol (nama tarao) ,  are linked by well-balanced gifts and 
counter-gifts of food as well as sister exchange marriages that are 
always outside the recognized kin structure : one cannot marry a 
girl who belongs to one 's kin group (Guiart 1973). 
The Christianization of a good half of New Caledonia proper at 
the end of last century by evangelists from the Loyalty Islands is 
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very interesting. Left on their own and no longer controlled by 
any resident European missionary, who were then English and in 
deep trouble with the French colonial authorities, these men from 
Mare, Lifu and Ouvea went spontaneously to the traditional routes 
open to them. They knew who were the authentic chiefs - not the 
ones nominated by the colonial authorities - and called them by 
their real names - not the ones known to the white men. They 
thus got immediate results by working through the networks which 
they had inherited membership, translated by the very name given 
to them at birth (Leenhardt 1953). 
Prior to contact, similar systems extended from the Loyalty 
Islands to southern Vanuatu with exchange relations going from 
the Loyalty Islands up to Epi , which was called tas (short for the 
local vernacular word tasiriki 'on the coast') by the Lifu people. 
They still go from the Loyalty Islands to New Caledonia. Each 
person who is part of any one system in the islands of Mare, Tiga, 
Lifu, Ouvea and Heo knows well the exact locations where each of 
its lineages can find its traditional corresponding local group.  In 
each case the identification goes through the set of names owned 
by each lineage and this furnishes the capacity to claim status and 
land, if former residence is changed. Myths justifying these 
situations may be given one day in a very symbolic script, and on 
another day as a kind of chronicle boasting historic authenticity. It 
is just a question of patience and who is present at the time. As far 
as possible, I have made an exhaustive survey of these relations 
over the last forty years . 
One will easily remember how Malinowski , in his well-known 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific ( 1 922) ,  showed that each 
Trobriand Islander received from his father the knowledge of the 
partners he inherited in al l the different locations participating in 
the 'kula ring'. Later each Islander might want to go and visit them, 
in order to trade valuables, food items or special materials found 
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here and there . The institution of such partners is found in many 
places and is the basis for all sorts of exchanges of valuable goods, 
from polished stone blades to mother-of-pearl or New Guinea 
Highlands vegetable salt. 56 Thus one can propose a generalization 
which could be valid in the rest of the Pacific. A man has always 
the benefit of trading partners in more than one place . These 
partners represent lineages and names indefinitely carried on 
through each generation, with which his forbears were already 
trading. 
What will change from place to place are , firstly ,  the 
justifications expressed for such formal relations criss-crossing 
every island and, secondly, the types of valuables carried from one 
cultural area to another. Polished serpentine disk-shaped heads of 
ceremonial clubs in New Caledonia become small pierced 
serpentine stone disks worn as neck pendants by women in Tanna. 
Wooden dishes from Huon Gulf and Tami Island finish up along 
the north-east coast of New Guinea and south-west New Britain, but 
then take other shapes and benefit from other decorative designs 
depending on their final location. Carried on the breast, the back, 
the forehead or the sides of the head, kapkap (delicately carved 
circular decorations made of shell and turtle) carry the same 
general shape in all islands, from the S anta Cruz group to the 
Admiralties. Each of the routes followed by such mobile valuables 
can be mapped. 57 The distances they travel are well documented, 
from the coastal areas up to the Highlands of New Guinea, in the 
same way as conch shells from Sri Lanka can be found in Tibetan 
monasteries. The first European to pursue this notion of exchange 
- sailing canoes along the coast, to and from the island of women 
potters of B ilibil - was the Russian scientist Mikloucho-Maclay, 
one of the most talented observers of any time. Even today the 
steady flow of goods in Bougainville from the Solomon Shortland 
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Islands testifies to the permanence of these exchange and solidarity 
networks . 
WHAT NEXT? 
Radcliffe-Brown often stated that when two unacquainted 
Austral ian Aborigines met they sat down and swapped 
genealogical information. This might happen, but the fi rst 
information exchanged would in fact be more immediate , much 
shorter and more to the point. It would be the very information 
Radcliffe-Brown introduced us to, that is, the name of the marriage 
section or subsection of each. This information determined where 
the newcomer would sleep, away from women who were forbidden 
to him and close to those who might be available, if they wished, to 
tell him who would be his local classificatory kin ;  the section 
names, in particular, were the same and known over wide expanses 
of land and in many language areas . This way of understanding 
the concept of 'horizontal structures' would thus appear equally 
valid all over the Australian continent. 
The social anthropology of the Austral ian Aboriginal 
population has been functioning separately from the rest of the 
South Pacific, evolving concepts which were solely associated with 
its own field of study. The more experience I gain, the more there 
appear to be vivid parallels and the less I believe in keeping apart 
two equally valid sets of conceptual analysis. 
Early Australian anthropology dwelt on the concept of 'the 
dreaming' ,  the 'dream time' , and so on, the different aspects of 
which have been extensively documented and systematically 
organized by the late Professor Elkin ( 1 933). We now know that 
this dreaming does not refer only to a dreamtime at the origin of 
all things, but is coextensive to the world and time of present 
human people . The space and time where humans dwell is parallel 
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to the space and time where gods and the dead ancestors have their 
abode. This is the very way the rest of the Pacific sees the invisible 
world and talks to it. 
For those who have had the privilege to work on the hundreds 
of millenarian movements (cargo-cults) which covered New 
Guinea and Melanesia before the war and during most of the 
1950s, after so many parallel instances which started immediately 
after Christianization in Polynesia and Fiji ,  the crucial function of 
dreamers, male and female, is clearly apparent. One must dream 
first before being able to present a viewpoint in public and be 
listened to . The dreamers came to the fore in the political 
disturbances in New Caledonia in 1 984-85 .  No Kanak group 
would act before being in agreement with the dreams of the 
established or newly appeared seers. Melanesians dream all the 
time or have day visions about the dead, to whom they will talk as 
if they can feel their presence at their side. Even my own 
Melanesian wife has dreams or visions about the immediate future. 
Polynesia is full of similar cases all the time, even in Tahiti 
today.  But we have rarely tried to conceptualize them and link 
them with the well-known ideas about the abode of the dead and 
how they can visit us or, contrariwise, how some seers have had the 
opportunity of short ,  or long, journeys and stays in the 
subterranean land of the dead. 
Anthropology in the Pacific has built its own series of concepts, 
never looking back over its shoulder, linking with Australia only as 
regards marriage control systems - although who will talk of 
section marriage where one is meant to take as a wife the mother's 
brother 's  daughter, and of subsection marriage where, as among 
the Nenema people of north-west New Caledonia, m arriage is with 
the mother's brother 's  daughter's daughter? There is a need for 
theoretical discussions to make use of the whole available range of 
cultural variations, including Australia, now that we know that 
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man's  antiquity has comparable early dates in Australia and New 
Guinea.  Australian anthropology should look at the rest of the 
Pacific, in the same way as colleagues specializing in New Guinea 
should learn that part of what they discover has alre ady been 
described somewhere in the chains of islands covering the Western 
and Eastern Pacific, albeit at a smaller statistical level. 
NOTES 
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Professor Jan van Baal, late of 
Utrecht University. 
1 He brought John Layard to Atchin and Vao for more than a year in 19 13 .  
Much later Reo Fortune's  famed monograph on Dobu was based on  only a 
six months' stay, his further field trips being more reasonably longer. 
2 Personal observations in 1949 and 1 952 and interviews with local 
merchant and government marine officers. 
3 Personal census of Espiritu Santo done in 1954 and pre- 19 14 field notes 
left by Captain Renault in the archives of the Societe Fran�aise des 
Nouvelles-Hebrides, Paris. See also Guiart 1958. 
4 Personal census of Malekula done in 195 1  and of Tanna in 1 952. See 
Guiart 1956. 
5 Personal fieldwork on the links between colonial Espiritu Santo and Aoba 
between 1 949 and 1973. Manuscript notes and lists established by Raghragh 
Charley of Matanvat of common-law marriages between European plantation 
owners and ni-Vanuatu women. 
6 Personal involvement in this campaign in the Shepherds Islands, south­
central Vanuatu and checking on its results elsewhere. 
7 Personal fieldwork in New Caledonia, the Loyalty Islands and Vanuatu 
from 1948 to 1992. See Guiart 1973 . 
8 In New Caledonia, from the Houa1lou Valley to the north of the island, the 
offerings to the mythical lizard or other beings protecting the lineages have 
never ceased among a population Christianized since the 1 890s. See Rene 
Guiart 1988:33-46 for modern instances of traditional religious concepts 
maintained. 
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9 See Reports of the ( 1 888-89) Cambridge Expedition to the Torres Straits, 
vol. IV: Arts and crafts ( 1912); vol. VI: Sociology, magic and religion of the 
Eastern islanders (1908),  Cambridge University Press. 
1 0  The term 'traditional' has no satisfying meaning except in a very vague 
way. It is nevertheless convenient, as opposed to terms such as primitive, 
tribal (who knows what tribal means?) and so on, the connotations of which 
are still more rigid and even more ethnocentric. The words 'custom', or its 
pidgin equivalent 'kastom', or French translation 'la coutume', have evolved 
in the colonial system, and certainly not for the good of the people subjected 
to this system. Their legalistic connotations are methologically dangerous, 
inasmuch as they imagine a set of fixed rules understood to be as exotic as 
they are thought to be irrational. The modern translation is the widely 
publicized idea that tradition is antagonistic to economic development. This 
judgement is still more ethnocentric than the preceding colonial view, and 
tends to serve as the justification of new sophisticated techniques aimed at 
destroying the Pacific Islanders' cultures in the name of their material 
progress. This is pure hypocrisy; those who support this view having been 
quite unable, over the last decades, to better in any way the native people's 
situation, and in particular their purchasing power. The reality is that the 
Islanders have always collected or planted the crops which brought them a 
sufficient revenue (sandalwood, beche-de-mer, coconut, coffee, cocoa, cotton), 
and abandoned what had become a non-paying proposition. 
1 l Pacific Islanders bear some responsibility here, with their constant 
indifference to our notions about time. 
1 2  The idea that the exceptions confirm the rule is, in fact, the more than 
2000 years old conception of the Greek grammarians of Alexandria, who 
could not manage to fit a number of real linguistic occurrences in their 
proposed laws. This argument should be considered today as false. A 
proposed rule can only be judged scientifically sound if no exceptions are 
found to it. If there are some, the validity of the rule must be reconsidered. 
13 See papers by Elkin and Stanner in early issues of Oceania showing how 
marriage systems were traded over the whole of Australia, and Berndt's later 
assessment of how the cult of Kunapipi swarmed over the Northern 
Territory. 
14 For examples of this process see Governor Guillain, Arrete du 22 Janvier 
1868; Garnier 187 1 ;  and Saussol 1979. 
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l5 See Guiart 1992, especially the chapters on Lifu and Ouvea. This is a 
completely revised and rewritten re-issue of the first half of the former study 
published in 1963 . 
1 6 This idea that anthropology can be done si tting down quietly in a 
Christian colonial village site with a few privileged informants is incredibly 
naive. Anthropologists need to deal with hundreds, if not thousands, of 
informants - men and women of all ages - to be sure of what is being 
recorded. Even children hold precious knowledge. See Guiart 1992:ch. 2 for a 
detailed methodological discussion of this point. 
17 Pig rearing was unknown in New Caledonia. 
1 8 See Lawrence 1955 ;  Nayacakalou 1 959,  1960, 197 1 ;  Sahlins 1957;  
Brookfield and Brown 1963 ; Panoff 1970; Ogan 197 1 ;  Crocombe 197 1 ;  
Lunsgaarde 1974; Rutz 1978. For Fiji see Chapelle 1978, Walter 1978; for 
Tonga see Marcus 1977; for Samoa, S .Tiffany 1980, W.Tiffany 1977, 198 1 .  
19 O n  names linked to social status and land tenure see the path-breaking 
paper by Lamont Lindstrom ( 1985). Lindstrom could have made use of the 
rather complete survey of names and social statuses I published for the whole 
of Tanna in 1956. Lindstrom says that man Tanna is not exactly Everyman, 
the heroic deeds and the less heroic but well-remembered intrigues which 
illustrated or caused wars of the past being part of a vivid tradition. The 
opposition between this part of Melanesia lacking genealogical depth 
(staying around three generations before Ego) and the (manipulated) 
Polynesian genealogies, is that the New Caledonians and ni-Vanuatu, at 
least, replace depth in time (genealogies) by physical extension in space. The 
reading of the past is followed from place to place, along a string of linked 
house foundations remembered by names. This is rather more like Aboriginal 
Australian use of the concept of time and space. 
20 See Williams and James 1859 for the ancient Fijian fear of one ' s  title 
being claimed by the sister' s son when of higher birth than his uncle, and the 
correlative precaution of introducing an abortion specialist in the retinue of a 
first-born girl of high rank marrying abroad. 
21 Ritual uses seem to prefer old pots, or broken ones, or even special and 
rather coarse ones produced by the appointed man himself. For a description 
of the excavation of a Kanak ritual location on the island of Konien, off the 
west coast of New Caledonia, see Guiart 1992: 128. 
22 Women and men share them in New Caledonia, the Loyalties, and in 
south-central Vanuatu, from Efatc to south Epi ,  on ceremonial occasions. 
Women cannot enter them in north-central Vanuatu and the Banks Islands. 
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23 Personnal communication, 1948; later checked in the field. 
24 The attempt to analyse the Tannese situation through the wielding of the 
magic word 'big-man' is unwarranted (see Bonnemaison 1987). The 
justification given is the pig-killing rituals called nekowiar. These are not 
geared towards prestige acquisition by the same two persons, the groups 
banding together on each side, and their spokesmen, being different in each 
case. This is in addition to a number of inherited exalted social statuses 
which ensure differentiated prestige levels to an important part of the male 
�pulation, the kweria holders and their spouses. 
In a meeting behind closed doors in Noumea, he had given the order for an 
attack on the armed constabulary post on Ouvea on the weekend before his 
murder. He later refused to let the young people in northern New Caledonia 
organize diversionary actions or even to accept a phone call by the desperate 
young people who had followed him, not calculating the risks and having no 
answer ready for what was happening: an extraordinarily violent repression 
by French army crack troops, authorized in effect by the signature of the then 
socialist president of the Republic (personal fieldwork on Ouvea and 
interviews with political leaders and my wife's kin on the island; Plenel and 
Rollat 1988). 
26 See Oliver 1949, 1955. For New Guinea proper see Strathem 197 1 ,  who 
shows that sons of big-men are favoured in the moka. 
27 As a means of scientific analysis, comparisons should only be attempted 
once the whole chain of variants has been uncovered between the locations 
chosen to be compared. As a result of this methodological precaution, they 
can only be of value as a teaching tool, or to suggest, illustrate or clarify an 
idea. 
28 See Guiart et al. 1973, where one of the very first computer analyses of 
data recorded over tens of islands and hundreds of informants shows that each 
piece of information fits in the whole picture without any discrepancy or 
logical contradiction being brought to the fore by the analysis, as if each 
person speaking knew exactly what the others would say. 
· 
29 The absence of a cultural trait existing next door has the same theoretical 
importance as its presence. 
30 Personal fieldwork, inland from South West Bay, Port Sandwich and 
Tisman Bay, in 195 1 .  The first inland villages have since moved over to the 
nimangki and nalawan rites bought by them from the Tomman Island 
people, having decided to become Presbyterians. The people inland from Port 
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Sandwich had already acquired a complex set of namanggi grade-taking 
rituals. 
3 1 These 'victims' come from specific lineages, and are meant to be killed 
and eaten. The specific dances of glee in front of dead corpses are enacted. In 
fact, these men change status: they are incorporated within the victorious 
chiefly lineage, given a new wife and are forbidden to keep up any relations 
with their former people. Who knows if this is an adaptation to a failing 
demography? 
32 This was the theme of an unpublished lecture given by Douglas Oliver at 
the Societe des Oceanistes in Paris some years ago. His view then was that if 
one substracts from each local situation the spectacular aspects of the 
reigning culture - those in fact which do not stand up to change and 
Christianization after contact - the remaining village structure is 
fundamentally the same all over the South Pacific. 
33 See Guiart 1992:ch .  1 ,  the case of the Boreare chieftainship ,  and eh. 2, 
describing the Bayes chieftainship, in which they reorder their society so as 
to prevent further land grabbing by maintaining a constant mass of people 
locally at a time of depopulation through an organized influx of lineages 
thrown out of their lands by European settlement or military repression 
(1878). 
34 See Thomas 1989 . This slightly inconclusive academic exercise ,  the 
paper plus the discussion, is helpful because it illustrates the nascent idea of 
the opposition among the first navigators. But it misses the point of the way 
Cook's  and later explorations started from east to west, thus concentrating on 
Polynesian islands at the expense of Melanesian ones, which got a more 
superficial appraisal, and fails to recognize the political and ideological 
colonial use of the division. The discussion published shows a lack of 
clarity, the valid geographical division not being separated from the wrongly 
assumed cultural one. 
35 They are, in fact, all at the least bilingual through general intermarriage. 
36 The only difference between Polynesian and Melanesian chieftainships in 
Ouvea is that the Melanesian-speaking chief, than, can be beaten up by his 
councillors ,  hingat, if he misbehaves, whereas the Polynesian aliki cannot. 
37 In Takeji on the north of Ouvea. 
38 In the Isle of Pines; in the north of the Wetr district on Lifu (Hanawa); on 
Teuta in northern Ouvea; Houallou and Bourail, respectively on the east and 
west central coasts of New Caledonia; in Fila (I vira) and Erakor on the south 
coast of Efate; in Makura, Tongariki and Tongoa in the Shepherds Islands. 
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39 In Mare (Roh), Lifu (Ahmelewedr) and Ouvea (Muli) in the Loyalties; in 
Mele on the southern coast of Efate. 
40 In the villages of Qiqatrul and Hmelek in the Losi district of Lifu; in 
Takeji,  Heo and Muli at the north and south tips of Ouvea; in Hienghene, 
Koumac and Balade, on either side of northern New Caledonia; on Owa Riki 
at the south of the Solomon Islands . 
41 In Arama at the north-eastern tip of New Caledonia and Merelava in the 
Banks Islands. 
42 All inhabitants of Ouvea are bilingual, if not trilingual (with the addition 
of the Lifu language) , adding to their father's and mother's  language the 
knowledge of a language from the areas of New Caledonia proper with which 
they have traditional relations:  Canala, Kouaoua, Houallou, Hienghene, 
Pom�bo, Balade. 
43 There are any number of instances where the girl is the person making the 
decision about such a marriage, in itself an adventure and a factor of prestige. 
White men have profited for two centuries from such strong-headed young 
women acting as free agents, often first-born children claiming their 
birthright and bringing land to their husband. 
44 First in a meeting called by Margaret Mead at the Bishop Museum to 
listen to my proposed hypothesis. Later I was surprised to find the same idea 
advocated by Kenneth Emory, who was present at that meeting , without 
giving the source. Fortunately I had published it earlier in a resume form; see 
Guiart 1963. 
45 In New Guinea and in the Melanesian arc of islands, the next people are 
never further away than one or two days by foot or canoe. Between Eastern 
Melanesia and Fiji there would be more than a fortnight's journey by boat, 
with a lot of tacking, which means first waiting for the change of direction 
from the reigning trade winds, then, once arrived, redoing all sails and 
rigging with new coir rope before starting on the return journey. It is the 
difference between continuous contact and limited exposure, with return 
journeys happening only once every generation or only very occasionally, 
and even not at all, as the Pacific Islands navigators went island hopping 
towards the east. Such mechanical factors can be of foremost importance in 
shaping the evolution of social , economic and religious institutions. New 
Guinea and Melanesia benefited from constant relations between all their 
parts and had not even cut the link to Asia through Indonesia. This meant, 
amongst other factors, a greater capacity for technical change. The New 
Caledonian and Fijian double-hulled canoes were more sophisticated than the 
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Tahitian ones, and the techniques of multi-hulled canoe building of the East 
Papuans, who participated in the high-seas hiri voyages to the west coast of 
the Papuan Gulf, were technically more advanced. Faced with double canoes 
easily disintegrating in the violent waters of the Tasman Sea, the Maori had 
to invent a way of building much wider single-hulled canoes and from then 
on kept to coastal voyages. They still used double canoes at the time of 
Tasman' s voyage. 
46 Archives of the New Hebrides Joint Naval Commission papers . 
47 See Murray 1 874 where he describes Mare, Lifu, Ouvea, Aneityum, 
Tanna, Eromanga, Efate. 
48 See also Sahlins 1 963 .  Going through missionary literature and in 
particular the earlier material can be useful as it contains quite a lot of 
practical information about political units and their numbers, for instance, in 
Fiji .  In one case Mrs Hadfield , wife of the last British missionary in the 
Loyalty Islands, gave indications about the statistical level of chieftainships 
in Lifu. 
49 For instance, the idea that ranked societies are linked to residence on high 
volcanic islands is ridiculous (see Sahlins 1 958),  as any raised coral plateau 
in Melanesia can be home to ranked societies boasting hereditary 
chieftainships; that is, the Loyalty Islands and the Isle of Pines, Efate and the 
Big Nambas area of northern Malekula and, in Polynesia, Tongatapu and 
Makatea. The current notion that volcanic soil must be more fertile than 
others is erroneous. Recent volcanic soils, such as those found on the slopes 
overhanging the coastal plains in Polynesia, can be nearly devoid of fertile 
elements , whereas the soils on the raised coral plateaux will present the best 
physical and chemical characteristics in the region. Only the very low coral 
atolls of Kiribati and the Tuamotu have presented difficult problems of 
survival, although they too house a highly ranked and differentiated society, 
claiming to be of Samoan origin in south and central Kiribati. 
50 The ethnographic data given in this study could be used to demonstrate 
that the women, far from being subordinate to the men, are their equals in 
that the men can neither work nor programme their strategies without the 
acquiescence of women, who are accused of using an inordinate number of 
ways of despatching men with whom they do not agree. Godelier recognizes 
that the women know much more than they say about the men 's secrets . 
5 1 I call the 'system of solidarity' in New Caledonia, the Loyalty Islands and 
elsewhere in Melanesia, a system of place names spread out in space as well 
as local lineages linked together in such a way that any member, going from 
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one location to another inside the system, can claim food, shelter, a wife and 
access to land, in every place named in his genealogy or in the quasi­
genealogical lists of his ancestors' successive residences. 
52 This precise point has taken me some years to check. 
53 In July 1980 the Kowut Kasua intervened in the fighting between the pro­
independence and the pro-French camps. They were in favour of letting the 
independence ceremonies and transfer of responsibilities proceed, but later 
went over to the side which claimed a limited autonomy for Tanna, thus 
allowing the Vanua aku pati to lose the elections for the Island Council. To 
justify their stand of 1980, they called me in to drink kava and showed me 
the Numrukwen and Koyometa stones that they had only just dug out from 
the volcanic soil of the White Sands area after having learnt through a dream 
of the precise location of the lost stones. 
54 One reason for the inadequacy of the big-man concept in Tanna is that the 
leaders of the successive nekowiar are never the same. The location shifts 
from year to year around the island and the unstable confederation of lineages 
on either side is never the same. 
55 Tikopian canoes take three days sailing or paddling south-south-west to 
get to the rock of Vatganay, twenty-two miles north of Ureparapara, where 
they can pull their canoes ashore to sleep and find coconut, breadfruit trees 
and bananas in season. Then they veer south-south-east for two days and find 
themselves in the middle of the Banks Islands, eventually landing on the 
coast of Espiritu Santo. 
56 The use of such vegetable salt is a daily occurrence in the mountains of 
Espiritu Santo in Vanuatu. 
57 See the beautiful map of coastal exchange relations in Tiesler 1969- 1970. 
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SHAPING AND RESHAPING OF THE PACIFIC : 
THE PERPETUAL EUROPEAN INFLUENCE 
S tephen Polonhou Pokawin 
On the occasion of the First European Colloquium · on Pacific 
Studies, it is very appropriate to address the role of Europe in the 
Pacific. The Colloquium focuses on the theme 'Transformation 
and tradition in the South Pacific' .  The theme tells us in a very 
simple way that the Pacific or the South Pacific is no longer the 
same as it used to be. The new and the old ways have merged and 
given way to new Pacific communities. Yet these new communities 
are not replicas of the metropolitan powers which brought about or 
accelerated the process of transformation. Tradition prevails in the 
midst of transformation resulting in characteristically Pacific 
communities di stinct from other communities throughout the 
world. 
THE PACIFIC 
The Pacific conjures up numerous images : the vast body of 
ocean between Asia and the Americas; the dynamics of regions of 
the world bordering the Pacific in Asia and America commonly 
known as the Pacific Basin or the Pacific Rim;  the tiny atolls and 
the idyllic existence of the inhabitants as portrayed by popular 
European literature; the testing of military arsenals by the United 
States of America and France; the challenges of the emerging 
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Pacific Island states. In this paper the Pacific is  understood as 
comprising the islands in Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia, 
their inhabitants and their environment. 
In colonial history an image of the Pacific has emerged as being 
inhabited by Polynesians, Micronesians and Melanesians -
conceptual categorizations based on peculiarities of the inhabitants 
and their environment as perceived by Europeans. European 
linguistic scholarship further introduced Austronesian and non­
Austronesian or Papuan categories to di stinguish Pacific 
languages. These categories straddle social, cultural and political 
distinctions . We also have the South Pacific, South-West Pacific, 
Western Pacific and Oceania as popular geographical descriptions 
introduced by Europeans. 
European influence has impacted upon the Pacific in many 
ways. As the Pacific Island states find their own places in the 
international community amidst ongoing changes in the economic 
and political arrangements of the world and ever-increasing 
technological achievements , international forces continue to effect 
changes in all areas of life throughout the Pacific. 
Much has changed since Europe ventured into the Pacific some 
200 to 300 years ago. The isolation that characterized the Pacific 
has been overcome by technology. Relations amongst the Pacific 
Islanders themselves have changed. Relations between the Islanders 
and the Europeans continue but have taken a new twist. New actors 
other than Europeans have entered the scene. Yet amidst all these 
developments , Pacific traditions continue to hold the Islanders 
different and distinct from one another, from Europeans and from 
others. The Pacific is being reshaped and Europe, which had an 
earlier impact, continues to influence the process. 
As isolation disappears in the Pacific, opportunities increase, and 
changing values at the international level make the peculiar 
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characteristics of the Pacific attractive to international consumers 
of all forms. They find expression in varied means through which 
Europe lends a hand in reshaping the Pacific. The Pacific today 
attracts investors , governments , aid agencies , environmentalists , 
scholars , holiday-makers , missionaries, illicit agents and shady 
characters. 
The papers presented during the Colloquium cover a wide range 
of subjects in many societies in the Pacific. A careful analysis of 
the topics alone may open a window into the minds of the 
Europeans . How do they understand the Pacific? What areas of 
knowledge predominate research interests among the European 
scholars? How would this affect wider European understanding of 
the Pacific? What do the Pacific Islanders say about what the 
Europeans are doing and saying? What are the scholars 
promoting? What are they perpetuating? Are they agents of 
positive transformation or are they perpetuators of outdated and 
oppressive notions? 
Eurocentricism has been a major argument used by Third 
World scholars against the apparent lopsided use of concepts and 
theories to understand the non-European societies . It is argued that 
Europeans use scholarship towards maintaining their dominance. 
What they say, write and think about the Pacific is what and how 
they want the Pacific to be. Basically,  as is popularly understood, 
this Pacific is a figment of European imagination intent on control 
and domination. 
The Pacific societies have been a rich field for anthropological 
research . This area of interest predominated scholarship in the 
Pacific for many decades. The way people live attracted interest 
among scholars and continues to do so . The studies built up the 
world's knowledge of what the Pacific was and is. This Colloquium 
brings together a collection of such scholars . The Pacific peoples 
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and governments are also responding to such research. Some areas 
of research are encouraged whilst others are being discouraged. As 
the people of the Pacific come to realize the power of information 
in the transformation process, they now know that documentation 
of tradition is  not necessarily free from manipulation. In this 
climate, the attitude, quality and professionalism of European 
scholars and researchers can determine their future relations with 
the people of the Pacific. 
The Pacific as we know it today was shaped by the Europeans . 
Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, The Netherlands, France, Germany, 
at the height of their glory, collectively shaped the Pacific. The 
United States of America, Australia and New Zealand , with 
predominantly European credentials, followed. Canada is a recent 
player in the region. And the European Community (formerly the 
European Economic Community) is entering the scene in a new 
way. 
The Europeans entered the Pacific as adventurers and explorers, 
empire builders , traders , missionaries , scholars and colonizers . 
They came to own land and control the inhabitants . They 
introduced thei r  brand of commerce, order, government, 
education, belief and life .  They created new political groupings out 
of numerous,  previously disparate groups . 
The Pacific changed hands throughout history.  The changing 
history of Europe determined the fate of the Pacific Islands. 
Today, the Pacific Islands are either independent, self-governing or 
remain the territory of a colonial power, in one form or another. 
Except for the French terri tories of French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia, al l maj or Pacific Isl and comm unities are either 
independent or have achieved a certain degree of self-government. 
West Irian has been incorporated into Indonesia. Thi s  political fact 
has a very interesting hi story that attests to European influence. 
STEPHEN POLONHOU POKA WIN 1 57 
Indonesia is  a country consisting of an Asian majority and a 
Melanesian minority. The country is shaped today as it was shaped 
by Europe in the past. The politics of self-determination for 
Melanesians in Indonesia spearheaded by the Free Papua 
Movement has effectively been ignored by international protocol 
and sensibilities . What was previously the Dutch East Indies 
became Indonesi a. The only factor which has influenced the 
redrawing of political boundaries set by Europe has been great 
distances separating inhabited islands. Thus, the Gilbert and Ellis 
Islands became the separate island states of Kiribati and Tuvalu 
while Micronesia became the Federated States of Micronesia ,  
Republic of B elau, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Otherwise, as a 
rule, the Pacific as it was divided by the metropolitan powers, which 
were predominantly European, has been maintained. 
To provide an in-depth look into European influences in 
shaping and reshaping the Pacific, I shall use the experience of 
Papua New Guinea, with which I am familiar. I note with interest 
that a substantial number of presentations in the Colloquium are 
based on studies undertaken or being undertaken in Papua New 
Guinea. 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Papua New Guinea is popularly known as the land of a 
thousand tribes. The island of New Guinea singly reflects the entire 
European experience in the Pacific. It was the most challenging 
and could be regarded as an example of the 'success story' of 
colonialism. The harshness of the geography and the inhospitable 
environment accounted for many human lives. Yet the process of 
bringing the island under European control did not waver. 
The Dutch, Germans and British divided the island into three 
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parts to become known as Dutch New Guinea, British New Guinea 
and German New Guinea. The changing fortunes of Europe saw 
the former B ritish colony of Australia taking over British New 
Guinea, which was then renamed Papua, and the Germans 
relinquishing New Guinea to the Australians through the League 
of Nations . And many years later, Dutch New Guinea was taken 
over by Indonesia to become West Irian. The decision by the 
European giants at that time to divide the island among themselves 
laid the foundation for the future of the island and its inhabitants. 
The colonial administrative process moulded the thousand tribes 
into three units . Over time the three units have become two 
political entities :  the independent state of Papua New Guinea; and 
Irian Jaya, a province of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Numerous anthropological , sociological and linguistic studies 
done over the past sixty-odd years have testified to the diverse 
nature of the societies in Papua New Guinea. Archaeological 
discoveries are uncovering amazing evidence of long-term human 
habitation. The hundreds of tribes were nations for all practical 
purposes. They had their own territories , languages ,  systems of 
'government' and had either friendly or adverse relations with 
surrounding tribes .  They saw themselves as different from others . 
They had their own identities . European colonial enterpri se was 
able to mould these small 'nations' into the largest nation state in 
the South Pacific. Introduction of English, Tok Pisin and Motu 
languages has progressively broken down the communication 
problem and brought about a sense of greater common identity . 
Advances in education, the road system , administration, technology 
and incre ased parti c ipati on in the modern economy have 
strengthened the process of promoting the cause for a single Papua 
New Guinea. There have existed rumblings of separation but so far 
'Project Papua New Guinea' has prevailed. With about four million 
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people and abundant natural resources, Papua New Guinea has 
emerged as the single most dynamic island state in the Pacific. An 
amazing transformation of one thousand tribes into one nation. 
Today in many parts of the country there are still people who 
were present when the Europeans first made contact with their 
tribes. There are also people whose encounter with the impact of 
government has only intensified since the country became 
independent seventeen years ago. Today there are still many 
villages which have no schools or basic health services . Illiteracy 
among all age-groups rem ains a major challenge for the 
government, and malaria and pneumonia are among major causes 
of death. 
About 80 per cent of the population live in villages. This will 
remain so even though urban drift is  increasing. Of the four 
million people one would have thought that a major relocation of 
the people by the government into a few development centres 
would have eradicated most of the basic problems that plague the 
country today. But village people have attachments to the land and 
the environment which they will continue to hold for a long time 
in the future. This is a clear illustration of the past and the present 
coexisting. People in villages maintain the age-old form of 
subsistence livelihood and live in grass huts and mourn their dead 
for days . At the same time their children go to universities, fly in 
jets, use telephones, listen to radio, watch television, learn about the 
recent advances in the sciences , hear of international efforts to 
bring food to the starving Somalians as it happens. Within a 
lifetime, advances in technology, education and commerce have 
penetrated and are influencing the perception of the people of 
Papua New Guinea from all walks of life. 
The European missionaries were among the first foreigners to 
settle and work among the people. They remain with them . They 
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now have Papua New Guineans working and living side by side 
with them . The Christian religion has spread right across the 
country. There are as many brands of Christian churches in Papua 
New Guinea as there are in Europe , if not more.  Conflicts , 
disagreements about interpretations and historical feuds between 
European churches find their way into Papua New Guinea's 
Christianity also . The inner man is being shaped and reshaped by 
the influences of Europe. Technological advancement is making 
that influence more effective. Today you do not have to be there 
on location to be in control of affairs. 
Apart from earlier sightings of parts of Papua New Guinea by 
the Spanish and Portuguese, three countries of European origin 
particularly have influenced Papua New Guinea's development 
from colonized terri tories into an i sl and state . These were 
Germany, Great B ritain and Australia. Great B ritain and Germany 
put in place the basic administrative structures that set British New 
Guinea and German New Guinea into motion. By the end of World 
War I, both territories had become the responsibility of Australia. 
Papua was administered as a protected territory of Australia whilst 
former German New Guinea was administered by Australia on 
behalf of the newly established League of Nations. 
Australia has had a greater impact on the transformation of 
Papua New Guinea than any other country. European influence 
remained particularly strong through the work of the churches. 
European missionaries established and promoted the Catholic, 
Lutheran, Methodist and Anglican churches .  Smaller groups like 
the London Missionary Society, South Seas Evangelical Missions 
and Swiss Missions also prospered. They were actively involved in 
propagating the Christian faith,  teaching in schools,  working in 
hospitals, running businesses and passing on numerous skills to the 
people.  
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Where a m1ss10nary was, the people of  the area associated 
themselves with the missionary and his country of origin. The 
missionaries ventured into very remote parts of the country. They 
lived in the villages. Many spoke the languages and learned about 
the cultures ,  which they either appreciated or detested. The 
missionary's own way of life left lasting impressions in the minds 
and lives of the people among whom the missionary lived and 
worked. In most cases, the villages where the missionaries lived, or 
those near the mission station, absorbed the values of the mission 
earlier than places further away. Some of the villagers became 
involved in advancing the work of the missions to other villages. 
Some travelled beyond the boundaries of their traditional 
territories to receive further instructions and acquire wider 
experiences.  In the process, they contributed to bringing other 
parts of the country under the control of the administration. The 
impact of the missions and missionaries was not only institutional 
but also personal; it was not only confined to the advancement of 
Christianity but it also transformed the many tribes into one people 
subjected to an authority alien to their own, the authority of the 
government. 
On 1 6  September 1975,  Australia's flag was lowered and the 
new Papua New Guinea flag slowly rose to its heights on 
Independence Hill in Port Moresby to symbolize the country's 
emergence from its colonial status into an independent state. In the 
minds of the leaders and the people , foreign control then ceased 
and the country was expected to be run by the people of Papua 
New Guinea. A large portion of the population was somewhat 
apprehensive. They were concerned that there were not enough 
trained personnel to carry on what the foreign nationals had been 
doing. In fact, many foreign workers had returned to their 
respective countries , either in good faith or in anticipation of 
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bloodshed when the country became independent. Many of these 
people returned soon after to work with the government or private 
companies ,  or they became consultants ,  often attached to 
international aid agencies, or they came to promote the products of 
the companies with which they were associated. It is now very 
obvious that, with independence, nationals increased their role in 
the affairs of the country, but foreign influence and control instead 
of decreasing, prospered. The desire by the national leadership to 
strengthen the economic base of the country, to improve the 
quantity and quality of services to the people,  to attract 
international assistance in performing its role nationally and 
asserting its role in the international scene, to train the workforce 
and to benefit from the latest technological advances, only 
increased the intensity of international influence on the affairs of 
the country. 
Where does Europe enter here? I suggest that the demise of The 
Netherlands, Great B ritain and Germany from the Pacific and 
Papua New Guinea never ended the role of these countries in 
influencing what happened there . Their strategies changed and 
their continuing presence received less prominence and acquired 
greater political acceptance. They became providers of needed 
basic services that were considered essential to the livelihood of the 
country. They ceased to be colonizers . As Papua New Guinea goes 
through even greater transformations,  these levels of involvement 
in the country's affairs will come under the spotlight of critical 
scrutiny and judgement. It is obvious,  however, that Europe had 
not really left the shores of Papua New Guinea and for that matter, 
the Pacific. 
When Europe was in Papua New Guinea up to the 1920s, they 
were dealing with tribal people whose entire world view was centred 
around their age-old traditions . Prevailing knowledge and 
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experience available at that time enabled Europe to achieve the 
aims  of  bringing the people under the control of  the 
administration; making them live harmoniously with each other; 
extracting raw materials needed by the European booming 
industries ;  establishing commerce ; and making Christians out of 
the pagans. 
After independence, the tribal people became the citizens of a 
new state. Their world view had broadened to include the world 
beyond their  wildest imagination. They were increasingly 
mastering the art of creating, developing and managing a modem 
social ,  economic, legal and political system. A system that was 
integrated into the wider world. Now, the Europeans must deal with 
people who have absorbed the values of government, business and 
social order inherited from Europe but specifically shaped by the 
new environment and traditions peculiar to Papua New Guinea. 
Europeans thus need different approaches to achieve the same 
aims that brought them into Papua New Guinea in  the first place . 
In fact, European influence on Papua New Guinea is much greater 
today than it has ever been in the past. This is being accelerated by 
Papua New Guinea's absorption into, and greater involvement with, 
the international system. 
ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN INFLUENCE 
From the vantage point of Papua New Guinea's experience I 
shall briefly discuss five areas in which the perpetuating influence 
of Europe continues to shape and reshape the Pacific. These are 
aid given to Papua New Guinea by individual European countries; 
expansion of commercial activities;  the two-headed scholastic 
endeavour involving Papua New Guineans receiving training in 
Europe and European scholars researching and teaching in Papua 
New Guinea; joint assi stance to Papua New Guinea by the 
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Europeans through the European Community; and the influence 
of the changes current! y taking place in Europe. 
The generation of Papua New Guineans that took the country to 
independence are now the seniors in the government. Many of 
them have left the public service and are now in the private sector. 
They are either being replaced or joined by generations whose 
preoccupation is not political independence but how Papua New 
Guinea can make use of its natural resources and the opportunities 
available in the international system to increase its capacity to 
function as an effective member of the international community. 
Aid by Individual European Countries 
Many European countries have bilateral relations with Papua 
New Guinea. Great Britain, Germany and France lead the way. Aid 
ranges from providing volunteers to serve in Papua New Guinea, to 
purchasing primary produce and supplying scholarships to 
educate and train Papua New Guineans . This is being done to 
promote better relations between the countries involved and at the 
same time help build up the capacity of Papua New Guinea at both 
the national and international levels. 
The establishment of foreign embassies and high commissions 
in Papua New Guinea has helped to increase the presence of 
those European countries concerned . These offices assist 
communications to and from the metropoli tan countries. Beyond 
the large-scale aid projects , smaller projects often receive funding 
from these foreign offices. Aid has been given in the form of 
needed school material s, educational v isi ts by key officials and 
money for construction projects . 
During most of the years after independence a l arge proportion 
of Papua New Guinea's annual budget was financed by Australian 
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aid.  This has changed to a policy tying foreign aid to specific 
projects. Countries other than Australia have also contributed to 
funding projects through the government system. At the same 
time, non-government agencies have contributed significantly to 
facilitating major programmes. The Hanns Seidel Foundation of 
Germany and the British Volunteer Service Overseas are two such 
examples .  
Who benefits from such aid? This is a question that has attracted 
much interest in the past. There are basically two responses. Firstly, 
that the recipient benefits from the aid by the positive outcome of 
the aid. And secondly, that the real beneficiary of aid is the donor 
country. The return that the donor receives is argued to outweigh 
the benefits to the recipient. Both arguments are applicable in the 
case of Papua New Guinea. Gennany is a major importer of Papua 
New Guinea's raw materials , including copper. An announcement 
by the Papua New Guinea Government in 1 990 to purchase 
military vessels from South Korea led to representations by 
German officials to the Papua New Guinea Government. For this 
and other reasons the project was shelved and to date the plans to 
strengthen the capabilities of the maritime element of the Papua 
New Guinea Defence Force to provide effective surveillance of the 
country's waters remain unrealized. 
Expansion of Commercial Activities 
In spite of great distances between Europe and Papua New 
Guinea, European countries have active commercial interests in the 
country . European companies, including Shell , San Miquel 
Brewery and Commonwealth Development Corporation, have 
established long and successful operations here.  They employ 
national staff and train them to run the affairs of the companies. 
European countries also buy Papua New Guinea's copper, copra, 
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coffee and other raw materials .  They also export manufactured 
goods to Papua New Guinea. 
Improved technology increases the capacity of European 
companies to m aintain an active interest in the country without 
being physically present. Papua New Guinea's desire to break her 
dependence on Australia promotes closer relations with other 
countries. Major efforts have been made recently ,  including a 
spectacular participation at World Expo 1 992 in S eville and 
various trade fairs in London and Brussels. As Papua New Guinea 
vigorously focuses on mining and petroleum , Europe will 
inevitably respond in order to benefit from the opportunities. 
Scholastic Endeavour 
Europe's long history of scholarship constitutes the powerhouse 
of human progress. The ability of the human race to learn more 
about itself and its envi ronment gi ves those with advanced 
knowledge the edge over those who lack such knowledge . The 
European expansion into other parts of the world w as 
accompanied and driven by knowledge that prevailed at that time. 
New experiences and findings refined existing knowledge and 
propelled the search for new knowledge. 
Much has been written by scholars , scientists and administrators 
about Papua New Guinea. Travellers have also documented their 
impressions and experiences. Many who have not travelled have 
read these works and have formed opinions , acqui red 
understanding and made decisions that affect the country . 
Information about Papua New Guinea, including academic 
analysis, is still being predominantly produced by non-Papua New 
Guinean writers . And European academic and research institutions 
contribute a great deal to Europe's success in this area. Those 
present at this Colloquium are testimony to this.  The fact that this 
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Colloquium is organized to bring scholars together to share 
information about a part of the world which may have no 
immediate concern to the general European public is evidence of 
the importance of research. 
Since scholarly work influences peoples' opinions and views , its 
role is very important. The driving force behind research, 
particularly in the social sciences, is becoming more and more 
subject to scrutiny. Basically, the information can be used to effect 
positive transformation as well as to deny those affected the 
benefits of decisions made by those who matter. 
Information made available by academic researchers is used by 
others in schools and universities to expound theories and learn 
about Papua New Guinea. Even Papua New Guineans themselves 
are learning about themselves through the eyes of others, including 
the Europeans . Today, abundant information about Papua New 
Guinea is stored outside of the country. 
An important form of international aid is the granting of 
scholarships by European countries for Papua New Guineans to 
study in educational institutions in Europe. Those selected have 
been few but their numbers are increasing and on completion they 
play significant roles in decision making and policy development. 
Special programmes have been designed in universities and 
colleges to address particular needs identified in countries like 
Papua New Guinea. And courses ranging from a few weeks to 
several years attract Papua New Guineans suppo rted by 
scholarships. These scholarship holders have also become the 
catalysts for refining the programmes and the concepts behind the 
programmes. Two things result from this :  Europe continues to 
influence Papua New Guineans by training them in the tools that 
they will use on their return; and, secondly, these nationals become 
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ambassadors of the school of thought and work to transform the 
country from within. 
The European Community 
Europe today is heavily involved in transforming Papua New 
Guinea through the European Community and its agencies .  
Experts on the economy, finance, and project development are 
actually located in key positions in Papua New Guinea in order to 
implement programmes and to facili tate changes in the 
institutional system to meet the requirements of the development 
programmes. The European Community, through its agencies, is 
involved in funding development through the national budget. In 
addition, it directly funds major national projects through the 
Office of International Development Agency, and also village­
based projects that substantially affect the lives of the people. 
The European Community is also directly, as well as indirectly, 
involved in facilitating the restructuring of the way Papua New 
Guinea organizes itself to bring about development. As a result of 
the conditions attached to the kinds of assistance they provide, 
Papua New Guinea must make changes or the programmes will not 
be available. Through the ACP-EECl agreements a lot of changes 
have taken place and will continue to take place in the basic 
institutions of Papua New Guinea. Through the World Bank, 
Europe also indirectly contributes to controlling and influencing 
the affairs of Papua New Guinea from New York, London and 
Brussels. 
Much consultancy work is also carried out by European experts 
in Papua New Guinea under the European Community 
programme. These experts decide on the fate of development in 
Papua New Guinea after spending a few weeks to a few months 
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assessing the environment for the planned programme and making 
reports to both the government of Papua New Guinea and the 
agency responsible. 
The European Community supports the economy of Papua New 
Guinea through trade agreements which guarantee purchases of 
raw materials , through funding to subsidize ailing industries and 
through the provision of markets for Papua New Guinea's produce. 
The Community also collectively provides scholarships for study 
in Europe. The programme guarantees Europe' s perpetual 
influence in transforming Papua New Guinea. It ensures physical 
changes to the communities as well as institutional and structural 
changes in the country, and it trains the people to absorb the 
accompanying values for long-term effect. 
Changes in Europe 
With improved technology Papua New Guineans are watching 
the changes that are going on in Europe now. The dismantling of 
Communism in Eastern Europe; the disintegration of countries like 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union; and the efforts by the European 
Community to come together in order to become stronger, are 
sending important messages worldwide. Television, radio and 
newsprint are transmitting the changes as they happen. Knowledge 
of history shows that Europe may be repeating the past when there 
existed a greater Europe in a diff ercnt context. 
The ideological war that separated Western Europe from Eastern 
Europe has disappeared. The two Germanies have · once again 
united, the Soviet Union has given rise to new countries, Yugoslavia 
has disintegrated and democracy and the free market economy are 
spreading across Europe; borders separating the countries are 
being relaxed. At the same time the influx of foreign nationals into 
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Europe is causing a resurgence of racial disharmony that at one 
stage ignited massive destruction of human lives in Europe. 
Due to the central influence that Europe has on Papua New 
Guinea and the Pacific in general, what happens in Europe will 
inevitably affect the affairs of the country and the region. 
TRANSFORMATION AND TRADITION 
Europe has had a major part to play in bringing about 
wholesale changes in Papua New Guinea and the Pacific. The 
changes have not only been m aterial but also spiritual and 
structural. Peoples' ways of life are changing. The rate of change is 
dependent on the degree of exposure to agents of change. Those 
with higher levels of education, in positions of authority and 
decision m aking, in better paid jobs and living in urban areas 
experience greater changes than those who live in very remote 
villages with no easy access to the outside world. Many fall in 
between and are grappling with how to make ends meet in the 
rapidly changing society. 
The m assive transformation, however, has not successfully 
diminished the role of traditions in the lives of Papua New 
Guineans . In spite of how modernized a person or  a community 
has become, the basic traditional pattern of behaviour prevails. A 
successful businessman versed in the principles of the modem 
economy must still adhere to meeting his responsibilities to the 
family and the community. The prime minister of the modem 
government must attend to traditional obligations in matters of the 
family and the community. 
Old traditions have also given way to new ones. Bride-price, for 
example, is developing new characteristics. As marriages occur 
between different tribes whose practices are different, elements of 
both are combined whilst other elements are set aside. Attitudes 
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towards land and sea are changing as the resources become more 
and more commercialized. This is striking at the heart of Papua 
New Guinea's society. Money has transformed communal assets 
into a struggle for the benefits. Thus communal land falls prey to 
di sputes about ownership, and forestry and mining divide the 
families and tum them into adversaries. 
What are these changes doing to Papua New Guinea? To answer 
this  question is to bring up the old issue of development. Who 
benefits from all these changes? Are these changes instruments of 
development that benefit all people or are they instruments of 
oppression and exploitation of the majority by a few on the basis 
of foreign principles? I shall conclude this paper by offering some 
thoughts on the question of whether or not Europe's perpetual 
influence in the shaping and reshaping of the Pacific has been 
beneficial to the Pacific Islanders .  How are the Pacific people 
responding to the process of development amidst these changes? 
Donor Versus Recipient Syndrome 
Due to the smallness of most of the Pacific Island states, their 
livelihood depends largely on assistance from other countries. 
Their own ability to sustain themselves is weak due to their small 
resource bases. To follow the strategy of development propounded 
by the metropolitan powers, they must forever rely on the donor 
countries. The history of the Pacific's exposure to the international 
market place has been one of it being a recipient of the 
metropolitan powers '  ideas, knowledge, funds and manpower. 
Major Pacific Island countries like Papua New Guinea and Fiji and 
resource-rich islands like Nauru arc trying to change the equation. 
However, the donor-recipient syndrome is not only limited to 
whether the island state is  economically strong. The total spectrum 
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of development is involved. The full impact of European influence 
is such that it is difficult to break away from being at the receiving 
end all the time. 
Workers Versus Owner Syndrome 
The incorporation of the Pacific into the international system 
has turned the Islanders into workers . This involvement in the 
modem sector requires them to work for the government, private 
sector or the churches. They work as unskilled, semi-skilled and 
skilled workers. Different categories of skills correspond to 
different levels of renumeration. 
All large businesses in the Pacific are owned and controlled by 
foreign companies. Whether it be in cash-crop plantations or 
fisheries or mining or forestry, the principle investor is not an 
original Pacific Islander. In an attempt to change this situation, 
governments have ventured into commercial investments. Statutory 
organizations have been set up to regulate investments and even 
invest in successful businesses with the aim of promoting national 
ownership. 
With the changing patterns of investment, the ownership of 
business has also changed. Plantations which were originally 
owned by foreigners have now virtu ally been taken over by 
nationals and national companies .  At the sam e  time , the 
commerci al tree crops are experiencing a serious downturn in 
prices .  Foreign investment, on the other hand , is moving into 
mining which requires high levels of in i tial capital outlay while 
providing a potentially high return. In Papua New Guinea the 
traditional significance of land consti tutes a complicating factor in 
ownership issues and the distribution of benefits from minerals, 
petroleum and forestry. 
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As a norm the Pacific Islanders are workers for businesses which 
are owned and controlled by foreigners or foreign companies. 
Dependent, Independent and Interdependent Syndrome 
The international system is founded on the principle of 
interdependence. The smaller systems or members influence and 
are influenced by each other resulting in an international system in 
which the smaller systems do not necessarily have any control. The 
transformation process in the Pacific has turned most of the island 
states into dependent communities . They are too insignificant to 
make any impact on the international system. Their extremely 
dependent situation reduces their effectiveness and thus practically 
excludes them from meaningful interdependent relationships with 
other countries. 
The notion of political independence only means that the island 
states have an elected government that oversees their affairs.  For all 
practical purposes, apart from the larger Melanesian island states , 
the Pacific environment has created a new category of nation states 
out of the Pacific Islands. International law and practice demands 
that they become self-governing or independent. They are 
absorbed into the international economic system in which they 
cannot effectively participate due to limited capabilities. They must 
develop a new relationship with the metropolitan powers and the 
international system to sustain a Ii velihood. 
Owner-Worker-New Owner Syndrome 
Generally, land in the Pacific is owned communally by the 
original Pacific Islanders . This was so until land alienation was 
effected with the expansion of European rule in the Pacific. Land 
was alienated to build towns , establish plantations and build 
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mission stations . Other seivices followed. The owners of the land 
became workers . They were owners before European rule, workers 
during European rule and are struggling to become owners again 
after European rule. 
The extent of land alienation depends in part on the size of the 
island. In the majority of small atolls, land alienation was extensive 
when the colonial powers decided that they would settle there or 
engage in business activities there. Where the i sland was sizeable, 
land alienation was less extensive even though, when it did take 
place, the original land owners lost either all their land or a 
substantial portion of their land. 
After independence, when political power returned to the people 
and they came to be more involved in the money economy, 
alienated land became a subject of contention. This has worsened 
as people from other parts of the country acquire land from the 
state and engage in gainful enterprises whilst the original 
landowners are virtually left on the side as onlookers. This has 
given rise to demands for compensation. In some cases, land has 
been returned to the landowners. 
This experience has resulted in a new move by the landowners 
to benefit more from the development of resources on their land. 
In Papua New Guinea, development in the mining, petroleum and 
forestry sectors raises the need for a new approach that must 
effectively take account of the interests of landowners . This 
approach has to critically review the introduced law that says what 
exists under the ground and in the sea belongs to the state. Where 
land needs to be developed in a post-independence period, the 
landowners do not only want to be benefici aries  of the 
development but also owners of the means of development. 
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CONCLUSION 
The nature of the Pacific Islands offers a challenge to 
innovation and creativity. The people have been absorbed into the 
competitive and advanced world system. They have not and will 
not move away from their traditions and acquire new ways of life 
that are devoid of their kastam. The new Pacific is of cosmopolitan 
character, combining the Pacific Islanders' own traditions and the 
influence of the world at large. 
It is easy for the Pacific to accept the changes being imposed 
from outside and follow the well-trodden path of development. 
Such an approach would only deepen their ali enation from 
themselves and from the rest of the world. The hope of the Pacific 
Islanders is to become more innovative and industrious in fully 
appreciating the positive value of what the Pacific offers them and 
to follow the path of development that fits their situation. 
With a very limited economic base, the strategy for development 
that requires exploitation of natural resources to generate capital, 
which would in tum drive the wheels of change, is unsuitable. 
Pacific Islanders need to make use of what is available within their 
means to develop themselves. Development must be refocused 
away from capital and profit into human development compatible 
with the environment. Thus, in a remote resource-scarce atoll , 
development is not Amsterdam, London and New York, but it is 
improvement and sustenance of a dynamic island life .  
NOTE 
1 The ACP-EEC Convention of Lome was set up to foster co-operation 
between countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) and the 
European (Economic) Community. 
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